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SUMMARY
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SHORT AND LONG TERM MEMORY
The thesis examines the empirical evidence claimed to support
a distinction between short and long term memory. It also examines
the logical status of such a dichotomous theory of memory. It is
concluded that no evidence has yet been put forward which compels
an interpretation of the data in terms of a dichotomous theory of
memory. It is also considered that there are grave difficulties
in ever establishing such a dichotomous theory on the basis of
psychological evidence, If a dichotomous theory is, as the writer
suggests, unproved, then the more parsimonious explanation of the
data in terms of a single memory system, must be adopted.
The thesis commences with an examination of evidence claimed
to support a dichotomous theory (ch.2) and considers the views of
some writers who oppose a dichotomous theory interpretation (ch.3)»
The following chapter (ch.4) is concerned with the problem of
establishing a dichotomous theory on the basis of the psychological
evidence. It is noted that all the lines of evidence claimed to
support a dichotomous theory depend on the assumption that rapid
and less rapid forgetting have different underlying causes. Chapter
5 continues with an examination of theoretical problems, in parti¬
cular the relationship between a recognition and recall. It is
concluded that the empirical evidence does not require a dichotomy
between recognition and recall in addition to a possible distinction
between short and long term memory.
(v)
Chapter 6 is concerned with the nature of forgetting. It is
concluded that no evidence unequivocally supports a trace decay or
interference theory, or indeed any other theory of forgetting, over
either the short er the long term. As long as this is the case it
is concluded that a distinction between short and long term memory
is unprovable.
The following chapters, 7» 8, 9» 10, and 11 deal with further
empirical evidence claimed to support a dichotomy of memory systems.
Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the limited capacity to retrieve newly
presented material, and it is concluded that such evidence can be
explained in single system terms. Chapter 9 deals with the claim
that acoustic coding is confined to short term memory and semantic
coding to long term memory. Empirical evidence is put forward to
dispute this claim.
Chapter 10 deals with claims that the differential reactivity
of the serial position curve to such variables as repetition,
indicates a dichotomy of underlying memory systems. It is concluded
that 3uch claims cannot be substantiated in view of findings which
show that conclusions based on serial position curve studies have
no generality.
Chapter 11 considers the physiological evidence and questions
its relevance to the controversy both on the grounds of the equivocal
nature of the evidence and because it is not clear that physiological
insult can inform normal memory functioning.
Chapter 12 reviews the positions outlined in chapter 2 in the
light of considerations in the course of the thesis. No dichotomous
theory appears adequate to handle the problems raised in the course
of the thesis.
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ABBREVIATIQNS USED III THIS THESIS
VSTM = Very short term memory
STM = Short term memory
STS « Short term store
STMS = Short term memory store
LTM = Long term memory
LTS a Long term store
LTMS = Long term memory stofe
LCH = Limited capacity hypothesis
ECS = Electric convulsive shock
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is basically concerned with an analysis of
differences between memory over the short and the long term. It is
hoped that such an analysis will reveal that current accounts of the
nature of memory, in terms of two dichotomous systems, one of short
duration and labile nature, the other of long duration and stable
nature, are not only unproved, but also probably unprovable. This
being the case parsimony demands that the most economical explanation
of the phenomena under examination - a single system theory explanation,
be adopted. In other words, the thesis aims at showing that no
evidence has yet been produced which establishes a dichotomous theory
of memory, in which information enters a short term memory system
prior to transfer to long term memory or to forgetting, furthermore
the aim is to show that it is unlikely that evidence can be produced
which will establish such a theory.
almost the first impression gained by someone entering the field
of memory is the extent to which disagreement reigns on the most
fundamental of issues. The domain of short term memory itself varies
as each item of experimental evidence in support of a dichotomy arises,
and estimates of its duration of 1 - 10 seconds, (Y/ickelgren 1969a),
15 - 30 seconds, (Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968), of one or two minutes
to one hour (Broadbent 1967), or even as defying analysis in terms
of time (MoGaugh, 1967) have been made. Even one of the major
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opponents of a diehotomous theory, Melton 19&7 a) unsure whether
the terra "short terra memory" can be applied to the first 15 seconds
after infoxraation has been taken in, and reserves the term "short term
memory" to phenomena occurring after this period of time. Earlier
phenomena are claimed to occur in "very short term memory" (VSTM).
Elsewhere Melton (19&3) distinguishes between pre- and post- categori¬
sation forgetting. The present writer takes a considerably more
radical view than i elton in claiming to show that information onoe
cateaorised cannot be shown to be entered into a short term memory
ay3ter. before transfer to long term iwmoiy. This categorisation is
almost instantaneous and almost certainly occurs within a second of
presentation of any information, not the 15 seconds that Melton is
willing to allow. This claim is made on the basis of information being
classifiable as meaningful within such short time intervals (e.g. the
understanding of words that are read) and thus post-categorised.
The present thesis is, as far as the writer is aware, only the
third major attempt to analyse critically a dichotomou3 theory of
memory* This is not, of course, to claim that only Melton (19^3)
and Postman (19&4) and "the present author have questioned the theory.
Brown (1953), Keppel and Under-wood (19&2), and many others have
opposed a dichotomous theory and many more have expressed doubt3.
Nevertheless, Melton's paper (19&3) an^ that of Postman (1964) are the
only major papers systematically attacking a diohotomous theory and the
present thesis is, as far as the writer is aware, the ohly systematic
attempt to attack the theory taking developments since 19&4 into
account.
The plan of the theaia^is as follows. The next chapter will
outline briefly the theoretical positions of the main workers in this
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field, tracing the development of a dichotomoua theory from Hebb (1949)
through to contemporary workers such as Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968),
Waugh and Norman (1965) and Glanzer et al (1969). Chapter 3 considers
papers critical of dichotomous theories e.g. Melton (1963)
Postman (1964) and others. Chapter 4 will concern itself with some of
the critical theoretical issues which must be considered before under¬
standing of the problem can take place. In particular a consideration
of the criterion by which it is decided that material is in one system
rather than another is analysed, as is a consideration of the evidence
which would be necessary to establish a dichotomous theory.
Chapter 5 also concerns itself with another important theoretical issue,
the relationship of recognition to recall. Chapters 6, to 12 are
concerned with the empirical evidence for a dichotomous theory of
memory. Chapter £ will analyse the evidence for a dichotomy on the
basis of different causes of forgetting as between SIM and LTM.
Chapter 7 will show that a dichotomous theory cannot be established on
the basis of the limited capacity to recall recently presented informa¬
tion; Chapter 8 will show that the experimental evidence produced by
the writer is not easily accounted for in terms of the limited storage
capacity hypothesis. Chapter 9 concerns itself with the evidence for
different interference effects in the two purported systems.
Chapter 10 looks at the evidence for a dichotomy between 2TM and LTM
on the basis of variations in the serial position curve as a result of
experimental manipulation. Chapter 11 reviews the literature on
amnesia relevant to the present controversy. Chapter 12 re-examines
the theoretical positions outlined in Chapter 2 in the light of the
empirical and logical considerations presented subsequently. Finally
chapter 13 summarises briefly the mein points which hare arisen in
the course of the thesis.
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P.HnlTKR ?
■TOKOHCTTf.M vc,T*nrt KTTnws nw a nTfiwvwworn mHi.'nw nv yr,«nW|
AMn TOK siTPPORTTOi fvt nmr.F.
This chapter will look at the main theoretical foxwulations of a
dichotomous theory of memory, and at the evidence which is used to
support such theoretical frameworks. Dichotomous theories will be
taken to be those theories which postulate two or more temporally
separate memory systems, a short term memory system, lasting at most two
to three minutes, and a long tern memory, lasting from two to three
seconds to years?'' As Melton (1963) however, ppinted out, up till 19&3
no publication had systematically considered the contrasting chafcacterfa-
tics of STM and LTM, and perhaps only the paper of Murdook (1967), and
to a lesser extent the book on "Human Memory" by Adams (19&7) oan be
said to have rectified the position. .Perhaps the failure to consider a
dichotomoua position systematically up till the time of Melton's
writing, i3 related to the relative lack of interest until recently,
in this particular aspect of memory.
Thus whilst the postulation of at least two separate memory
systems is not new in the history of psychology, James having suggested
this as long ago as 1890, little real interest was taken in the problem
until fairly recently. Perhaps a re-awakening of interest in the
problem can be attributed to Hebb (1949)* In his now classic book
Footnote. The time overlap takes account of theories which postulate
the simultaneous existence of short and long term memory.
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" organisation of Behaviour", Hebb suggested that the rapid decay of
items from immediate memory is due to their physiological representation
being in the form of an activity trace, with a rapid trace decay rate,
rather than in the form of any structural change in the physiology of
the brain, which is presumed to underly the storage of material which
has not been forgotten over longer periods*
Hebb in fact, does not appear to have much to say about the
psychological evidence which would lead one to seek neurophysiological
explanations of memory in terms of two memory systems. He does, however,
point to transient memories and at the same time points to the need for
long tern structural memory. Hebb's main emphasis, however, was on the
physiological possibilities of a dual trace system. In addition to
Hebb, therefore, the theoretical positions of the following writers
will be considered briefly in turn* Broadbent, Bower, Peterson,
Glanzer, .augh and Norman, Norman, .iekelgren, Weiskreaatz, Adams,
Atkinson and Shiffrin, and Tulving.
Broadbent'a theory
With Broadbent (1958, (1963), a dichotomous theory is somewhat
more explicitly stated in psychological terms. Broadbent (19&3) roakes
a clear differentiation between pre- and post-categorisation memory
(the former being more eonanonly referred to nov/ as very short term
memory (e.g. Wickelgren 1969a). It is this post-categorisation 3hort
term memory which Broadbent also regards as being subject to autonomous
trace decay which clearly marks him as a dichotomous theorist, and
indeed he regards the function of the paper as,in part, summarising the
evidence for a dichotomous theory, i.e. evidence which distinguishes
short from long term memory. Whilst the evidence which Broadbent uses
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will be outlined presently, it i3 important to establish at once the
relationship between the P and 3 systems previously outlined by Broad-
bent (1953) and short term post-categorisation memoiy. Broadbent (19&3)
regards informalion as entering the nervous system through a limited
capacity channel. Once through this channel, items can be held in a
3hort term 3tore, but only as long asthey can pass through the same
*
limited channel capacity as that by whioh they arrived. Broadbent (
quotes the example of a telephone number which is not forgotten
provided new information does not arrive. It seems reasonably clear
that Broadbent is talking of the ? system when talking of the limited
capacity channel, and of the 3 system when talking of short, term
memory store. This is important because the 3 system must not be
confused, as it might easily be, with long term memory. The distinction
which Broadbent makes between two kinds of short term memory cannot be
overemphasised.
The evidence which Broadbent puta forward in support of the view
that post-categorisation 3hort terr memory can be distinguished from
long term memoiy, rests basically on the assumption that rapid forget¬
ting is time dependent whereas forgetting over longer periods is
material dependent. In other words, Broadbent i3 arguing for the
classical distinction between SWI and LTM, that ST.V. forgetting is due
to trace decay, LTM forgetting to interference. The actual evidence
quoted is that of Conrad (i960) and Cottfad and Hille (1953)» which
time, rather than the amount of interfering material seems to affect
forgetting over the short term. Broadbent also uses evidence of the
different effects of overt and covert rehearsal, the former being
hypothesised to be slower and therefore showing the greater effects
of time alon§ on forgetting,
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nuJ"7h» e* Sh°Uld, be noted Broadbent1958? S,'Stem bef0re the P in
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Broadbent does admit that the evidence that short term
forgetting is purely time dependent is not too convincing, but points
out that there is not very much evidence that similarity factors result
in forgetting, whilst such evidence is plentiful for longer texro
forgetting.
Broadbent then, restates the position of Hebb, pointing to
psychological evidence. As Neisser (1967). however points out, he is
not at all explicit as to the theoretical relationship between STM and
ITl.', His theoretical work up to 19&3 can heat h® seen in terms of
describing a model for VSTM and STM, rather than S*B1 and Lit!.
Finally Broadbent (19&7) makes two points which are of
importance. On P. 40 he admits that the memory span evidence for
limited capacity contains a long term element, an admission which
distinguishes him from other dichotornous theorists, such as Adams,
Secondly on P 94. he admits that differences between STM and LTV; may
be differences in degree, but the degree is so drastic that one should
distinguish them. To take this position is clearly inconsistent with
what he has previously claimed, in that trace decay and interference
are different in kind, not degree.
Bgwer'a theoretical posing
Bower (1967) is somewhat more explicit than Broadbent on the nature
of the relationship between STM and LTM Bnd quite explicit as to at
least one criterion for distinguishing material in the two systems. On
P 134• in ®n exchange with Melton on how to tell whether an item was
in SIM or LTL, Bower states explicitly that it was in STM "Because they
can forget it." (One feels that Melton ought to have known better).
Elsewhere (19&4) he uses the example of rapid forgetting following
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shook to indicate a separate SIM and again in 1967 on P 122 he notes
that ECS or shock results in loss of material in SIM but not LTM. It
is somewhat sad therefore that Bower allows that the effect of drugs
might be to cause forgetting of items recently placed in LTi , as it
marks a clouding of an otherwise clear statement as to the criteria
by which material claimed to be in STM and LTI are to be distinguished.
As to the relationship between short and long term memory. Bower
regards an item as residing in ST!t at risk of being lost in an all or
nothing manner, unless rehearsal results in it being copied into long
term memory. As with other theoretical formulations, such as iVaugh
and Norman* s (1965) an item can be resident in STM, Llivl or both.
Clearly, however. Bower regards L3M as a stable memory system not
usually subject to forgetting of a rapid nature.
Finally, his views on recognition within a short term, long term
memory context are clearly at variance with those of some other
dichotomist theorists, notably Adams (1967), in that Bower claims,
P 168, the long-short model has no natural way to accommodate within
its conceptual framework any distinction between recognition and recall.
Peterson's Theory
Another theorist whose contribution to the study of memory has
been of the greatest stimulus and benefit is Peterson. Peterson and
Peterson (19.59) discovered that even very short sequences (3 letter
trigrams) could be rapidly forgotten after a single exposure, thereby
holding up for experimental investigation a vast number of variables
under conditions of interest both to the experimenter and to the
subject. The full significance of Peterson and Peterson's (1959)
experiment was not appreciated even by Peterson for a little time.
They conceptualised a brief presentation of trigrams as a learning
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trial; latencies resembled that of recall in a learning experiment
and repetition improved recall in an orderly fashion. However, it soon
became apparent that rapid forgetting in the absence of rehearsal for
a three letter trigram could be used by trace decay theorists to
support a trace decay theory of short term forgetting, and hence a
dichotomy between short and long term memory - long term forgetting
being generally accepted as resulting from interference.
Since then Peterson has advocated a dichotomous theory of
memory on a number of occasions (e.g. 1963, 1966a, 1966b) and his
theoretical position is now considered.
Peterson (1966b) does consider that evidence on trigram for¬
getting supports a trace decay theory of forgetting for memory over the
short terra. Along with other lines of evidence, he interprets evidence
of differences in retention probabilities for the first trigram of a
sequence a3 a function of mode of presentation, as favouring an
autonomous trace decay theory. Xeppel and Underwood (1962) showed that
under conditions of visual presentation there was no forgetting of the
first trigram of a sequence, "/hen however the presentation was
auditory a certain amount of forgetting was observed. As Peterson points
out it is difficult to attribute such forgetting to IToactive inter¬
ference, so that it is not unreasonable to suppose that autonomous
trace decay does sometimes occur, but is not always measurable. It
must be stressed that Peterson like Brown (1964) does not deny the role
of other possible mechanisms of forgetting in the short term. Yet he
clearly considers that the presence of a decay factor is considered to
be one type of evidence for the existence of a short term store.
Peterson considers that there are learning mechanisms in short
- 10 -
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as well as long term memory, but suggests that there is also a
recency mechanism which masks the operation of learning which is
initiated immediately, iiemory for recent events is largely affected
by this short term mechanism and memory drop3 off rapidly when events
of the same class follow each other. On the other hand memory for
events in the more distant past is made possible by learning
mechanisms and it need not decrease over the course of short inter¬
vals, but may increase. Peterson also conceives of the long term
store being of such a nature that items in it are, for a time, more
available than newly presented items in the short term memory.
Peterson's evidence for a recency mechanism rests on the evidence
that the rapidly declining part of the forgetting curve is
differently affected by certain variables, as compared to the
asymptote. Thus for example, the number of presentations, their dura¬
tion, and their spacing differentially affect the rapidly falling
part of the forgetting curve and the asymptote. Whilst Peterson bases
these conclusions on evidence from paired associate studies, it is
clear that this kind of evidence is related to the evidence provided
by G-lanser and Cunitz (1966) and later workers using the serial
position effect for free recall as evidence of a dichotomous theory.
- 11
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Peterson (19660) like Tulving (1968) makes use of the reminiscence
effect to support a dichotomous theory. He also uses (1966a) the
evidence of Peterson et al (1963) who showed avoidance of responses
recently given in an anticipation task, presumably because the sub¬
jects know it must be wrong because of its recent presentation. This
recenoy mechanism which enables this to be done is considered akin to
a running memory span. It is perhaps noteworthy that evidence for
reminiscence of recently presented items after a period of less than
30 sees., which is used by Peterson as evidence for a dichotomy -
switching to a more efficient secondary system, contrasts with
evidence of a dichotomy produced by Glanzer and Cunitz showing degra¬
dation of the most recently presented items over a period of J>0
seconds. In other words both the better and worse performance on the
mo3t recently presented items after short periods of interpolated
activity are used as evidence of a dichotomous theory of memory by
different dichotomous theorists.
Glanzer'a theory
The theoretical position of Glanzer is enigmatic in various ways.
In his first major theoretical paper on a dichotomoua theory he
proposed that STM was unlimited with respect to capacity, whereas LTM
was limited, and that this was true by definition (Glanzer and Cunitz,
(I966)). This is at variance however with almost all other
formulations of a dichotomous theory, and Glanzer (Glanzer et al 1969)
has now come back into line, regarding STS (Short Term Store) as
limited to some 3 " 6 items.
Glanzer's main position outlined in a number of papers -
Glanzer and Cunitz (1966) Glanzer and Leinzer (1967) Glanzer (1969)
and Glanzer et al (1969) i3 that the serial position curve produced
- 12 -
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from a free recall task, indicates output from two memory stores. The
early and middle part of the serial position curve indicate output
predominantly from LTT.i, whereas the recency part of the curve indicates
output from ST..L (Glanzer and Cunitz 19&6). Glanzer and Cunitz base
this conclusion on the differential effect of variables on the early
and later parts of the serial position curve. Thus, for example,
interpolation of activity between presentation and recall affects the
most recently presented items only, causing a degradation in performance,
whilst rate of presentation effects the earlier part of the serial
position curve only. Glanzer and I.eInzer (19&7) produce evidence
that repetition decrements all but the last few positions.
Glanzer (1V&3) produces evidence which closely resembles
Peterson's recency mechanism evidence when he demonstrates that the
greater the distance between associated words, the less is there an
effect on recall. In his most reoent paper Glanzer (Glanaer et al
I969) claims that it is the number of items following presentation, not
the time interval, which has an effect on the most recently presented
part of the serial position curve.
At the present time, then,Glanzer believes GTS (Short Term Store)
tebe a limited capacity buffer store, capable of holding some 3 to 6 itana.
Incoming items result in some items being either transferred to LTS
(Long Term Store) or lost, and, displacement is regarded as the cause
of forgetting in SIM.
.Yauah and Norman's Theory
.Veugh and Norman make James' (1390) distinction between Primary
and Secondary Memory (PM and SM denoting the two 3tores). Unlike
James, however, they regard Bz1 as encompassing a certain number of
- 13 -
2/10
events, rather than time, a displacement theory of short term
forgetting, rather than autonomous trace decay. "Every verbal item
that is attended to enters FM. As we have seen, the capacity of this
system is sharply limited. New items displace old ones; displaced
items are permanently lost. When an item is rehearsed, however, it
remains in PM and it may enter into SK." An experiment reported in
the course of their paper, which showed forgetting to be dependent on
the number of interpolated items rather than time, was the evidence
which led them to conclude that forgetting in PM is due to displacement,
which they regard as encompassed by an interference theory of forgetting.
They do not consider the cause of forgetting in long term - secondary
memory, but there is no evidence to suggest that they do not regard it
also as being caused by interference.
An important aspect of their theory is that PM and SM can to
some extent overlap, and they consider that many experiments on short
term memory are really measuring a composite of output from two
storage systems (a view also shared by G-lanzer et al (1969) )•
The evidence that Waugh and Norman put forward for supposing that
the serial position curve represents output from two storage systems is
also similar in kind to that of Glanzer, the differential effects
of variables, for instance on what is basically the middle and end of
the serial position curve and the claim that the probability of recall
of an item from PM depends on the number of interpolated items between
presentation and recall, unlike SM.
augh and Norman also appeal to introspection, and point to the
"echo box" phenomenon, in which the most recently presented items can
be effortlessly "Parrotted" back. Clearly this ha3 much in common
- Ik
2/11
with Peterson's recency mechanism.
Norman's Theory
Norman (1963, 1969) ba3 restated some of the ideas presented in
the Waugh and Norman paper, together with some additional material.
Like Broadbent and Peterson, Norman (1969) distinguishes between a
visual information storage (VSTM) and immediate memory. On P 81 he
states "In the models of Chapter the output of visual short term
memory entered an auditory information storage. That auditory storage
i3 the immediate memory of this chapter". Apart from making the
distinction between the type of very short terijj memory that is the
subject of Sperling's (i960) work for instance, Norman is clearly
stating the position that auditory Coding is a characteristic of ST?.,
a position that he restates on P 127-128 when using evidence from
Baddeley (1966a,b) to draw a distinction between SUi and LTfci.
Norman does differ from other dichotomists in taking the view
that the limit in immediate memory capacity might be in terms of the
limit of rehearsal capacity, rather than mere storage capacity.
Norman's Psychological Review paper (1968) makes many of the
points made elsewhere. For instance a dichotomy between STM and LTM
is maintained because retention of material in "primary storage is
affected by acoustical similarity among the items which are to be
retained, whereas in secondary memory, semantic similarity has the
same effect." Yet Norman is clearly unhappy about a dichotomous
theory of memory, lie points out that for a transformation from visual
to acoustic coding to take place material in secondary memory must be
utilised. Again he attacks a box dichotomous theory which implies
that material is stored in one box (Primary storage) before it con
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be transferred to another. "The trouble with such a theory lies in
the assured separation between the two systems. Perceptual recogni¬
tion of words and of familiar sensory input requires, at the least,
that we be able to find some representation of the inputs in secondary
storage. If -i-he box theory is held, there must be sufficient inter¬
connections between the storages to allow a comparison of
just-perceived sensory events with the collection of previously ex¬
perienced perceptions. This Intercommunication must be so direct and
complete that a formal distinction between the two storage systems
becomes difficult to make. In fact with sufficiently complex
interactions the two systems become equivalent to one." It seems
reasonable to suppose that Norman is at this point more or les3 abdica¬
ting a dichotomy.
In fact this is not the case. Norman regards Pi and Si as
different properties of the same physical device. Ke goes on to des¬
cribe a model similar to Hebbs', in which temporary traces appear as a
result of initial activation, which dissipate unless some action is
taken to maintain them. Permanent changes in storage occur when there
has been reactivation of temporary traces. However, because Primary
traces are continually changing, whereas secondary traces are passive
and permanent the two storage modes have different retrieval
properties.
Again the distinction between visual storage and shoJt tonn
memory is s+ressed, Sperling's (19^7) visual information and Nelaser's
(1967) echoic and iconic storages being within the compass of such a
sensory storage, whereas Sperling's auditory information storage and




Like Norman, Wickelgren (1969a) has his reservations about
certain claims made by other dichotomous theorists, but nevertheless
holds a dichotomous theory. Wickelgrep., in fact proposes a tricho¬
tomy between STM, Intermediate Term Memory (ITM), and LB,!, and regards
tho time interval of STM as about 10 seconds, of ITM from 2 minutes to
several hours, and LTM from several hours to days and years. Clearly
much of the experimental work in memory on the differences between
STM and LTM would be regarded by Wickelgren as representing
differences between STM and ITM. (He also distinguishes a fourth
category in fact, very short term memory - "visual" - a precategor-
isation store.
ickelgren (1969a) does not use differences in coding over time
as evidence for a dichotomous theory of memory, indeed he points to
evidence of conceptual coding after about 1 sec., and predicts acoustic
coding in LTM. (In another paper however, (1969b), he does appear to be
suggesting a distinction in terms of coding.)
ickelgren regards the question of whether trace decay curves
indicate a decrease in the rate of deoay with age, or whether they are
the sum of several exponentially decaying ones a3 critical.
Whilst ickelgren would appear to subscribe to the view that STM
has limited capacity, much of this work has aimed at showing that it
is not of a non-associative (buffer storage) type and he has demon¬
strated the effects of acoustic similarity on STM (1956a).
Elsewhere (1968) Wickelgren believes that evidence of a clinical





The dichotomous theory proposed by Weizkrantz (1966, 1967) also
relies heavily on "Physiological" data, specifically on the effects of
electro-convulsive shock on memory, Weiskrantz notes that amnesic
effects of ECS might extend to material in the memory system for
several weeks, and therefore beyond any possible short term, dynamic
trace. Part of the effect of ECS therefore is to produce interference
phenomena in LTfc, which results in material being forgotten in LTM.
A3 the interference subsides, so recovery of LTM is to be expected,
and indeed this is in line with clinical findings. Weiskrantz still
maintains however, that there is evidence of a separate, dynamic short
term memory system, on the basis of evidence from E&j, because amnesia
following ECS never seems to recover fully, and this appears
particularly true of material taken in up to 5 seconds before shock.
For Weiskrantz then, the relationship between SIM and LTM is
conceived to be similar to that envisaged by Hebb, with a dynamic,
short-lived memory, subject to rapid decay, and a stable, long term
memory, subject to interference effects,
Adams' theory
Physiological evidence is also one of the three lines of evidence
which Adams (1967) proposes as supporting a dichotomous theory of
memory, the other two being the limited capacity of short texm memory
to store items for recall and the differing interference and coding
systems in short and long term memory. Specifically he claims that
SIM is an acoustic coding system, whereas LTM employs semantic coding,
and bases this conclusion on the work of Conrad (19&4) Baddeley (1966b)
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and V.'ickelgren (1965a). (1966).
The physiological evidence upon which Adams bases his theory is
that produced by Lilner e.g. (1959)* which indicates rapid memory loss
following certain types of brain lesion# whilst at the same time older
memories are spared.
Adams1 theoretical position is in many respects different from
many other dichotomous theorists# particularly his views on rapid
forgetting and the nature of the difference between recognition and
recall. To Adams the problem of trace decay or interference as the
cause of rapid forgetting has been resolved in favour of the latter,
on the basis, basically, of the experiments of Keppel and Underwood
(1962) and '.Vaugh and Norman (1965) • /hat Adams means by Interference
however, and what many other writers mean e.g. Melton (1967a) Hilgard
and Bower (1966) are somewhat different. For Iv.elton and Hilgard and
Bower, interference as a theory of forgetting means more than that
the effects of previous experience and similarity factors are
operationally measurable on a memory task; it means specifically that
the cause of forgetting is due to factors other than loss of stored
material. It must be admitted that Adams is not alone in using
interference as a purely operational term; Wickelgren (1969b) does
not appear to be using the tem in its classical and usual sense.
In regarding forgetting in short term memory as being due to
interference rather than trace decay, Adams is clearly stating a
position which differs radically fr<m Hebb and Broadbent, for instance,
although it is perhaps not far removed from the position of Waugh and
Norman (1965) who also regard interference theory in a somewhat
different light from others.
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The moat important difference between Adams, and all other
dichotomous theorists, with the exception of Atkinson and Shiffrin
(1968) is , a3 far as the writer is aware, the denial by Adams that
rapid forgetting per se is a characteristic of short term memory.
(P 136). In this writer's view thi3 statement shows a complete mis¬
understanding on the part of Adams, of the nature of the problem, and
indeed Hilgsrd and Bower put the central problem (P 5°6) 33 "How best
to explain the decrements in short term recall" i.e. rapid forgetting.
The other relevant point of difference between Adams and most
other psychologists concerns the relationship between recognition and
recall. Adam3 regards recognition and recall as indicating two
dichotomous underlying memory states, rather than the almost universal
assumption that the difference lies in the nature of the retrieval
mechanism (e.g. Norman and Vickelgren 19&9)* Adams regards recognition
as some form of 8 Perceptual trace, somewhat akin to an image. It is
",,,,,a stimulus attribute whose strength was defined by frequency of
stimulus occurrences and independent of responses learned to the
stimulus." "As far as memory is concerned, the S Perceptual trace ia
reactivated by the original stimulus at the recognition test and
causes the subject to identify it as old". P 265.
Apart from having implications for an experimental resolution of
any problem In the field of memory, Adams' position has implications
for a formulation of a dichotomous theory of memory. As presehted
there are clearly 4 possible memory systems, rather than two, a short
and long term memory system both for recognition and recall. Adams'
dichotomy for the mo3t part would appear to be of recall mechanism,
although he is not averse to using recognition experiments to dispose
of problem theories of a more general nature (e.g. Hebb and Foord's study
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(1943) is used to dispose of autonomous trace transformation theory).
For Adams, then, 51?/. can bo regarded as a separate compartment
from long term memory, on the evidence that different principles would
appear to apply over the short and the long term. There may be inter-
coranunication between ST?/ and L1M although this is taken to depend on
the nature of material.
Atkinson and Bhiffrin's Theory.
Perhaps the most explicit statement of a dichotomous theory is
by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). Like Broadbent, '.Vickelgren and Norman,
they too distinguish between a short term sensory store and short term
memory, but make no distinction between intermediate and long term
memory. In addition Atkinson and Shiffrin distinguish between oentral
processes, such as rehearsal, which are under the control of the
individual, and structural aspects of memory, such as the nature of
storage systems.
Atkinson and Bhiffrin view information, upon being token in, as
residing in a short term sensory store, the store which decays in a
matter of milliseconds according to the evidence of, for instance,
Sperling. Information then enters a short term store, in which
information is assumed to decay and disappear completely, but the time
required for the information loss is considerably longer than for the
sensory register. The character of information in the short term
store does not depend necessarily on the form of sensory input, but
visual input may be held in an auditory short term store. Atkinson
and Bhiffrin do, however, stress that it is difficult to separate
auditory, verbal and linguistic aspects of short teim memory and use
the ebbre/iution a.v.l. to indicate the nature of 51?.'. store. Again
on P 93, they note that most experiments in the literature dealing
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with long terra store, have been concerned with storage in the a.v.l.
mode, but "it is clear that there is long term memory in each of the
other sensory modalities, as demonstrated by an ability to recognise
stimuli presented in these senses." Thus they clearly do not distin¬
guish STM from LTM on the basis of different coding systems being
employed by the two memory stores, as others, e.g. Adams, have done.
The rate of decay of SI!,! is claimed to be difficult to estimate
because of the influence of central processes such as rehearsal;
however they claim that the evidence suggests a decay rate of between
15-30 seconds.
The long term store differs from the others in that information v
which enters this system is not lost and does not deoay in the same
manner. Indeed in another paper (1969) they claim that in LTM infor¬
mation is never lost from store. ihilat all information is
eventually lost from the sensory register and STM, information in LTM
is relatively permanent although it may be modified or rendered
temporarily irretrievable as a result of other incoming information.
(P 93)» On P 127, however, they do admit that rapid forgetting is
possible, of material entering long term memory.
The basic evidence upon which Atkinson and Shiffrin base a
dichotomy between short and long term memory ia the work of
Milner (1959# 1966, 1968), on the effect of hippocampal lesions upon
memory, in which newly acquired information is lost in a period of
about 30 seconds, whilst old material i3 retained.
Atkinson and bhiffrin are sometaat equivocal about the nature
of transfer of material between the sensory store, the short term
store and the long term store. .'hilst they regard transfer from
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STS to LTS as primarily a function of central processes, it is also
an unvarying feature of the system, so that whilst information is
residing in STS, transfer is talcing place to LTS, They suggest that
evidence from incidental learning supports this view, as well as
evidence from Hebb (19&1) who provided evidence of permanent storage
even though subjects were not trying to store material in LTS. It
might therefore be reasonable to interpret rehearsal as having the
function of maintaining material in STS so that transfer can take
place (Pill). Indeed on r 111 they state "In terms of STS structure,
we can imagine that each rehearsal regenerates the STS trade and
thereby prolongs decay", and on P 128 "We assume here that LTS
increases linearly with the time an item resides in the buffer."
Again when dealing with transfer from sensory register to LTS
and LTS Atkinson and Shiffrin are equivocal. On p 115 they note
"In general, information entering STS comes directly from LTS and
only indirectly from the sensory register." They use the example of
a word, where verbal representation is sought in ITM for entry into
STTvl, The sensory aspects of a word are matched in LIT,I until a verbal
representation i3 found. To this writer it appears that this entails
information from STS entering LTL direct. Yet the following passage
on P 96 is worth quoting»
"In the case of transfer from the visual image to the a.v.l.
store it seems likely that a selective screen is made at the
discretion of the subject. As each element in the register is
screened a matching programme of some sort is carried out against
information in long term store, and the verbal "name" of the element
is recovered from long term memory and fed into the short-term store.
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Its corimunication between the sensory register and long term
store does not, however, permit us to infer that information is
transferred directly to long term store from the register".
A further point made by Atkinson and Shiffrin, with which the
writer wishes to take issue at this point, concerns the notation used
by these authors. They claim it is important not to confuse the
terms STS and LIB with the terms LTM and STM, a position which is
of course unexceptionable. SIM refers to memory examined in
experiments of short duration# However, in claiming that STM may
contain both SIS and LIS and hence not be amenable to a diehotomous
or single system interpretation, they fail to appreciate that attempts
have been made to dichotomise STM and LTM on grounds other than storage.
Such a distinction has been made by Tulving (19&3) on the basis of
differing retrieval effects. In other words, it is reasonable to
make the distinction between BT5 and STM, but this cannot be taken
to mean that it is illegitimate to dichotomise between ST!.l and LTM
rather than STB and L'IS.
Tqlvlng«3 Thyyry
Tulving's (1968) theory is in fact completely different from any
other, in that he claims the dichotomy between short and long term
memory should be on the basis of dichotomous retrieval systems,
whereas other theorists have assumed the difference to lie in storage
mechanisms. He also differs from most theorists, apart from Adams,
perhaps, on his views of the relationship between recognition and
recall. On P 27 he bluntly states, without recourse to empirical
evidenoe "Scores on a recognition test ere determined by different




The distinction between retrieval and storage which Tulving
makes is in terms of the potential availability of information in
the storage, and the accessibility of this information. This
difference i3 indicated by experimental data which indicates that a
subject can recall more items at a later time than at an earlier time,
without the necessity of interpolated presentations. Clearly this
indicates that the retrieval "Mechanism" ddes not have access to all
the available information in store.
It does not, of course, show that there is any need to hold a
dichotomy between short and long terra memory, based on retrieval
systemsj although Tulving uses evidence of differential effects of
variables on the shape of the serial position curve to draw this
conclusion. Thus, he quotes evidence from Murdock (19&2) Postman and
Phillip (15^5) Glanzer and Cunitz (19&6) and Glanzer and I.'einzer (1967)
who have shown the recency effect, unlike earlier portions of + he curve,
was independent of rate of presentation, of test length and of repeti¬
tion. On the other hand, the recency effect disappeared with an
interpolated activity lasting 30 seconds.
On P 12 Tulving states "All these findings, in showing that
certain experimental variables affect one part of the aerial position
curve whilst leaving another invariant, strongly suggest that the
Ottrve reflects the operation of two types of recall mechanism". It is
perhaps surprising that as Peterson (1966 c) too has suggested, a
dichotomy on the basis of retrieval recovery over time, Tulving should
not consider Peterson's simple explanation of Glanzer and Cunitz's
findings on the effects of interpolation of activity on the shape
of the serial position curve.
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Tulving goes on to consider the interpretation of the serial
position curve given by Waugh and Norman (19&5) *n so *"ar as it is
relevant to a dichotomoua theory of memory# and points out that they
equate retention with recall, which is# as has been pointed out above,
not satisfactory. Tulving therefore prefers the view that all infor¬
mation is stored in the same unitary storage system, and that
differences in recall of early, late and middle items reflect
primarily differences in the accessibility of these items. P.13 "Late
input items may be retrieved more easily because of certain kinds of
additional auxiliaiy information, stored with each item at the time of
presentation, and not available for items perceived earlier. The
acoustic trace of an item the subject hears may be one kind of
such auxiliary information that might serve as a retrieval cue for the
item. Juch an acoustic trace may rapidly decay even if its loss
does not affect the rest of the information stored in input. The item
for which the acoustic trace is lost may still be potentially
retrievable through other, less powerful but more permanent retrieval
cues."
It is not entirely clear, from this passage, what Tulving means
by separate retrieval mechanisms. It seems that he is advocating
changes in storage affecting the possibilities of retrieving an item.
After all, the acoustic trace is part of the stored material, even if
it did not initially "belong" to the original item. More difficult
is the interpretation of Tulving's theory in terms of a dichotomy. The
evidence produced to support a dichotomy, variations in the serial
position curve as a result of experimental manipulation, say nothing
about acoustic or any other added traces which decay rapidly, and this
is the evidence needed for a dichotomy based on the grounds Tulving
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claims. After all it is not inconsistent with a dichotomous position
to say it is the actual item which is decaying rapidly - indicating
storage. Perhaps the use of different cues enables previously in¬
accessible material to be recalled. This analysis of Tulving's
position at this juncture is intended to indicate that Tulving in fact
presents no evidence to justify his position on a dichotomy, i.e. that
there are dichotomous retrieval a3 opposed to storage systems.
a mpfol j.70del for a qichptampMq jhopry
Murdock (19&7) *n what is probably the most systematic review of
dichotomous theories of memories, has suggested as a result of such a
review, a "modal model" - synthesis of the various views put forward.
The model is as follows:
Items enter a sensory store, and if attended to, and processing
demands are not too great, pass into Primary memory, which is a system
of limited storage capacity. Whilst in Primary memory, items can be
copied or transferred into Secondary memory, and rehearse! is a critical
variable.
Three forgetting mechniams are suggested: decay from the sensory
store; displacement from Primary memory; and interference from
•Secondary memory. Finally it is noted that items can reside in Brt or
SM or both; the two storage systems are not mutually exclusive.
Murdock makes no claim that his model is the true dichotoraous
model (clearly it is not) and whilst it is useful to have Murdook's






Vhilst most theorists agree that items enter ST from a sensory
register, this is not true of Atkinson and Shiffrin, who regard items
as entering SIM from LTii. The nature of STVT is disputed by Tulving,
who regards it as part of the same storage system as LTK and
presumably therefore not limited in storage capacity. Rehearsal is
regarded as critical by some dichotomist theorists in transferring from
STM to LTM (e.g. Waugh and Norman) but only as important by others
e.g. Atkinson and Shiffrin, who regard transfer as automatic if
material resides in STS.
The cause of forgetting in ST. is considered to be autonomous
trace decay by Broadbent (1963)» displacement by Atkinson and
Shiffrin (196.5)» interference by Wiekelgren (1965)* and Adams (1967).
and when one considers that the whole question of a dichotomy of
memory systems resolves itself around the cause of forgetting in the
short term (Hilgard and Bovver 1966) this must be regarded as a most
serious state of affairs for a dichotomous theory.
Summary of Evidence
The evidence for a dichotomous theory of memory can be summarised as
follows:
1. Rapid forgetting of newly acquired material which is not
rehearsed (Hebb 1949» Bower 1967)*
2. itopid forgetting is time dependent; over longer periods
forgetting is material dependent (i.e. trace decay causes forgetting in
the short term, interference in the long term)(Broadbent 1963.
Peterson 1966 .




4* Different interference and coding effects over time, i.e. SI* is
subject to acoustic interference and LTM to semantic interference and
coding effects only (Adaxaa 1967. ickelgran 1969fc»Norman 1968, 1969)*
5. The differential effeots of rate of presentation, dunation of
presentation, delay, etc. upon differing sections of the serial
position curve (Peterson 1966b, Glanzer and Cugitz 1966, Waugh and
Norman 196.5» Tulving 1968 amongst others).
6. Reminiscence effects indicate a switch from one retrieval
mechanism to another (Peterson 1966c, Tulving 1968).
7. Recency mechanisms are indicated by avoidance of responses
recently given (Peterson 1966a).
8. Rapid forgetting of newly acquired information following ECS
and other shock (Weiskrantz 1967* Bower 1967)*
9. Physiological insult to the hippocampus, resulting in rapid
forgetting of newly acquired information, but no damage to older
pre insult memory. (Wickelgren 1963, Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968,
Adams I967)
10. The effects of Protein synthesis inhibitors on Memory
(Deutsch 1969).
11. Introspective evidence J" a rapidly disappearing "echo box"
(.augh and Norman 19&5* Norman 1968.)
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30MB SUPPORTERS OF A SING-LS SYSTEM THEORY
Whilst a number of theorists have expressed doubts over the
interpretation of memory data as indicative of two dichotomous memory
systems (e.g. Galanter (1967), Keppel (1968b), Loess (1968), Deutsch
(1969)j Postman (1964) and Melton (1963) ), the two major attacks
on the dichotomous theory of memory have come from Postman (1964)
V
and better known, perhaps, Melton (1963). These are now considered.
Melton's Theoretical Position
..elton's theoretical position is stated in a number of
places (1963s 1964, 1967) and is not entirely free from contradiction.
Indeed in 1967 he states - p 91 - that very short term mem6^y might
last up to 15 seconds, and might have unique characteristics. In the
I \
light of the theoretical statements of Wickelgren (1969a)! of I V
Broadbent (1963) and others, a period of up to 15 seconds is clearly
within the domain of short, post categorisation memory, and not very
short term memory which is taken to last up to about 1 second only.
To allow that memory can have unique characteristics up to 15 seconds
II
after intake of information is, in the view of this writer, a!
collapse of the theoretical position that STM and LTM are onja
continuum.
despite possible reservations about Melton's theoretical
position, his attempt to attribute to short and long term memory a
universal cause of forgetting - interference, and to dispense with a
dichotomous interpretation of the data, has been most influential
and few papers on the topic fail to note that due to his work the
3/2
question of whether one should talk of one memory system or two is
still in doubt (e.g. Kurdoek 1967).
The principal questions that Helton addresses himself to are
thesej
1. Does STM involve activity traces, whereas LTL involves
"structural" traces, as suggested for instance by iiebb (1949)*
2. i*>es aTi.. involve autonomous trace decay, whilst Lit. involves
irreversible, non-decaying traces, as Hebb has also suggested, and
3- hoes d>Ti.. have a fixed capacity that is subject to overload and
consequent loss of elements stored in it for non-associative reasons,
whilst Lit; i3 iufinitely expandable with failure to retrieve
attributable mainly to incompleteness of the cue to retrieval, or to
interference effects.
In posing the question of a single system thory or a duplexity
theory in these terms, Melton is clearly replying to dichotomous
theories based on various assumptions made by Hebb (1949). However
many psychologists have allowed that Hebb's formulation is invalid
in respect to one or more of the points made above, but still hold
a dichotomous theory, fickelgren (1969a) for instance, holds that
forgetting in STL is due to associative factors, Adams (I967) hold®
that interference is the cause of forgetting in STL, and Tulving
(l96ii) holds that all material enters the same storage system, and
taat differences between SIM and 1TM lie in trace utilisation not in
the nature of the trace laid down, ihatever answers that . elton gives,
therefore, cannot be taken as overthrowing a dichotomous theory of
memory, without taking these later theoretical positions into account.
It must be admitted, however, that many theoretical
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formulations do make the assumptions that Melton wishes to attack
(e.g. Broadbent 19&3)*I indeed i slton (1963) considers that the decay
of traces in immediate memory, compared to the irreversability of
traces established through repetitive learning, is the moat universally
acclaimed differentiation.
Melton's attack on a dichotoaous theory involves trying to show
that associative interference accounts for forgetting in short tens
memory as it is assumed to in long terra memory. Th® tern "interference"
as used by : elton differs from the usage of the teim by psychologists
such as augh and Norman (19&5) end ickelgren (196%), in that elton
uses the term to indicate that all instances of failure to retrieve
are not instances of erasure of traces. 'rhus 19&7. p 54 "Interference
theory, as applied to UK has no permanent erasive component."
later - P 223 - I elton makes it clear that interference works at the
time of retrieval, and also contains a temporary unlearning component#
according to his view of interference theory. he claims that the
competition at response is the classical theoretical formulation,
(it is the formulation of McOeoch (1942) ) it does seem unnecessarily
confusing that different writers should use the terra with such different
meanings. (Baugh end Norman for instance appear to regard interference
theory as a form of displacement theory • p 89 "Is its physiological
trace in some sense written over by the traces of the items that
follow it?" )
The point is not merely pedantic. As I elton (1963) himself points
out, classical interference theory implicitly accepts a one mechanism
theory of memory. Its extension to forgetting over the short term,
therefore, makes it impossible to hold a dichotoraous theory of
memory. for writers such as Adams (1967) to claim that interference
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governs forgetting over both the short and the long tern, and still
maintain a dichotomy is therefore at worst paradoxical, and at best
misleading.^
The evidence that Melton brings to bear on the question of
whether or not rapid forgetting is due to interference ooraes from the
papers of -.eterson and Peterson (1939)# Murdock (19&1) Keppel and
Underwood (19&2) and his own evidence. A consideration of the
evidence leads him to the conclusion that trace decay is not a major
factor in short term forgetting. Thus he points out that single
consonants are remembered with very high frequency over a 32 second
interval filled with disruptive activity# and secondly that intra unit
interference accounts for forgetting, rather than time per se.
(Increasing the number of consonants shows an orderly decrease in
retention.) The evidence of Keppel and Underwood (19&2)# too, is
strongly suggestive of -I effects in short term memory experiments
and hence the effect of previous similar material on the time course
of forgetting.
The other line of evidence which Melton considers^ is based on
repetition effects. The most cogent argument put forward is based on
an experiment of Hebb (19&1) replicated by Melton, which shows that even
with* large number of items interpolated between one presentation and
its repetition, there is evidence of a repetition effect. In • elton's
replication experiment, 8 sequences of 9 digit numbers were interpolated
oothote8 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Chapter 6
- 33 -
3/5
between presentation and repetition, and Melton remarks - P 19 -
"Purely the structural memory trace established by a single occurence
of an event must be extraordinarily persistent." Again Melton is
further persuaded by the orderly way in which repetition operates
in both sub span and supra span units to increase the probability of
retrieval, that the STM LU distinction is unwaranted.
postman's theoretical poqitfoffi
Postman's (19&4) criticism of a diohotomous theory may be
considered under two main headings: 1. The limitation on our
capacity for irmaediate reproduction of materials. 2. The mechanisms
of rapid forgetting.
In considering the capacity of immediate memory, and in parti¬
cular, the memory span. Postman notes that it is not the transmission
of information per 3e which is limitedi it is the number of items,
and that the limitation may be due to such factors as proactive
Inhibition, which also operate in long term memory.
As with Melton,Postman (19&4) sees the nature of short term
forgetting as central to a resolution of the problem of a dichotomy
or a continuity of memory systems. Again, like Melton it is Hebb's
theory which is considered and the notion of autonomous trace decay
that is attacked. Postman notes that the concept of the decaying
memory trace derives most of its face validity from the extreme
rapidity of forgetting of unrehearsed material and that rehearsal is
claimed to prevent the trace decaying.
Postman raises two objections to the interpretation of this
type of data in terms of two memory systems. In the first place
he notes evidence which suggests that interpolated material, and
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not time is responsible for forgetting, and perhaps more importantly,
he notes that results of immediate memory experiments and those of
long term memory experiments, upon which conclusions concerning a
dichotomy are drawn, are not sufficiently comparable to make a
judgment about the relative rates of forgetting in the two situations
(a peint echoed by Keppel (19&5) and Goggin (1966) ),
Postman points particularly to the difficulty, if not the im¬
possibility, of a true test of trace decay in immediate memory
experiments. Even unrelated interpolated material may have inter¬
fering properties of a retro-active kind, and in LW; (rote learning
studies) 3uch effects have been found even where inter item similarity
is low.
Summary of Helton's and Postman's Position
Both 4 olton and Postman, then,are concerned to attack a
dichotomous theory of memory in which ET forgetting is conceived of
as being due to autonomous trace decay, and LTM forgetting is
considered due to (classical) interference, Rehearsal is seen as a
means of transferring material from short to long term memory and the
two systems are not conceived of as overlapping, temporally.
Evidence of retention following a single exposure is taken as evidence
that a structural trace results from a single exposure. In that both
postman and Lelton were concerned with a Ilebbian theory, their attacks
on a uichotomous theosy are not able to take account of later
formulations. To say all this is not to be taken as critical of
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their important work in this area of memory. On the contrary, claims
that Melton and Postman hove not brought down a dichotomoua theory of
memory (e.g. by 7,'augh and Norman (1965) ) must be set in the context
of dichotomous theories a3 they then were at the time the papers were
written. .That must be made plain however, is that the work of Melton
and Postman is not enough: more recent developments must be taken
account of. Moreover, perhaps one major criticism can be levelled
at both Melton and Postman. Neither ha3 faced up to the problems
poeed for a single system theory by physiological evidence, e.g. of
the type produced by Milner (1959)• and upon which many dichotomists
rest their oase, e.g. Wickelgren (1963) Atkinson and Shiffrin (1963),
that physiological insult involves a failure to retain recent informa¬
tion, whilst leaving previously learned material unaffected.
Qtfrer qonqi^rflU*?^
finally, no chapter on evidence for a single system theory
would be complete without reference to the work of Hebb (1961). Hebb,
it will be remembered, is responsible for stating the dichotomous
position from which most present day argument has emerged. Yet as a
result of work on repetition of digit sequences, he changed his
position, at least to the extent of allowing that a single repetition
of a set of digits produces a structural trace which can be cumulative.
The actual experimental procedure, which As was noted, was more or less
replicated by Melton, involved presenting a series of digits, followed
by an interpolation of a number of digit sequences, followed by a
second presentation of the original sequence. Saving on learning





The two previous chapters described the theoretical positions
of those maintaining a dichotonoua and a single system theory of
memory, and outlined the basic empirical evidence which led to such
positions. This chapter will look in general terms at some of the
problems raised in holding a dichotomous theory of memory.
Specifically it will pose tho question as to what evidence i3 necessary
in order to hold a dichotomous theory; it will examine the means by
which such evidence for a dichotomy is gathered and will aim to show
that these means preclude the possibility of proving a dichotomous
theory of memory.
Ttn. basic criterion for distinguishing short and long term memory
As Hilgard and Bower (19'6) note, the question of whether one
should maintain a 3ingle system or duplex system theory of memory
ultimately rests on the question of the nature of rapid forgetting.
They consider a possible resolution of the problem to rest on the
question of whether rapid forgetting is due to autonomous trace decay
or to interference, clearly a response to the dichotomous formulations
of Hebb and Broadbent. Yet as a review of dichotoraous theories in
Chapter 2 clearly showed, many formulations do not insist on
autonomous trace decay as the cause of forgetting in short terra
memory, and indeed some, e.g. Wickelgren (19&9 Q) find Adams (19&?)
actively deny it, and use evidence which at first sight aearns un¬
related to the question of the cause of rapid forgetting, to claim a
dichotomoua theory. Thus Adams suggests that the limit in capacity
to recall recent information, and differences in interference effects
aa between short and long term memory, are grounds for holding a
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dichotomy. Why then, ia rapid forgetting the basic criterion
upon which all the evidence for a dichotomous theory of memoiy rests?
In order to answer this question it ia necessary to consider the means
by which inferences on memory states are drawn.
Investigation of memory processes involves presentation of material
under controlled conditions, and investigating the effect of an indepen¬
dent variable on retention. Those interested in differences in memory
processes over time, clearly, therefore, wish to investigate any
differential effects that an independent variable may have over time.
In the nature of the subject matter under investigation ar^F difference
attributable to an independent variable must involve either forgetting
or some addition to material originally presented. If no forgetting
occurred either immediately or after a period of time, then every item
originally presented would be recallable at any point in time. In
3uch a case no inferences could be made regarding different mechanisms
underlying memory in the short and the long term, unless of course
qualitative additions were made to each item.
Of course forgetting does occur, and differences in the time
course of forgetting are of necessity used to draw inferences regarding
underlying memory mechanisms. This necessity is brought about because
no qualitative additions i.e. associative differences, have yet been
3hown over time. It must be admitted that one, semantic association,
has been suggested (by Adams 19&7• Baddeley 1968) but Gruneberg and
Gykes (196/e) have noted only some of the many studies indicating
semantic processing in STM. Indeed, as they point out, that the words
before one as one reads, are meaningful, indicates immediate semantic
processing.
Evidence, then of qualitative differences over time in the
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nature of memory came from studies indicating quantitative differences
in forgetting rates over time as a result of experimental manipulation.
For instance to measure the effects of repetition on short and long
term memory, one obtains a measure of the effect of repetition on
forgetting in what is considered short term memory (i.e. measuring
differences in the forgetting rates of materials which have, and have
not, been subject to repetition) and comparing this with a measure
of the effect of repetition on forgetting in what is considered to be
long term memory, (again by measuring differences in forgetting rates
of materials which have and have not been subject to repetition).
Effectively then, the effect of repetition on rapid and less rapid
forgetting i3 measured, and perhaps the inference drawn is that rapid
and less rapid forgetting react differently to repetition} the infer¬
ence of those holding a dichotoraous theory of mamoxy being that such
different reactions are based on different underlying systems of
memory.
All the lines of evidenoe produced to support a dichotomous theory
of memory, are in fact baaed on the assumption that rapid forgetting
distinguishes material in the two purported systems i.e. that material
which is rapidly forgotten has been lost from 8TM whereas material
which is less rapidly forgotten has been lost from ISM. The lines of
/\
evidence produced to support a dichotomous theory which are listed in
Chapter 2 will now be examined in order to illustrate this.'
^ Footnote: Actual criticism of the lines of evidence will be
postponed to later chapters,
- 39 -
k/k
vsaid forgetting and the eronirical evidence
The first two linea of evidence, the phenomenon of rapid
forgetting of newly acquired material and the claim that differences
between rapid and leas rapid forgetting are in terms of autonomous
trace decay for the former and interference for the latter, clearly
depend on the assumption that rapidly forgotten material is lost from
ST., and needs no further elaboration.
Point 3» evidence of the limited capacity of subjects to hold
material for recall, compared to the relatively unlimited capacity to
retrieve well learned material, might at first sight not appear to
depend on rapid forgetting differentiating the two systems, and indeed
Adams (1967), who puts this line of evidence forward as indicative of
a dichotomy of memory systems, claims that rapid forgetting is not a
characteristic of short term memory per se. Yet, as Adams admits,
the usual means by which it is claimed short term memory is limited
involves the use of the immediate memory span in order to assess what
the capacity of immediate memoiy is. The memory span is obtained by
assessing the number of items in a sequence whioh a subject can cor¬
rectly reproduce following a single exposure. Typically a subject
will be able to recall 7-9 items successfully. Where more than this
number of items are presented, rapid forgettting takes place such that
the sequenoe cannot be successfully reproduced. It is at the point at
which rapid forgetting of supra-3pan items sets in that the memory
span is therefore defined. Moat important of all, however, the memory
span items are considered to evidence the capacity of short term
memory because they are themselves rapidly forgotten in the absence of
rehearsal, as many psychologists e.g. Hunter (1964) point out. Clearly
rapid supra-span and rapid memory span forgetting together are
- Uo -
h/5
responsible for assuming that the immediate memory span defines the
capacity of short term memory. Thus the limited capacity hypothesis
is ultimately dependent on the assumption that short and long term
memory can be distinguished on the basis of rapid forgetting. This may
be stated alternatively. If rapid forgetting cannot be taken to
distinguish short and long term memory then the immediate memory span
cannot be taken as indicative of a characteristic of short term memory.
It might be argued that supra span forgetting is due to failure
to take information in (registration) rather than to rapid forgetting.
Yet certain evidence is against this interpretation*, thus merely
adding a single digit 0 at the end of a sequence severely hampers
recall of the rest of the sequence (Conrad i960). In fact scores in
his subjects were reduced from 732> to $3%. Forgetting here was clearly
demonstrated and it is therefore reasonable to suppose, as Conrad's
experiment in many ways ressembles going from a sub to supra span
series, that the effect of adding digits over the memory span is to
induce forgetting. Again, subjects can always tell, of a sequence of
digits say, that items are digits, and not letters, an impossibility
unless each item had been acquired and c&tegcrised.
The next line of evidence considered, differing coding system
systems as between short and long term memory, also put forward by
Adams (1967) amongst others, rests on the demonstration that acoustic
confusion, i.e. confusion amongst items which sound alike, is confined
to the short term whereas items with similar meanings were confused in
the long term. The evidence upon which Adams rests his case, basically,
are the experiments of Baddeley (1966 b) who olaimed to show that
acoustically similar lists ware subject to marked interference effects
over the short term only, whereas semantically similar lists were
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subject to interference over the long term only. Again at first
sight it is not evident that inferences based upon this type pf
data rest ultimately on the assumption that rapid forgetting dis¬
tinguishes the two systems. However, for interference effects to
show themselves, forgetting must have taken place, and to regard SIM
as being susceptible to acoustic interference is to allow that in SIM
rapid forgetting has token place of such a nature asto allow
confusions of acoustic aspects of stimuli to take place. On the other
hand to confine semantic interference to long term memory i3 to claim
that slow forgetting i.e. forgetting which manifests itself only some
time after the intake of information, is of such a nature that
semantic aspects of items are confused. Clearly if rapid forgetting
of aemantically related material occurred, its effects would be
manifest shortly after the Intake of material and semantic confusion
would be attributable to short term memory. Thus again, the assumption
that rapid forgetting distinguishes the two memory systwis is seen to
be operating in this experimental situation.
The next line of evidence, noted in Chapter 2, concerns evidence
for a dichotomous theory of memory based on free recall studies of the
sorial position curve, in particular, the fact that different sections
of the serial position curve 'react* differently to different
variables. For example the early and middle sections of the serial
position curve are affected by rate of presentation of items, whereas
the last part of the curve is not. In order to see that this evidence
ultimately depends on rapid forgetting distinguishing the two systems
it is necessary to consider what the experimenter and subject are
doing in a typical free recall, serial position experiment.
Typically, subjects are presented with a list of items above the
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memory span, and are requested to recall as many items as they can,
immediately the presentation io finished. The items are then
plotted according to their probability of recall, for each position
on the presentation list. A second list of items is then presented,
in which some variation in presentation rate, nature of material etc.
is present, and a second serial position curve is plotted. Differences
between the two serial position curves are then examined, normally
comparing the effects of the independent variable on the beginning and
middle sections, and the end section of the curve.
Two points of particular importance should be noted. The earlier
the item on the serial position curve, the longer it has to be retained
from presentation to recall, and the larger the number of items inter¬
polated between presentation and recall. Whilst something of an over¬
simplification, the serial position curve is therefore in a sense a
form of normal forgetting curve, in which one oompares forgetting
immediately after presentation with forgetting after a period of time
between presentation and recall. iVith the forgetting curve one
expects normally that retention immediately after or soon after pre¬
sentation to be high, but dropping off steeply until the curve levels
out. This is also present in the serial position curve where the
most recently presented items are best retained, but where the
probability of retention drops steeply the older the item, until there
is a levelling off in the probability of forgetting. Hence any
difference between the earlier and later part of the serial position
curve is due to differences in forgetting rates, with rapid forgetting
being characteristic of the recency part of the curve. The effect of
variables on the serial position curve is therefore to change the
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course and extent of rapid forgetting, and the assumption that
the recency part of the curve indicates output basically from tJ.EM
is based therefore on the assumption that rapid forgetting is
characteristic of ST?', but not IT?.
Perhaps two examples will help to illustrate the points being
made. Glanzer and Cunitz (1$>66) carried out two experiments in which
the shape of the serial position curve was examined in relation to two
independent variables. In one experiment this variable was time
between presentation and recall, the intervals being zero seconds,
10 seconds and 30 seconds. In the latter two conditions there was an
interpolated activity between presentation and recall. The result of
interpolation of activity between presentation and recall was a
reduction of the recall probabilities of the last few items, whilst
the earlier items were unaffected. Glanzer and Cunitz claimed that
this indicated that STM but not LTP was affected by interpolation of
activity. Whether this is so or not will be considered in a later
chapter, at present it ia only necessary to note that the immediate
recall condition is testing recall before the most recently presented
items have gone through their period of steepest decline i.e. early
in the forgetting curve. After a delay of 30 seconds or 30 they will
hove had this opportunity and one would not expect the moat recently
t footnote» A number of 3tudies using paired associate techniques
have been used by for example Peterson (1966 a) to support a
diehotomous theory. These studies have shown the differential
effects of independent variables, on the first and later sections of
the forgetting curve. Apart from providing empirical support for
free recall studies, it reinforces what has been said about serial
position curves being an alternative fonj of presentation of this
kind of data, to forgetting curves.
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presented, items to have such high recall probabilities as previously.
In other words one is merely examining the course of rapid forgetting,
and in attributing this rapid forgetting to STM G-lanzer and Cunitz
are clearly using it as a criterion for distinguishing STM and LTM.
It is reasonable to point out at this stage that the conclusion,
that rapid forgetting of the recency section of the curve indicates
output from STM, is to admit that rapid forgetting is the criterion by
which one decides that material is characteristic of STM. Thus if
items in the first part of the serial position curve had somehow
(mysteriously) been forgotten as a result of interpolation of activity,
lo; ving the end pert of the serial position curve unaltered, the. the
end part of the curve would be taken as indicating basically output
from long term memory, LTM not being susceptible to rapid forgetting
i.e. being a stable memory system (Murdock 19£>7)»
The second experiment carried out by Slanzer and Cunitz showed
thc.t I'ecentation rate affected the earlier and middle but not the
last part of the serial position curve. In their experiments the
rates of presentation of items varied from one every three to one
every nine seconds. Clearly even at the fastest rate of presentation
the opportunity for rehearsal was present. As numerous studies have
shown the greater the opportunity for rehearsal or control processes,
the greater is retention, and clearly as rate of presentation in¬
creases, so do opportunities for control processes decrease. One can
therefore interpret the serial position curves of this type of ex¬
periment in terms of control processes affecting the extent but not
the rate, of rapid forgetting. Again rapid forgetting must be
assumed to be the criterion which distinguishes short from long term
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memory if the recency part of the curve is to be interpreted in terms
of output from short term memory.*
The next line of evidence noted in Chapter 2 (point 6)
reminiscence effects, indicates, according to Peterson (1966 c), a
switching from one retrieval system to another. The experimental
evidence consists of showing that material which is rapidly forgotten
i.e. unavailable to immediate recall, can in fact be recalled more
efficiently after a period of time. Thus again, rapid forgetting is
assumed to distinguish material in "STM" and KLTM".
The seventh line of evidence noted, is based on evidence of
avoidance of responses recently given and therefore known to be wrong
in an experiment in which responses given some time previously are not
avoided. This can again be attributed to rapid forgetting. As one is
able to retain information recently given for a short period of time
one i , able to avoid a response recently given and known to be wrong.
On the other hand becuase of rapid forgetting only the most recently
given material will be available to aid in such a tads. Rapid for¬
getting again underlies this operational distinction between e ort and
long term memory.
The next lines of evidence, Points 8, 9 and 10 are those based
on the effects of shock of physiological insult. In all cases infor¬
mation recently acquired is rapidly lost and inferences are based on
this rapid forgetting of such a nature that it is assumed rapid for¬
getting indicates loss ofrom STM.
* The whole question of the serial position curve and its relevance
to the present controversy will be dealt with in Chapter 9.
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The introspective evidence, put forward by ffaugh and Norman
(196.5)» foint 11, appeals to introspective evidence of rapid for¬
getting and needs no further elaboration. As a statement of the
phenomenon of rapid forgetting it3 value as a source of evidenoe for
a dichotomy stands or fall3 on the question of whether rapid and less
rapid forgetting have the same cause.
The purpose, then, of this analysis of the lines of evidence
put forward in Chapter 2 in support of a dichotomous theory was to
indicate that all those lines of evidence depend on the assumption that
short and long term memory can be distinguished by attributing to short
term memory rapid forgetting or its operational consequences, and by
attributing long term retention or less rapid forgetting to long terai
memory. If rapid forgetting takes place in long term memory then all
the empirical evidence for a dichotomous theory is questioned because
it becomes impossible to decide, of any operation which results in
(fa
rapid forgetting, in which system it should be considered.^
The evidenoe required to establish a Dichotomous Theory
kany theoi'ists do in fact accept that the critical question is
whether rapid and /less rapid forgetting have the same underlying cause
in which case rapid forgetting can be assumed to take place in the
same system as leas rapid forgetting, (e.g. r.ielton 1963, Hilgard and
Bower 1966). The previous analysis of evidence for a dichotomous theory
j/L As the writer has noted elsewhere (Grruneberg 19&9 a') Hl^° argue that
relatively stable retention i3 only a sufficient condition for LTM
entails the possibility that all material enters L1M direct and makes




indicated that those psychologists who claimed that rapid forgetting
was not a characteristic of STO per se e.g. Adams (19&7) were
inconsistent and in fact made this assumption when putting forward
evidence of a dichotomy.
The present writer would like to take the points raised by
Hilgord and Bower, by I elton and by others, a stage further.
Hilgard and Bower, for instance, concentrate on the question of
whether autonomous trace decay of interference cause forgetting over
the short term, it being accepted by many dichotomists e.g. Broadbent
(1963) that interference causes forgetting in long term memory. Many
arguments are put forward to support the possibility of autonomous
trace decay as the cause of short term forgetting, inoluding some
which are required to overcome the problems posed for autonomous
trace decay by evidence that similarity of items affects forgetting
in the short term, and so on. They do not consider whether some of
these arguments could be used to support the view that forgetting
over longer periods might be due to autonomous trace decay, a view
that is certainly held by some psychologists (e.g. Brown 195®)• *n
view of what has been said, it is not enough to establish the cause of
forgetting in the short termp it must be shown to be qualitatively
different from forgetting in the long term if a duplexity theory is to
have currency. Indeed the question of the aotual cause of forgetting
is not crucial to those holding a single system theory. They can
accopt forgetting as being due to any cau3e, be it autonomous trace
decay, "classical" interference, displacement, compression or whatever.
The critical issue is whether there is any evidence which 3hows that
J
whatever the oause of forgetting is, over the short term, is not
the cause of forgetting over the long term.
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Whilst the actual cause of forgetting is not critical for those
holding a single system theory, the question as to the cause of
forgetting is relevant to the issue of one memory system or two
because certain theories of forgetting imply, as Melton (19^3) notes,
a single system theory. This is particularly true of interference
theory in its classical form, in which forgetting is olaimed to be
due to factors other than storage loss (e.g. competition at time of
response). (Psychologists such as Adams who look upon SIM forgetting
as being due to interference, and at the same time hold STM to have
lii ited storage capacity are using "interference" in a misleading way.
as was pointed out previously, they are not talking of interference in
the same way as other psychologists <£ Indeed Adams uses interference
in a way which is probably indistinguishable from trace decayJ ). To
hold a classical interference theory position is incompatible with a
limited storage capacity hypothesis, in that interference theory
claims that once in store, material is forgotten for reasons other
than loss from store - a hypothesis that is contradictory to the
limited storage capacity hypothesis.
whilst a failure to resolve the question of the exact nature of
short or long term forgetting is not critical to a resolution of th©
problem in favour of a single system theory of memory, a failure to
resolve the problem of the nature of short term forgetting is in
fact fatal for a dichotomous theory of memory. This is because a
failure to show that short term forgetting is qualitatively different
from long term forgetting must lead to the abandoning of a
dichotoraoua theory in favour of a single system theory on the grounds
of parsimony, a single system explanation being more parsimonious
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than a dichotomouu theory interpretation, other things being equal.
In other words, if it cannot be shown that short term forgetting is
not due to "classical* interference (assuming interference i3 the
cause of forgetting in IVKvi) than a single system theory must be held
as only one explanatory principle i3 involved rather than two. It
is not necessary to show that only a single system theory can handle
the data, it is necessary only to show that it can handle the data as
well as a diehotomous theory, in order to force an abandonment of a
diehotomous theory.
Dingle system theory explanations of the empirical data
If one holds a single system theory one is of course faced with
the problem of explaining rapid forgetting. A single system ex¬
planation i3 in tems of differing susceptibility of materials to
those factors which universally cause forgetting, rather than
differences in underlying memory mechanisms. As 7/ickelgren (19&5 ®)
puts it "Ob the contrary, if interference in STM can be shown
to depend on the nature of the interfering adtivity in the same way as
in LTftj, then it will be plausible to assume that S'R and LTIC are
performed bv the same system operating in a quantitatively different
manner under different degrees of learning." Rather than different
degrees of learning, this writer prefers to talk in terms of differing
susceptibility to forgetting. Differences in susceptibility may have
various causes. Thus for example, items in the middle and end of any
sequence are likely to be more susceptible to pro-active and inter
item interference merely due to their position within a sequence}
again if interference cor autonomous trace decay causes retention
failure through failure to discriminate similar aspects of stimuli,
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as some psychologists have suggested (e.g. Conrad 1967), then
differences in forgetting rates can be attributed to the relation¬
ship between the new item and the existing cognitive framework. Those
items which are unique, yet related to other items in the cognitive
framework one would expect to be forgotten leas rapidly because they
would be less subject to interference and retrieval difficulties.
Again, repetition of an item to the point of learning may make an item
immune from rapid forgetting factors because the strength of the item is
above a point at which it is liable to gross interference factors, as
Corbaliis (i960) suggests. Newly acquired items may be unduly
susceptible to interference because they have not been fully integrated
within the memory system and hence be unduly susceptible to forgetting
factors. Differences in susceptibility of differing materials to rapid
forgetting e.g. acoustic a3 opposed to sernantically related materials,
may again merely reflect the higher susceptibility of acoustically
related materials to those factors which universally cause forgetting.
This may be because acoustic relationships, being much less frequently
used than semantic relationships, are less well integrated within the
memory system and hence much more liable to those factors which
universally cause forgetting.
a dichotomous theory - unproved and unprovable?
If it is always possible to claim that rapid forgetting can be
accounted for in terms of differing susceptibility of materials to those
factors which universally cause forgetting, iij as the next chapter
illustrates, it is not possible to claim that rapid forgetting is due to
autonomous trace decay, displacement, compression or whatever, as
opposea to some other form of forgetting in LH.1; if as subsequent
chapters hope to show, all the evidence considered in Chapter 2 is
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either defective or another way of posing the question as to the
cause of rapid forgetting rather than answering it, then a dichoto-
mous theory is unprovable and unproved. It is unprovable if there are
no empirical means of distinguishing the possibilities of two memory
mechanisms and one mechanism in which rapid forgetting is attributable
to differences in susceptibility of materials to forgetting, and if
it is empirically impossible to separate interference and other
A
forgetting factors.
It is unproved if no evidence unequivocally supports a
dichotomy, even allowing that rapid forgetting can be used as a
criterion for distinguishing material in the two systems.
As was previously pointed out, to hold a single system theory
it is not necessary to show that the data can only be handled by a
single system theory, it is enough to show that it can be handled by
a single system theory. In other words it is enough to show that no
evidence unequivooally supports a dichotomous theory, in order to hold
the more parsimonious single system theory. The single system theory ia
more parsimonious despite postulating differing susceptibilities of
materials to those factors vrhich universally cause forgetting because a
dual system theory must in fact do the same, as well as postulating two
memory systems rather than one. If material in long term memory did
not differ in its susceptibility to forgetting, then all material of the
same strength, once in LTM, would be forgotten at the same rate. Yet
j/L Footnotex It is certainly unprovable if one allows, as Adams (1967)
does, that interference operates in both ifUlu and LTM. It is clearly
impossible to separate two systems theories from those which adwiooate




various experiments e.g. by Baddeley (1^66 a) indicate that
semantically related material is forgotten at a faster rate in LOT
than non-semantically related material, clear evidence of differences
in forgetting rates for different materials in LTM. If therefore, one
is not going to postulate different underlying mechanisms to account
for different forgetting rates, one must account for the phenomena in
terms of differing susceptibility to factors which universally cause
forgetting, and hence create a more unparsimonious theory than a
single system (not a single process) theory.
It might of course be argued that parsimony is somethingati ich
a scientist need not accept. In the view of this writer this is quite
wrong. Parsimony is the scientific principle. Given enough lost hoc
assumptions almost any theory can be justified, but the most economical
theory is held until it is shown to be the less economical; the
confusion of some writers e.g. Atkinson and Ghiffrin on the question of
parsimony is one of confusion of economy of systems and economy of
explanation. Of course a single system theoiy of memory may be lesa
iBraifflonious than a dichotomous theory if the maintenance of a single
system theory requires the postulation of more general principles than
the maintenance of a dichotomous theory. If, however, a single system
theory requires the postulation of a lesser number of general principles,
than it is more parsimonious, and thi3 is the position taken by the
present writer. If it is never possible to distinguish between an
explanation based on two systems and one based on differing suaepti-
bility to forgetting of materials within one system, then the necessary
addition of a further explanatory principle for a dichotomous theory
in terms of differing susceptibility of materials to forgetting in one
of the systems makes it less parsimonious in a real sense. This is
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because a 3 ingle system theory and a dichotortious theory hold the
3ingle system theory principle in common, and a dichotomous theory
add3 an additional principle.
Summary of Chapter a
Thi3 chapter has looked at the criterion upon which evidence for a
dichotornous theory is based. All the lines of evidence noted in the
previous chapter were examined in order to demonstrate that they
depend on the assumption that rapidly forgotten material is lost from
short term memory, and that long term memory is a relatively stable
system.
The critical question can thus be seen to be the cause of rapid
forgetting. Has it the same or a different cause from long term for¬
getting? It was pointed out that for the purposes of maintaining a
single system theory it was not necessary to speoify the cause of rapid
forgetting. It is sufficient to »|k>w that there is no reason to suppose
that the cause of rapid and less rapid forgetting differs, whatever the
cause. Yet to hold a dichotomous theory it is necessary to show that
r\
certain theoriec cehnot account for rapid forgetting in that they are
incompatible with a duplexity theory.
It was next noted that if one holds a single system theory one
is faced with explaining the phenomenon of rapid forgetting. Basically
a single system theory accounts for rapid forgetting in terms of
greater susceptibility of materials to those factors which universally
cause forgetting, as it seems to the writer empirically impossible
to distinguish a two system theory in which rapid forgetting has a
different cause from less rapid forgetting, and a single system theory
which accounts for rapid forgetting in terms of differential
susceptibility of materials to those factors which universally cause
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forgetting, then a dichotomoua theory of memory is unprovable .
Thia ia also true if different causes cannot be attributed to rapid
and leas rapid forgetting, in which case, of course, rapid forgetting
must be accounted for in terms of differing susceptibility of materials
to thoae factors which universally cause forgetting.
Not to be able to establish a dichotomous theory is to force its
abandonment in favour of a single system theory, beoause of considerations
of parsimony. This is because a duplexity theory must apply in explana¬
tions of long terra forgetting, the principle of differing susceptibility
of materials to those factors which universally cause forgetting, in





There are two reasons for considering the relationship between
recognition and recall et this point. First, it has methodological
implications in that recognition experiments are often taken to have
relevance for findings baaed on recall experiments, e.g. Adams (1967),
as previously noted, uaea Hebb and Foord's (l%5) experiment employing
a recognition teak, to diamia3 the autonomoua trace transformation
theory of the 0estaltiat3, who3e findings were often based on recall
experiments. Second, and more important perhaps, if recognition and
recall are dichotomous states, then there exists the possibility of
foui' memory systems over time, rather than two i.e. a short term and
long term recognition memory, and a short term and long term recall
memory.
In this chapter an analysis of the relationship between
recognition and recall will commence with a consideration of the nature
of recognition and recall tasks. There will then follow an analysis of
the various positions taken by writers on the relationship between
recognition and recall. The first hypothesis considered is that
recognition and recall involve dichotomous storage systems.
The next hypothesis to be considered is that recognition and
recall involve dichotomous retrieval systems as Kintsch (1963) for
instance , has suggested. It will be argued that this is not a
necessary conclusion otf the basis of available evidence.
If recognition and recall tasks are not indicative of
dichotomous states, then the question of the exact relationship
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still remains. It is suggested that recognition scores do indicate
greater storage than do recall scores, whatever the relationship
between recognition and recall, and it is further suggested that the
relationship between recognition and recall involves forgetting rather
than partial acquisition at least under normal circumstances.
The r^.tv.ro of recognition and recall tasks.
The recognition test takes two basic forms. In one form
(multiple choice testing) the correct item is embedded in a number of
false alternatives (diatractors) and the subjects are required to select
the correct item. The forced choice techniques employed by She oil (1567)
in which only one distractor was present, is a special case of this
technique.
The seoond form which the recognition test takes is to present an
item without a distractor, and ask whether the item is new or old, new
a: i Id items being mixed in the retention test. (This f r of b: e
recognition test is used by the writer as it overcomes man/ of the
di. ,'iculties of interpretation involved in the multiple choice test,
such as the effect of identifying incorrect responses on retention
scores( (See Chapter 7).
■:ecall tests on the other hand, involve the presentation f
material, and a request for the reproduction of that material without
any further oues from the experimenter which might aid retrieval. This
is to essential difference between recall and all recognition tests,
whether single item or multiple choice. The recognition tasks both
involve presenting the subject with the ultimate cue for tetrieval m
t .0 jri( .inal item.




recognition and recall, it is soon clear that there is as much
disagreement amongst students of memory in this area as on the ques¬
tion of the relationship between short and long term memory, and this
disagreement crosses tie theoretical boundaries of single system a3
opposed to dichotomous system formulations on short and long term
memory. Thus both Tulving (1968) and Mams (196?) who are dichotomous
theorists maintain that recognition and recall are dichotomous states,
whereas Tiiffrin and Atkinson (1969) and Bower (1967), also dichotomous
theorists, t<.. ;e the opposing view.
'hilst Tulving (1968) - P 27 - states "Scores on a recognition
test are determined by different retained information from that measured
by recall tests.", others, such as Norman and .Vickelgren (19&9) prefer
to back up their assertions with empirical evidence. The relevant
parugra hs (P 195) are quoted in full.
"There is actually considerable evidence to support the assump¬
tion that the same memory system is employed in both recognition aid
recall, though there is really no evidence on the relation between the
memory system used in recognition and that used in multiple choice
tests of 3TA.
'Qualitative support for the assumption of a common memory system
for both recognition and recall is provj.ded by experiments showing that
errors in STK tend to be phonetically similar to the correct item for
both recall (Conrad, 1964, Wickelgren 1965a, 1965 b, 1966) and
recognition, ickelgran (1966), and that repetition, primacy ind recency
affect recall and recognition tests of STM in similar ways. Quanti¬
tative support for the assumption of a common memory system for recog¬
nition and recall is provided in a study by Norman (1966) which
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compared the rates of decay for the two types of tests, using strength
theory to transform response probabilities into trace strengths in
both cases. The rate of decay in verbal ,T! was quite similar for both
recall and recognition."
Despite the claims put forward by Norman and Wiokelgren (1969)
and by Tulving (1963) there is evidence which poses problems for those
holding both a common memory system and a dichotomous memory system for
recognition and recall.
ijflgggak&aa. j&ateSaaaaa atoyase sya-^emg.
Adams (1967) considers the hypothesis that recall and recognition
are based on a common memory trace but that recognition has a lower
threshold and is more sensitive, and concludes that there is little
empirical support for this position. lie claims that the hypothesis is
based on the findings that recognition tests yield higher retention
scores than do tests employing recall. Such findings ere frequently
reported in the literature e.g. rostman et al (1943). Kay and Dkemp
(1936) and also confirmed in Experiment 1 of this thesis (Chapter 7)*
Adams attacks this position however, by an appeal to such findings,
as those of Davis, Sutherland and Judd (I96I), who showed that
increasing the number of alternatives reduced recognition, and
Bahrick and Bahrick (1964) who showed that reducing the discrimina-
bility of items reduced recognition, in multiple choice recognition
tests.
On P 267, Adams notest "There remains the uncomfortable fact
that recognition is not so superior to recall when the number of
alternatives in the recognition test is large or the discriminability
of alternatives is low." Why this should be an uncomfortable finding
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is not clear to the writer, as Adams himself earlier notes "that
superiority of recognition over recall can be abolished, should not
subtract from the very high retention and capacity that can be pro¬
duced by the recognition method when the number of alternatives is
small. Recall can yield nothing like the vast capacity for recognising
hundreds of stimuli, as Rhepard (1967) ^aa found." Again Davis et al
(1961) upon whom Adams' discomfiture rests, are concerned to use their
evidence to show that recognition and recall are the same process,
not different.
The question that Adams is faced with, then, concerns the
reason for the reduction in recognition capability as the number of
alternatives or. their discriminability increases. Adams treats the
number of alternatives end their discriminability as two separate
variables, but the evidence of Dale and Baddeley (19&2) and of Field
and Lachman (1966), is that thi3 is not the case, the similarity of
alternatives, not the number, is the critical variable. Common sense
too, dictates that this is the case. If a subject is presented with a
recognition task of this nature: Presentation item: "The battle of
Hastings was in I066." Recognition task: "Has the Battle of Hastings
in 1066, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904 1969, it is clear- that
increasing the number of alternatives in the range 1904 19&9
is unlikely to affect recognition. One possibility is that increasing
the number of alternatives, where it does affect recognition scores,
does so by increasing interference factors, and indeed Davies,
Sutherland und Judd (1961) Field and Lachman (1966) and Teghtsoonian
(1965), ('"ho also showed increasing difficulty of recognition with
increasing the number of alternatives), suggests this very hypothesis
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a hypothesis that Adams is certainly aware of. Again Field and
Laohman note that one factor in increasing the number of alternatives
is an increase in interpolated activity and the retention interval, which
can be expected to have a detrimental effect on recognition scores.
There is in fact a great deal of evidence to suggest that
recognition rate is dependent on similarity factors, just as recall
rate varies with similarity of material, apart from the evidence of
Dale and Baddeley (1962) that similarity and not number of alternatives
per se is critical in recognition rate, Thu3 Dachs (1967 c» ") found
recognition of synonyms embedded in sentences was very low, and
Underwood and Freund (1963) in an experiment similar to that r ported
in this thesis on acoustic and semantic confusion, found that both
acoustic and semantic relationships hed a detrimental effect on
recognition rate. The experimen+al evidence of Annisfeld and Knapp
(1963) also showed the effects of semantic relationships on recognition
scores, and Allen and Gorton (1963) have shown that knowledge of the
meanings of rare words facilitates recognition. Again both Gorman (1961)
and Shepard (1967) found that frequency of usage of words was related
to recognition rate, a finding supported by Young e+ al (1968), and the
evidence quoted by Norman and A'ickelgren (1969). noted earlier, supports
a similarity interpretation of forgetting for recognition as for recall.
Furthermore a study of recognition threshold by Landauer and Freedman
(1963) indicates that recognition time increases ss Ci+egory size
increases, suggesting that recognition is affected by associative
factors. It seeras clear, therefore, that the relationship between a word
and its previously learned associates, affects recognition rate.
This brief review, then, indicates that recognition, using
- 6l -
5/7
a small number of alternatives, is superior to recall and that the
disappearance of this superiority with increasing the difficulty in
discrimination of alternatives, in recognition tasks, can be attributed
to an increase in the detrimental effects of similarity on recognition,
just as this affects recall. This does notcf course indicate that
recognition is not less sensitive than recall, merely that tasks can be
devised such that this sensitivity is not allowed to operate.
s an alternative to the hypothesis that recognition and recall
are based on the same memory system, Adams puts forward a perceptual
trace hypothesis, in which it is claimed that exposure to an environ¬
ment. i stimulus establishes an S-perceptual trace of some stability.
P. 265: wAa far as memory is concerned, the S-perceptual trace is
reactivated by the original stimulus at the recognition test and causes
the subject to identify it as old. A capability for recalling responses
associated with a stimulus need not be present for the identification
response to occur, although it may be in some oases. If so the recall
of the response is assumed to be based on a different memory st; te
which is being called the "memory trace". " On P 269, Mams elaborates
further what he means by the S-perceptual trace, when he talks of an
"uncoded image", and differentiates recognition and recall on the grounds
oL recall involving a response to a stimulus, whereas recognizing does
not involve the output of a response.
It has to be said for this theoretical position that it is not
disproved by evidence of a correlation between recognition and recall
scorea for individuals, as Norman and Wickelgren (1969) appear to claim •
Thus dans notes that an S-perceptual trace is the basis for recog¬
nition find that a recall trace can be formed at the same time.
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fet there can be little doubt that if he regards recognition as an
uneoded image, Adams' theoretical position falls in the face of
empirical evidence. In the first place, his formulation in terms of
reactivating a perceptual trace with the original stimulus appears
to be advocating a template matching process. Von Kreis (1901)
points out that such a formulation is incompatible with stimulus
generalisation and equivalence, for instance a tune transposed in
key. memory depends on form and pattern constancy and not on the
resti...ulation of the identical stimulus,
further evidence against the "uncoded image" hypothesis comes
fro;; the experiments of Underwood and freund previously noted, which
have demonstrated the effects of semantic and acoustic factors on
recognition. The demonstration of acoustic and semantic similarity
effects on recognition rate indicates that recognition memory has
organisational properties involving acoustic and semantic relationships.
g.; n the evidence presented by Norman and ..ickelgren (19'j5)
must be considered. They found that curves for recognition of single
digits and pairs of digits were different. The curves for digit pairs
did not follow that of single digits, indicating that some organisation
of the digit pairs had taken place, contrary to an "uncoded image"
theory.
Other evidence quoted in Norman and Wickelgren's later (19&9)
pope-, end referred to earlier, claims that organisational properties
of recognition and recall are similar, fhey note that repetition,
ri;. ,c.; and recency effects act in a siraSLar way in recognition nd
recall. The evidence here however, is not too dear. Wolf and
John .e (l ob) for instance found that repetition in a series facilitated
recognition but degraded recall. Nevertheless, as Wolf and Jahnke
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admit, the experimental tasks were such that this can be explained
without inferring a dichotomy between recognition and recalls the
recognition task involved merely identifying an item as having
occurred, the recall taak depended on retaining both the item and the
fact that the item was repeated. It must be pointed out too, tha+ this
result is something of an oddity and that repetition normally
facilitates recognition as it does recall, e.g. Lachman, Laughery and
Field (1966)/ ^ 2
An earlier and related experiment by Melton (19&7 *s Qiao
something of a puzzle in that he found that increasing the interval
between repetitions decreased recall, but increased recognition.
However, this experimental task was exactly opposite to that of Wolf
and Jahnke, in which only recall of an item wa3 required, whereas
in recognition, the identification of a repetition was required. It
does ss em reasonably clear that as the nature of the experimental task
can produce results in the opposite direction, there is no need to
postulate a dichotomy in underlying mechanisms.
In another experiment Jahnke and Erlick (1968) whilst noting
similarities in the serial position curve for recognition and recall,
also note that the curve is unchanged by increasing delay, unlike
recall*
f- 1. Footnote: As will be seen in Chapter 6, it is likely that
opportunities for organisation, rather than repetition a3 such,
facilitate retention.
j> 2. Footnote: The experiment of Lachxnsnet al (1966) is in itself
an oddity in that after 128 repetitions, recall was better than
recognition, although the authors account for this in tej&t of serial
order eventually helping recall.
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Whilst one must allow that these findings, which were obtained for
serial material within the memory span i.e. 7 digit sequences, are
difficult to account for in terms of one system for recognition and re¬
call, it is not obvious how they can be accounted for in dichotomous
terms *
There are indeed other findings which are awkward to account for,
the experiment of Lachman et al (1968) discussed earlier, being one.
notaer is the finding of Shepard (1967) and Gorman (1961) that frequent
nouns are less well remembered than non frequent nouns (using recog¬
nition) contrary to the findings from recall experiments of Lloyd (1964).
Again xoung et al (1968) found a cross-over effect, with recognition
superior for high frequency words immediately after presentation but
inferior for low frequency words 24 hours later. The experiment of
Turnage (1967) is of relevance here. Using a recall task he found
high frequency words better recalled immediately, but that after 30
sees, low frequency words were better retained. This fits in, t least
to some extent, with the findings of Young et al (1968) on recognition.
It may well be that these contrary findings are a function of the
experimental designs used, particularly in relation to the time interval
between presentation and retention test. This is a reasonable assump¬
tion to the extent that different experimental designs were employed in
all the experiments. Thus, unlike other experiments, that of Lloyd
involved a sequential memory task, in which recall n was required
more rv idly than for normal memory tasks.
respite the problems posed for a single system for recognition
a call, at best by one or two isolated experiments, it seems clear
t; t t is vast bulk of experimental evidence indicates a large measure
of communal!ty in the organisational properties of recognition nd




It must be admitted that Adams is not entirely clear as to
what he regards as the nature of the u-perceptual trace. ftbilat on
P. 269 he does describe the trace as an uncoded image, he earlier
quotes, without comment as to whether he accepts what he quotes, from
a paper by Sheffield (1961). Sheffield refers to sensory responses,
which are certainly not uncoded images as they are assumed to be sub¬
ject to learning principles of association by contiguity. Further
Sheffield notes that they need not (as opposed to j|o not, which Adams
claims) heve any motor component.
It may be, therefore, that Adams holds that recognition and
recall have the same organisational properties, and are subject to the
same kind of forgetting factors, but differ only in that items recalled
have a response potential, whereas item3 recognised do not, and indeed
never have had such a potential. If this is what is being claimed,
then the situation is somewhat more complex. It is not obvious to the
writer that it is empirically possible to distinguish such a theory
from one which regards the relationship between recognition and recall,
as one within a single memory system, in which partial learning or
forgetting accounts for the inability to recall, but only recognize an
item.
Take for example the evidence which Adams himself puts forward,
that one can achieve high recognition rates for stimuli which are
difficult to verbalise i.e. nonsense shapes, e.g. Deese (1956)
Clark (1965), and are thus based on a pure 'S' perceptual trace. It
seems reasonable to suppose that 3uch figures contain little redundancy
and are,therefore, difficult to process, taking a long time to be fully
learned. Yet 3uch shapes are likely to be relatively unique so that
partial learning will be enough for identification.
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There has, in fact, been a recent attempt to consider whether
recognition and recall differences could be attributed to tv?o differ¬
ential storage processes, or whether retrieval differences were involved.
The study, by Freund et al (19&9) involved examining differences between
recognition and recall when subjects were unaware at the time of
presentation by which mode they would be tested. As "they found no
differences for recognition and recall as a function of this variable,
they concluded that this was consistent with retrieval differentiating
recognition and recall. Yet this experiment, as the authors themselves
admit, iejmerely consistent with this supposition, it does not disprove
the possibility that all items automatically enter a recognition memory
aid .:.v also automatically onter a separate recall memory.
If it is empirically impossible to distinguish the dichotomous
and non-dichotomous recognition/recall theories outlined above, it is
reasonable to assume, on the grounds of parsimony both at a biological
and ex lan^tory level, that recognition and recall are related within
the same memory storage system. Thus it appeal's biologically un-
parsimonious to have a duplication of memory systems, in which both
have the same organisational properties. It is unparsimonious at an
explanatory level in that the organisational principles of memory
established by using recall tasks appear more or less to fit the
organisational, principles found by using recognition tasks.
If then, one assumes that recognition and recall are not
dichotomous memory storage systems, various possibilities a riceming
the relationship between the two can still be hypothesised#
Dichotomous Retrieval Systems
The second dichotomy which has been suggested, e.g. by
hintsah (1968), is in terms of retrieval systems, indeed with other
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writers, e.g. Schonfield and Robertson (1966) and Kurdock (I96S), he
suggests that only recall involves retrieval. Schonfield and
Robertson quote Deese (1963) "In recall a subject must produce a set
of responses, whereas in recognition the set of responses is produced
for him". One might -well agree, to a large extent at least, with Deeae,
and yet argue that the terminology of writers such as Schonfield and
Robertson is unhappy. If retrieval is defined in terms of whether the
subject must produce his own cues (or moat of them) whereas, in recog¬
nition this is unnecessary, then the view of Schonfield and Robertson
may just be tenable. The experimental evidence of Gofer et al (1969)
and light and Carter-Sobell (1970) however, indicates that as changed
semantic context between input and output can inhibit recognition, some
search process is needed to account for this; recognition cannot
merely be in terms of identifying a recently given item. In other
word3 in recognition, retrieval cues, in the form of context are given,
just as is the case with recall. Available information, to quote
Tulving and l.adigan (1970) is not "automatically accessibleP when an
•old' item is presented. Again, such writers as Tulving (19&8)
look on retrieval as trace utilisation, and in this sense the
distinction between recognition and recall is not in terms of the
requirement of retrieval from storage, aa clearly the stored material
is utilised even in recognition, in that at theory least some matching
of new and old information must take place.
Retrieval, in fact, as Freund et al (19&9) note, is too broad
a term to be functional in this type of analysis, and the distinction
made between various aspects of retrieval by Shiffrin and Atkinson (1969)
has therefore some appeal. They distinguish searoh, recovery and
response generation. Search involves the location of stored information,
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Recovery is the process by which the information is made available
for response, and finally response generation is the process which
compreses all aspects of translating the recovered information intoA-
the desired response, which might include the utilisation of partial
inform tion in order to guess responses.
Norman (1968) regards recognition and recall as differing in
terms of differences in the question asked of the storage system and
hence differences in the search process. P 533 "In recall the task
is t regenerate an item given its context - ("what word were you shown
yesterday?"). In recognition the required task is just "the reverse.
Here the item itself is given; the question is whether the context
surrounding the item is appropriate ("Is this the word you were shown
yesterday?"). Note that the recognition task does not require the same
type of search used in recall, the recursive query - output - decision -
query chain is not needed. All that is required in recognition is an
assessment of the appropriateness of the various associations surround¬
ing a stored item to the association demanded by the query".
If Norman regards the information that the words "you were shown
yesterday" indicate the giving of context in the case of the recall task,
it is diii icult to see why this should not also be giving the context
for a recognition task. In the recall task as well as the recognition
task one must presumably check the appropriateness of any item located
in store in terms of its appropriateness, i.e. in terms of the various
associates surrounding the stored item. It may be that more than one
match mismatch operation is not required in a recognition as opposed to
a recall task, but this hardly necessitates the postulation of two
types of retrieval process (search).
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it seems reasonable therefore, to go along with Shiffrin and
Atkinson (1969) when they conclude on the question of recognition
and recall i 171. "Hypotheses which ascribe different retrieval
mechanisms for recognition and recall are not necessary.In both
recognition and recall the presented stimulus will be sorted into
an L.T.area and a search initiated th- re. In the case of recog¬
nition, the search can be quite limited, perhaps consisting of an
examination of a single image." Gruneberg (1969b) was getting at the
same point j. .J22. ,when restating Hunter'3(1964) suggestion that as
one moves from giving few retrieval cues to giving many, one is going
from a recall to a recognition task.
According to this type of analysis,, one might argue that what
chonfield and Robertson are saying is that in single item
recognition all the cues to the location of information are given,
the subject merely has to indicate whether the information .s
stored where the cue indicates, whereas in recall such cues are not
given and the subject has to search a larger area of storage on the
basis of what cues he has. Of course in recognition tasks the full
information may not be stored or the strength of the trace may be
weak, relative to other similar traces .In such a case a decision
has to be mace as to whether an item is old or new. This decision
is affected by response generation, which may well involve response
bias.
A further distinction that is claimed between recognition and
recall concerns the effects of list organisation on retention.
Kintsch(1968) found that the organisation of a list aids recall
but not recognition. This he considered evidence for a dichotomy
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of retrieval systems. On the other hand Bower et al (1970) l&chraan
and Tuttle (1965) Itoaenberg (1968) and Handler et el (19&9) did find
recognition aided by list organisation. hilst there is no obvious
explanation of these discrepant findings, it does not seem necessary
in our present state of knowledge, to dichotomise between recognition
and recall on the grounds which Kintsch suggests.
If one allows, then, that recognition and recall do not differ
in terms of differing storage retrieval systems, but that recognition
involves less of a search than does recall (perhaps one match mismatch
as opposed to many) then the two major problems posed at the beginning
of the chapter are answered, tirst, recognition experiments do have
implications for findings based on recall experiments, and second,
it seems unnecessary to consider whether there are four rather than two
memory systems over time. Nevertheless, two further problems remain.
In the first place one is faced with the question of whether the
amount of information which can be obtained by recognition and recall is
merely a function of the task set, or whether there are real differences
in the amount of information which can be obtained by using the two
*
methods. The second problem follows on from the first. If recognition
teats yield additional information about the amount of information in
store compared to tests of recall alone, how does this come about?
Is it, for instance, because in addition to information which can be
obtained by recall as a result of complete infoircation storage, other
information of a less complete nature is stored, which can only be
located by the use of efficient search cue3, or might there be other
explanations? These two problems are now considered in turn.
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Information revealed b.y recognition and recall
Bahrick (196k) has proposed that differences between recognition
and recall are in terms of differences in the rature of the task and do
not reflect underlying differences in memory. He claims that the higher
recognition scores may reflect a higher degree of original learning,
in that it requires fewer trials for recognition to reach a given
criterion than recall. If one gives the same amount of learning
opportunity to a recognition and a recall task, then the former will
receive a higher degree of original learning. If one could reduce the
learning opportunities for recognition until they were equal to that
of recall, differences would presumably disappear.
3 Field and Lachman (1966) however, point out, the isete of
whether recognition is superior to recall is by itself meaningless.
The appropriate question is that concerning the conditions 'which lead
to superior recognition performance contrasted with recall performance.
Ihus G-runeberg, Experiment 2 Chapter 7, (19&9 b) also has s/iojvn that
following a single presentation of a list of words, recognition
measurement indicated many more items in store than a previous free
recall task had indicated. Using different experimental designs,
and different materials, Brown (1965), Postman et al (1948), hay and
Skemp (1956) and Brown and Packham (1967) have all shown that
recognition is superior to recall, after recall has run its course -
this despite interpolated recall having a detrimental effect on later
recognition in some instances (Postman et el, Brown and Packham).
Balirick (1964) may well be right, that this extra recognition w s
possible because it require,? less learning than does recall, but it
does not mean that recognition is not superior to recall given the same
learning task. Hecognition is superior to recall in the se 2e of
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indicating more items are stored as indicated by recognition than
are indicated by recall, after all information obtainable by recall
has been obtained. Again, of course, to argue that recognition is
superior to recall only because less learning is involved is circular;
the evidence upon which such an assertion is based is the larger
recognition scores obtained by recognition tests after an equal
numb r of trials.
Further attempts to account for recognition recall differences in
terms of task differences have been made by Davies et al (1961) and
Slamecica (1967)* As has already been noted, these writers showed that
increasing the number of alternatives reduced to zero differences
between recognition and recall scores.
gain the evidence of Davies et al (1961) Teghtsoonian (1965)
and dlamecka, cannot be taken as showing that recognition and recall
do not normally yield differences in measured retention in favour of
recognition. Hather the results indicate that the relationship
between recognition and recall is of a non diehotomous nature, -i-'hus
recall may be inferior to recognition for the reason that Slamocka
suggests, indicating that perhaps the larger number of alternatives
to be considered in recall increases interference relative to the
recognition processes, as has previously been suggested. It is still
important to stress that whilst one can devise tasks in which recog¬
nition is not superior to recall, by reducing recognition scores, one
still has evidence, e.g. Shepard (1967) Gruneberg (l969 b) that the
amount of information which can be shown through recognition is superior
to that shown through recall. One must beware of arguing, by analogy,
that because a man with his legs tied to a post cannot run any faster
than a man with no legs there is no real difference between the
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running ability of a man with lags end a man without. Because one
can reduce recognition scores to the level of recall scores does
not mean that one can increase recall scores to the level of normal
recognition scores. In the nature of things recall may involve more
interference than recognition under normal circumstances.
It seems reasonable to assume that recognition and recall may
bo art of the same memory system, that recognition tasks may, under
normal circumstances yield higher scores than recall tasks, ai^d that
this is not merely an artifact of measurement technique or task, in
that recall scores have nevex* been known to reach the level of recog¬
nition scores under normal circumstances. If, then, recognition tests
yield greater evidence of storage of items than do recall tests,
co next question is, why?
Partial Learning - acquisition or forgetting?
It has been suggested (Mc Kulty 1965, 1966) that the superiority
of recognition over recall is due to recognition requiring only partial
learning of information, whereas recall requires complete learning.
Thus it might not be possible to recall that a word previously pre¬
sented was Edinburgh but if one has learned the "Edin" part, then
amongst a list of alternatives such as Edinburgh, G-lasgow, London,
correct identification would be possible. The critical question for
present purposes is whether this partial learning is due to failure
of acquisition or of retention i.e. forgetting of material previously
c ired.
It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that both possibilities
might be operating, depending on the experimental conditions. Ihus t
very fast rates of presentation it may be that only a part of the
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stimulus is acquired before the next stimulus is presented, and so
on. In such a setting it might be reasonable to suppose that partial
learning implies partial acquisition. Memory tasks, however, more
commonly involve presentation rates such that categorisation of the
stimulus is possible. Thus dock (1957) notes that if one were to
break into a sequence immediately after presentation, one would be
able to obtain recall of the last item presented. There is
experimental evidence that this is the case, e.g. Murdoch (1963) and
further evidence is presented by G-runeberg and Sykes (196? b).
In one experiment subjects were read a list of items at one per second
and had to respond immediately (auditorally). This they succoeded in
doir vdth only one or two errors out of 40 words presented. in,
as ochonfield (1967) notes it is not self evident why subjects should
acquire part of a word, when it seems as easy to acquire the word
itself.
It seems reasonable to suppose, therefore, that where categori¬
sation f items has taken place, (at presentation rates of 1 item per
second at least) then in looking at the relationship between recog¬
nition and recall one is dealing with the problem of forgetting. ..hat
therefore, is the cause of forgetting such that recognition only is
possible where once recall was possible? Various possibilities x^esent
themselves.
: orgetting can, in fact, be accounted for under Hires general
headings, (l) There may be degeneration of an underlying t ace dor
neurological reasons which are independent of experience (autonom his
trace decay); (2) There may be degeneration of the underlying trace
through experiential factors, e.g. displacement or compression etc.,
or (3) there may be forgetting for reasons unconnected with the loss
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of the underlying trace, i.e. retrieval problems, e.g. competition
of responses
These possibilities, in other words, are reflections of the
possible mechanisms of forgetting, with which the next chapter will
be concerned. Even if it is not possible to solve the problem of the
nature of rapid forgetting, however, chapter 7 indicates the importance
of the relationship between recognition and recall in an analysis of the
limited capacity hypothesis, and the non dichotomous nature of the two
is assumed in an experimental attack on semantic and acoustic inter¬
ference effects in short and long terra memory.
The foregoing analysis of the relationship between recognition
and recall has also interesting implications for the more general
question of the grounds upon which a dichotomous theory of memory can
reasonably be held. any psychologists who hold that short and long
term raemoiy are separate systems, nevertheless maintain that recognition
and recall are not dichotomous. Norman and '.Vickelgren (19&9) both
dichotomists, deny a dichotomy to recognition and recall, on the grounds
of similar reactivity of recognition tasks and recall tasks to such
variables as repetition. This very reason was advanced by J elton (19&3)
to reject a dichotomy between short and long term memory. Furthermore
the large difference in capacity between recognition and recall, has
its parallel in the distinction between short and long term memory
(Adams 1967)*
If evidence of communal organisational characteristics is
sufficient to reject a dichotomy between recognition and reoall, despite
operational differences, it is not obvious why this principle should not
be extended to the distinction between short and long term memory.
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Finally, it should be stressed that whilst of great
importance to an analysis of differences between STM and I»TK, any
inadequacy of interpretation of the relationship between recognition
and recall is not critical to such an analysis. In almost all cases,
empirical evidence exists using both recognition and recall, which casts
serious doubt on either being indicants of underlying dichotoaous
memory systems*
Sui.m<ary
This chapter has concerned itself with an analysis of the
reloti : rip between recognition and recall. This analysis v/as noted
to be necessary in the context of a thesis on differences betwoor. short
said long term memory, both because of methodological implications, and
the theoretical possibility that a dichotomy between recognition a.id
recall might involve further distinctions between short and long term
memory.
The first possibility considered was that recognition and recall
differed in terms of the underlying storage mechanisms employed. The
possibility that recognition consisted of uncoded images was examined
and shown to be inconsistent with a large amount of evidence which
indie, tea organisational characteristics of recognition memory. The
possibility that recognition memory is a separate storage syste. .. Lth,
however, the same organisational characteristics as recall memory seems
to be empirically undistinguishable from a theory which claims that
recognition and recall are part of the same storage system.
The next possibility considered was that recognition no. r call
differed in terms of underlying retrieval mechanisms, it even being
suggested that the question of retrieval did not apply to recognition.
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The analysis of the retrieval process by Shiffrin and Atkinson
(1969), however, indicates that the terra retrieval i3 too broad to be
of functional value in this type of analysis, and a distinction
between search, recovery and response generalisation is useful. Suoh
an analysis reveals that differences between recognition and recall
are likely to be in terms of the amount of search required, not in
the utilisation of stored material. As Shiffrin and Atkinson (1969)
note, it does not appear necessary to hold, therefore, that recog¬
nition and recall have different retrieval mechanisms. Thus it
appears reasonable to view findings based on recognition experiments
as relevant to findings baoed on recall tasks, and it appears
unnecessary to consider the question of whether there are four
memory systems over time, rather than two.
Two further problems wore next considered. Can recognition
scores reveal that more information is stored than can be obtained
by recall scores, and if so, why? The empirical evidence is ■'■hat
after recall has been required, a recognition task can reveal evidence
of further storage. 1+ was then suggested tha+ whilst partial leaiv
ning can account for +his superiority of recognition, i+ is likely
to be partial learning as a result of failure of memory, rather
than partial acquisition, in normal memory tasks.
The question of the relationship between recognition and recall
is then seen as being intimately bound up with the cause of forgetting,
particularly rapid forgetting anu that the different possibilities
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Implied by different mechanisms of forgetting, relating recognition
to recall have profound effects on the interpretaion of empirical data
will be seen in subsequent chapters.
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CHATTER 6
THE NATURE 01'' FOI {GETTING
In Chapter 4 it waa noted that forgetting can in part be
accounted for under three general headings. 1. There may be degenera-
tion of an underlying trace for neurological reasons which are
independent of experience (Autonomous trace decay). 2* There may be
degeneration of the underlying trace through experiential factors,
e.g. Displacement or compression etc. or 3» There may be forgetting
for reasons unconnected with the loss of the underlying trace, i.e.
retrieval problems.
The terns trace decay and interference are often used in the
literature to account for the possible causes of forgetting, o.g. Hil-
gard and Bower (1966) Waugh and Norman (1965), and undoubtedly one of
the major confusions in the field arises because the term interference
is used by different writers to either include or exclude the second
category above. Waugh and Norman (1965) for Instance regard displacement
as an aspect of interference, and Adams (1967) regards interference as
any process which cannot be regarded as autonomous trace decay.
Wickelgren (19&9 *>) who has frequently argued for an associative inter¬
ference explanation of forgetting in short term memory (19&5 e» 19&5
1969 a) appears to advocate that associative interference results in
trace decay, as do Posner (19&7), Posner and Konicfc (1966). Brown (1964)
too, talks of experiential factors causing decay as "interference with
the trace", but he does point out that "competition" from previous or
subsequent learning is the basis of "interference theory".
F elton (1963, 19&4» 1967 a) who with Irwin (1940) is responsible
for the two factor interference theory, quite clearly regards inter¬
ference as involving processes which exclude the possibility of
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storage los3, and he quite clearly regards the classical theory of inter-
ference proposed by I cGeoch (1932) in the same light* Thus (1967) P* 34
14Interference theory, as applied to ISM ha3 no permanent erasure compo¬
nent. It hus merely competition of response at the time of retrieval."
ohiffrin and Atkinson (1969) are thus in error in contrasting their
permanent storage hypothesis flbr interference theory in LTI with that of
a non permanent store for Melton's theory. Again Melton (1967) -2 228.
"Interference, in the classical theory of forgetting, is a theory whioh
says that interference is at the time of attempted retrieval. Both
habits are established. It is not interference iin the sense of erasure
of a trace or anything like that. The only additional hypothesis of
the theory is that there is a temporary - and I emphasise temporary -
unlearning of the first of the two habits, if such is required for the
learning of the second." There can be no doubt that for Melton at
least, interference does not include the possibility of trace decay as
a result of experiential factors (experiential trace decay).
It is not the purpose of this chapter to review in detail the
various theories of forgetting. Many other writers have done thi3,
and such reviews as those of Postman (1961) Keppel (1968 a) Hilgard and
Bower (1966) Jung (1968) and Adams (1967) can be consulted for a fuller
exposition. V/hat isof importance, as noted in Chapter 4» is a considera¬
tion of whether there is evidence that the cause of forgetting in
the short term is not the cause of forgetting in the long term.^
In other words what wiill be undertaken is an analysis of the
•
■ ■
/ Initially a distinction will be made between autonomous trace decay
and interference theories, in order to demonstrate that even a "pure"
interference theory is difficult to distinguish, experimentally, from an
autonomous trace decay theory. The jbsition of experiential decay
theories will be considered later in the chapter.
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evidence which ia claimed to differentiate autonomous trace decay
theory from interference theory, particularly in relation to the time
scale over which these are claimed to operate.
Various line3 of evidence have been used to support one theory
at the expense of the other; these are now listed.
1) oimilaritvi It is claimed by interference theorists that similarity
effects indioate interference, e.g. uickelgren (1965 a). However,
autonomous trace decay thorists claim that lack, of similarity effects
in the short term indicate autonomous trace decay.
2) i.ate of -ir-eaentatiom It is claimed by autonomous trace decay
theorists e.g. iiniwii (195^) that rate of presentation affects rate of
forgetting in such a way as to indicate autonomous trace decay.
Interfex-ence theorists on the other hand, deny the unequivocal nature
of the evidence, and point to Other evidence which shows the number and
nature of items interpolated between presentation and recall to be
critical, rather than time per se.
3) proactive Inhibitiont It is claimed by interference theorists
that material presented before presentation of a critical item affedts
retention, kurdook (I96& Turvey (1967).
4) Henetition effects: It ia claimed by interfei^ence theorists that
the orderly increase in retention with repetition indicates a single
memory system, kelton (I963).
3,t reminiscence effects t Evidence ox retrieval of material
previously conaidex-eu decayeu is of embarrassment to a trace decoy
theory, keUeoch (194k)
6) kodalitv effects 1 The evidence cited by trace decay theorists is
that in a Peterson and Peterson design, the first item in a sequence
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visually presented is not forgotten after 13 seconds whereas, using
auditory presentation, a certain amount of forgetting does take place,
Peterson (1966 b).
7) Intrusion errors; The evidence from changes in the pattern of
recall errors over time, where errors are shown to be similar to
correct responses, initially (Conrad 1964),
Before going on to consider the evidence for and against these
lines of evidence in short term memory, where almost all the evidence
for trace decay comes from, it is useful to consider the question of
similarity in long term memory.
Long Term Forgetting
There is, in fact, very little dispute that what is termed inter¬
ference causes forgetting in long term memory amongst those holding
either a single system or a dichotomous theory of memory e.g.
Underwood (1957) Broadbent (1963), at least to the extent that it is
allowed that experiential faotors reduce the amount of material
retrieved. Brown (1953)• (1959 )« (1964) and possibly Conrad (1967) are
exceptions, regarding long term memory as involving autonomous trace decay.
Apart from the famous experiment of Jenkins and Dallenbach (1924)
confirmed by Skstrand (1965), in which it was found that when interpola¬
ted activity was minimal so was forgetting i.e. during sleep; many of
the older experiments e.g. McGeoch and McDonald (1931)• Underwood and
Goad (1951) found experiential factors to affect forgetting over the
longer term. McGeoch and McDonald found that for learned materials,
synonyms as interpolated activity resulted in higher forgetting i.e.
greater HI, than was the case with material unrelated to the learned
material, and McKinney (1935) showed the phenomenon of HI using a
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recognition task. Whilst many of the earlier studies attributed
interference to retroaction. Underwood (1957) noted that many of the
earlier studies were open to the criticism that they used the same
subjects repeatedly, leaving open the possibility that proaction was
responsible for a large amount of forgetting, and he succeeded in
demonstrating that his wa3 in fact the case, a finding later confirmed
by, amongst others, Beidel (1959)*
Whilst Hilgard and Bower (1966) and Brown (1964) note that
interference theory is the most popular theory of forgetting, whilst
Neisser (196? and Peterson (1966 b) regard it as essential to account
for at least some forgetting in terms of interference, and whilst
Adams (1967) regards interference as the only empirically defensible
theory of forgetting, it does, as for instance, Jung (1968) and
Tulving and Aadigan (1970) point out, have some serious problems, the
major one of these being the lack of support for an extra experimental
interference hypothesis. This hypothesis assumes that the learning of
a verbal list in the laboratory interferes with previously learned
verbal responses and partly extinguishes them; these partly
extinguished responses then recover and the conflict between these
responses and the newly learned responses is claimed to lead to forget¬
ting. This hypothesis is necessary in order to account for forgetting
in subjects naive as far as verbal learning tasks are concerned. For
non naive subjects, previous learning tasks serve as a potential source
of interference, of course.
The hypothesis assumes that the more frequent a word, or more
meaningful, the more associations it has to recover and interfere with
the learned items. Thus the most meaningful associations show less
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retention. This hypothesis and similar ones derived from the original
hypothesis were not confirmed in a number of studies, e.g. Uhder.vood
and Postmen (i960) and Postman (1962). Various suggestions have been
made as to why extra-experimental interference has not been demonstrated.
One plausible explanation, suggested by Keppel (1963 b) is that
subjects can isolate the habits learned inside and outside the labora¬
tory, to some extent - the "selector mechanism'' is too efficient.
Again Keppel (1968 a) has suggested elsewhere that HI might be respon¬
sible for such forgetting as does occur, and Jung (1968) also advocates
this explanation.
Despite the problems posed for on interference theory by the
failure to support the extra-experimental interference hypothesis,
abundant evidence exists for the association of experiential factors
with forgetting over the long term.
The basic problem in differentiating the three general theories
of forgetting is that all of them can account for the effects of
similarityand previous experience on forgetting, a fact which is over¬
looked by Adams (1967) and Neisser (196?) but which Keppel (1968 b)
Hilgard and Bower (1966) and Norman (1969) note.
In fact, as far as long term memory is concerned, the evidence
upon which interference theory is largely held, similarity effects, is
not fatal evidence against an autonomous trace decay theory, in that
it can account for the effects of similarity on forgetting. Thua
Brown (1958) and Conrad (1967) have accounted for the effects of
similarity on forgetting by noting that interference may be the result,
not the cause of forgetting. In accounting for the inoreese in
forgetting as a function of the number of preceding items in the
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experiment of Keppel and Underwood (1962), Conrad (1967) suggested
that trace decay results in a progressive loss of characteristics which
may differentiate one item from another. For example, after only one
item has been presented, decay of that item will not result in
appreciable forgetting because there i3 nothing to confuse that item
with. After a second item is presented however, decay of aspects
which differentiate one item from another becomes much more problematic
from the point of view of having to retrieve the correct item. Thus
if the item KAZ is given first, its decay to KAZ (where A is a
blurred letter) will still enable retrieval to take place. If a second
item KOZ is now introduced, it3 decay to KOZ will preclude the possibi¬
lity of distinguishing the two itera3. In fact, both the effects of
previous experience on later forgetting (PI) and the effects of
similarity on forgetting, can be accounted for in such terms, and
Brown (1959) *s arguing for autonomous trace decay over both the short
ahd the long term, with decay rapid at first, less rapid later on.
That Brown and Conrad have argued for a trace decay theory using short
term memory experiments, should not blind one to the fact that this
type of explanation can be used to justify the holding of on autonomous
trace decay theory for long term memory.
ohort Term memory
1) ^im^arifry
It is in the study of forgetting over the short term that much
of the evidence, noted at the beginning of the chapter, in support of
one theory or another is obtained, and it is in the short term only that
autonomous trace decay is claimed to operate, e.g. by Broadbent (1963),
Broadbent claims that whilst similarity does affect long tern
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forgetting, so that interference can be assumed to operate, the
effects of similarity on forgetting cannot be demonstrated over the
short term. For a long time this appeared to be true and Posner (196?)
notes an early study in which similarity effects over the short term
S* t/AS i-i-y
were not found. Again Brown (I958^raade this claim, and even very
recently Glanzer et al (1969) have restated that similarity ha3 no
effect on forgetting in short term memory. The inference from this is
that associative factors do not operate to produce forgetting, whatever
the interference forgetting mechanism is claimed to be.
The empirical evidence, is however against such an assertion,
and whilst it may be more difficult to show the effects of similarity
over the short term than over the long term, these have been shown.
Thus A'ickelgren (1965 a, b) has shown that the amount of forgetting
varies with the auditory or linguistic similarity between the series
to be recalled and the interfering material. Using a recognition task.
Underwood and Freund (19^8) showed the effects of both acoustic and
semantic similarity on recognition rates in the short term. Semantic
similarity does, however, seem to have a weak effect over the short
terra, and this was the effect that Glanzer et al (1969) failed to find,
a restatement of Broadbent's (1963) earlier assertion.
'.Vickelgren (19&5 a) having shown the effects of interference in
STT" certainly argues for the possibility that SIM and LTM are continuous,
but Glanzer et al (19&9) have questioned whether the experimental
procedures used by Wickelgren indicate short, as opposed, to long term
memory effects. To argue ih this way, however, entails the possibility
that one can have rapid forgetting from long term memory, in that
Wickelgren showed acoustic interference effects within 30 seconds, and
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as noted in Chapter 4, such an admission collapses the basi3 for
holding a dichotomous theory of memory. Furthermore, even on
Glanzer et al's (1969) "criterion" of output from UTV, the "recency"
part of the serial position curve, the effects of similarity on forget¬
ting have been shown. Craik (1963) and Kintsch and Buschke (1969)
have shown the effects of acoustic similarity on the recency part of
the serial position curve.
Perhaps the most influential experiment in extending interference
theory to short term memory has been that of Keppel and Underwood (1962)
who questioned whether rapid forgetting of three letter trigrams
indicated autonomous trace decay, a3 had been suggested on the basie of
ths experiments of Peterson and Peterson (1959)* Keppel and Underwood
showed in one experiment, that there was relatively little forgetting
in the first trigram presented, but that retention became progressively
worse as more trigrams were presented, resulting in the rapid
forgetting that Peterson and Peterson had observed. This was a
reasonably clear demonstration of the effects of PI in the Peterson
and Peterson type of experiment, and this helped to extend the theory
of interference to short term memory. It seems reasonable on the basis
of Keppel and Underwood, and of Wickelgren and others, to conclude that
similarity is associated with forgetting both in proactive and retro¬
active designs, in the short term.
These results, then, are supportive of an interference theory of
forgetting, but as was noted in discussing long term memory, they are
by no means fatal for an autonomous trace decay theory, which now poses
the question as to whether such similarity effects, assuming they exist*
are the cause or tho result of trace decay. In other words
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a trace decay theorist can still argue that trace decay causes
similar items to be confused and to interfere with one another.
2) nate of presentation and Interpolation of Items
Evidence claimed to support a trace decay is the evidence of
Conrad and Hille (1953) that rate of presentation of items per se
has an effect on retention, the slower the rate of presentation the
greater is forgetting, which of course is the result of autonomous
trace decay. As Posner (1964) and Aaranson (1966) note, however,
the evidence is not unequivocal, and Ivaokworth (1962) and ollack et
al (19.59) report findings in the opposite direction, although i'osner
himself confirms the evidence of Conrad and Hille. Poaner suggests
that the contradiction in findings can be resolved if one takes account
of restraints in recall, and Neisser (1967) also suggests that this
might be important. Yet as Aaranson (1966) points out, the experiment
of l.ackworth (1962) involved both ordered and unordered recall, and
j-oaner's (1964) experiment involved reversed recall, in which it was
found that at slower rates the earlier items were better recalled.
How is it, Aaranson asks, that the longer en item i3 in store, the
better it is recalled, if autonomous trace decay is operating? If
anything, in fact, the evidence in thi3 field is supportive of inter¬
ference theory.
maugh and Norman (1965) for instance, using a probe technique,
found that reponse did not depend on time but the number of inter¬
polated items. Their experimental method consisted of presenting
items at a rate of one per second and at a rate of 4 per second, then
requiring recall of an item in the sequence by asking for recall of
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an item subsequent to an item which was given by the experimenters
at the end of the sequence. Glanzer et al (1969) also found that it
was the number of interpolated items, not the time between presentation
and retention test, which caused forgetting, again not supporting an
autonomous trace decay position. The evidenoe in this area is clearly
not unambiguous. Yet, aa with other evidence, it is not clear that the
evidence is fatal for an autonomous trade decay theory. Thus Hilgard
and Bower (1966) point out that where one finds no difference in the
amount forgotten for different rates of presentation, thi3 could be
because slower rates of presentation allow for more opportunities for
rehearsal. This greater rehearsal (or indeed any other process going
on in time) could be offsetting the larger time interval.
Just as with interference theories, there are areas in which
autonomous trace decay theory is uncomfortable. For instance, Neiaser
notes that autonomous trace decay is likely to be too slow to account
for findings that very rapidly presented sequences of digits are
difficult to recall. Even allowing partial decay of these sequences
does not account for their being more difficult to recall than more
slowly presented similar sequences. Perhaps some form of processing
at slower rates of presentation counteracts this deoay for slower
rates of presentation, aa Hilgard and Bower suggested in accounting
for Vi'augh and Norman's (1965) experiment.
3) Proactive Inhibition
Two experiments, one by Murdoch (1961) and one by Turvey (1967)
are also problematic for on autonomous trace decay theory. In the
first it was found that irrelevant words before a critical "to be
remembered1' item reduced retention of the critical item after an
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interpolated activity. 'Purvey showed that where items were homogenous
and unrelated to a later critical item, retention of the critical item
was higher than when the prior word3 were hetexogenous. The problem
raised by both these experiments is how items unrelated to later items
can affect later retention, and in particular why unrelated items which
are homogenous with respect to each other, but different from a critical
item, can affect retention to a greater extent than items which are
heterogenous.
One possibility in the case of Murdoch's experiment is that whilst
"Pi'oactive" woi*ds were unrelated to the critical item as far as the
experimenter was concerned, they were similar to the critical item
along various dimensions,ie. all were English words, given within a
short time of each other, thus sharing a similar "time tag". Hence
decay might lead to some confusion. As far as the Turvey experiment is
concerned, one might use the same argument for the heterogenous items;
their very heterogeneity made the critical item part of the heterogenous
list. Because of the homogeneity of non^critical items in the other
condition, the critical item was different enough on the dimension which
was common to the other items to be distinguished more readily fx\>m the
other items, despite partial decay.
4) Hepetitlon effects
The evidence cited by Melton (19&3) as supporting an interfei-ence
theory, the orderly increase in intention as a function of repetition,
has recently been questioned. Hilgard andBower point out that whilst
repetition effects are claimed to support interference theory, in that
they are interpreted in terms of strengthening existing associations,
they can be handled by autonomous trace decay theory in that various
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possibilities can be suggested.
a) Kepetition may establish multiple tracesj
b) Repetition may change the rate of decay of a single copy;
c) Increase the probability that items are transferred to long term
memory;
dj Relay the onset of normal deday processes.
The problem is that recent evidence on repetition effects suggests
that repetition as suoh may have none of these effects; thus repetition
may reduce the amount of material retained, or at least retrievable,
compared to an unfilled interval. Glanzer and Meinzer (1967) using a
free recall technique found that repetition reduced the level of the
asymptote, interpreted by dichotomou3 theorists in terms of long term
memory. Ragle (1967) also found that those who rehearsed by repetition
were inferior to those who rehearsed by association, using a free recall
experiment and Dalrymple - Alford (1967) failed to find any improvement
in retention as a result of mere repetition.
Further evidence that repetition per se does not appear critical
comes from Melton (1967 b) who found that recall increased as the
interval between the occurrence of two items increased, and Sitterley
(1968) found recall performance to decrease whenever either digit
duration or interdlgit interval decreased, and concludes that old infor¬
mation is being processed as new information is coming in. If this is
the case, then repetition per se would appear not to be the important
factor in increasing retention, but rather processes which allow for
organisation of material - Bartlett's "Effort after meaning".
-hilst therefore, none of the interpretations of repetition effects
in terms of trace decay suggested by Hllgard and Bower seem adequate
to account for the data on repetition, because they are founded on a
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false premise, the same argument can be made against interference
theory. It seems best to assume at present that repetition is
normally involved when there is "Effort after meaning" or some attempt
at organisation and it is this which improves retention. Perhaps the
effect of thi3 organisational factor is to reduce the amount of trace
decay or interference. In other words, the many studies which do show
repetition to improve retention e.g. Waugh (1962), lachman et al (1966)
may do so by providing opportunities for reorganisation. At least it
seems clear that for example Posner (196?) is in error inequating
rehearsal with massed repetition.
The evidence that a single exposure is enough to establish a
permanent trace (Hebb 1961, telton 1963) compliments evidence on
repetition effects. If a single presentation of material produces a
permanent structural memory change, this is at variance with the
hypothesis that material in short term memory is lost through
autonomous decay, unless rehearsed. The experimental evidence that
Hebb and Melton produced was that a single presentation of a digit
sequence results in evidence of retention even after the interpolation
of large numbers of different digit sequences. Cohen and Johansson
(1967) found thet where overt rehearsal was prevented, no improvement
in retention occurred. Cohen and Johansson's evidence does not disprove
the possibility of permanent storage, it does appear to make the evi¬
dence of Hebb and Melton inconclusive.
5) Heminiscenoe effects» The retrieval of previously irretrievable
items
A3 Osgood (19.53) for example, points out, the problem of
reminiscence is one which a trace decay theory has difficulty in
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coping with. If a trace has decayed or been lost from the memory
system, how can it be retrieved at a later stage than that of its
assumed los3. Brown (1959) answered this by assuming new retrieval
techniques might uncover material not previously amenable to retrieval,
and the evidence of Tulving (1962) certainly supports the view that
retrieval cues improve recall. Provided therefore, the trace has not
completely decayed, reminiscence effects can be accounte® for by trace
decay theory. A classical interference theory, too, has little trouble
in accounting for reminiscence effects in terms of the spontaneous
recovery of previously extinguished responses. Spontaneous recovery
may be due to dissipation of fatigue effects perhaps.
Peterson (1966 c) conducted an experiment in which the last items
of a series were better recalled after a short period, than was possible
immediately* He interprets this evidence as showing a dichotomy of
systems, in which improved retrieval indicates switching from one
system to a more efficient system of retrieval. The interpretation is
almost identical to Brown's except a dichotomy is claimed. Yet the
evidence that the use of more efficient retrieval systems can aid
immediate retrieval, noted above, makes it extremely dubious that an
underlying dichotomy exists. In any case, an alternative explanation
in term3 of interference theory, noted above, prevents the establishing
of a dichotomous theory on this type of evidence. Again, as has been
noted previously, a classical interference theory does not entail a
dichotomous theory of memory.
6) modality effects
Paradoxically perhaps, the experiments of Keppel and Underwood
have been used as evidence for autonomous trace decay by Peterson (1966 b)
- 93 -
Vi6
Peterson notes that with visual presentation there was virtually no
forgetting of the first trigram presented, after interpolation of
activity lasting 18 seconds. With auditory presentation, however,
there wa3 some forgetting even of the first item presented. As Pro¬
active interference can hardly be taken to account for thi3 forgetting,
and as Retroactive interference was identical in both cases, it is
argued that the auditory forgetting must be due to autonomous trace
decay. Peterson does not argue against interference causing forgetting
in the short term, but argues that autonomous trace decay also occurs,
only it is not always observed.
Whilst tjiis is an ingenious argument for autonomous trace decay,
the findings can be accounted for by arguing for differential retro¬
active interference in the two experiments. Thus the interpolated
activity involved in an auditory tahk, counting backwards aloud,
might well result in producing sounds acoustically similar to those of
the presentation trigram. A further objection i3 that many recent
studies e.g. I.lurdock (19&7) indicate that auditory presentation resultai
in higher storage than does visual presentation in the short term.
As Tulving and Ladigan (1970) suggest, auditory and visual information
may be processed quite differently. Yet in view of the contradictory
results, it is not po3silie to say at this stage that autonomous trace
decay is operating in either modality.
7) Intrusion Errorsi
One line of evidence which has recently been put forward as
evidence of autonomous trace decay theoiy concerns the nature of
intrusion errors in certain types of memory experiment. Thus, Gonrad
found that intrusion errors in sequences of letters were letters
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which sounded like the correct letter, e.g. P for V, and so on. Conrad
argues that in a trace decay theory one would expect to find a degrada¬
tion of the trace in which errors would start off being similar to the
original itern and gradually become more and more random.
As Keppel (1963 b) points out, however, there i3 good reason to
suppose that such evidence is not critical in deciding between the two
theories. This is because there is no reason why interference theory
should not predict the same effects, in that it is not necessary to
postulate an increase in interitem intrusion errors for interference
theory. Thus it is not necessary to postulate a functional role for
intrusion errors. The items which cause interference may not be
selected in place of the forgotten item, because of the operation of
other factors such as guessing^ As Keppel notes there is ample
evidence in the literature of Lib! that the occurrence of errors is not
correlated with assumed interference processes.
The evidence reviewed then, indicates that neither autonomous
trace decay nor interference has been proved or disproved in either
short or long term memory. In examining these two theories, however,
no distinction was made between "Classical" interference theory, in
which forgetting i3 due to factors other than storage loas, and
interference resulting in trace decay, the "Acid bath" position of
iesner ana Konick (1966). .Such a distinction, however, appeared
unnecessary in the course of the analysis. This is because it is
difficult to see wnat evidence would distinguish an autonomous trace
decay theory from an "Interference causing decay" theory, if no
evidence can be produced which can distinguish an autonomous trace
decay theory from a classical interference theory. The question of
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which came first decay or interference, seems as insoluble as the
hen-egg problem.
There are however, other experiential trace decay or trace loss
theories which do not depend on evidence of associative interference in
the short term, ouch theorists a3 Atkinson and Shiffrin (1963) and
Glanzer et al (1969) rely on a displacement or overwriting model for
forgetting in short term, in which experiential factors work through
incoming items displacing already present items in a short term store#
As noted previously however, the evidence produced by Waugh and Noiman
(1965) and Glanzer et al (1969) on the importance of the number of items
interpolated, rather than time per se, as a cause of forgetting, does
not rule out the possibility of a trace decay interpretation of the data.
It is not clear that the compression theory suggested by J'urdock
(1968 b) differs in essence from a displacement theory, Kurdock's hypo¬
thesis is that after the limit of short term memory is reached there is
a loss of some information from each item, rather than of all information
from some items, which a displacement theory is presumed to require. Yet
a compression hypothesis would appear to differ only in the detail of whet
is pushed out of store, and does not therefore seem essentially different
from a displacement theory.
Again the empirical evidence against a pure displacement theory
has been noted, the evidence of the importance of associative factors in
forgetting. Finally, if one holds a displacement theory in spite of the
evidence of similarity factors affecting forgetting in the short term,
it is difficult to see why it must be abandoned as a theory of forgetting
in the long tercn.
This chapter then, has not been concerned in detail with the
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evidence for various theories of forgetting, it has been concerned to
illustrate that the issue of different mechanisms of forgetting over
time has by no means been settled. This is by no means a revolutionary
position to take as the following quotations will show.
Melton (1964) P 190* are not yet in a position to treat all
long term forgetting as the product of interference factors alone."
1.9 pel (1968) P 192 "3ut for the comparison with STM, the question
of critical importance is whether decay and interference interpretations
can produce a set of clearly differential predictions. Several points
of contrast may be suggested." (My underiinings). There can be little
doubt that Keppel, whose name is very much associated with interference
theory (e.g. Eeppel and Underwood 1962) is not convinced that as yet, at
any rate, the issue is settled beyond doubt. (Norman (1969) also basi¬
cally an interference theorist, also has similar doubts).
ilgard and Bower (l966) P 511• "as is the case with many such
scientific debates, there is no completely clear resolution to this one,
conceivably the issue is beyond resolving and may be destined to become
one of those hardy perennials that continue to send up new sprouts every
so often in the field of learning theory."
Brown (1958) P 20. "The results of the individual experiments have
already been discussed. They fit well with the hypothesis of rapid decay
of the memory trace when it is first established. It is not claimed
that they are incompatible with alternative theories of forgetting."
eterson (1966 b) also an autonomous decay theorist, i3 willing to allow
interference theory explanations in addition to trace decay. Thus both
trace decay and interference theorists allow the possibility >f the
other theory being applicable.
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Finally even Neisser (1967) who maintains that some form of
interference theory is necessary admits P 239 "-^t least forgetting
cannot be exclusively due to decay".
This writer, too, refuses to take a definite position on the
question of the nature of rapid forgetting, being quite content to
conclude with the authros just quoted, that all possibilities are
open. Yet if all possibilities are open, so that either trace decay
of interference might be operating in both short and long ter 1 memory,
then a dichotomous theory of memory is also unproved, and if, as Hilgard
and Bower suggest, the problem is beyond resolving, then so too is the
question of a dichotomy between sho£t and long term memory.
this in fact, is what the writer was implying when talking of a
that interference is the cause of forgetting in short and long terra
memory, then a dichotomy becomes unprovable because it is impossible to
distinguish two memory systems, and differing susceptibility of materials
to those factors which universally cause forgetting. If trace decay is
the cause of forgetting in short and long tern memory then the same
arguments hold, as indeed they do with any theory of forgetting which
cannot be shown to be the exclusive province of either short or long
tern, memory.
ixapid forgetting, it will be remembered, is the criterion by
which it is decided material has not progressed beyond short term memory.
The previous paragraph can be put in other terms. A failure to show
that rapid forgetting has a different cause from less rapid forgetting
entails a collapse of the criterion by which short and long term
dichotomy being unprovable (1970).
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memory can be dichotomised. If rapid and leas rapid forgetting can
have the same oause, then it is possible for material to enter long
term memory directly and be rapidly forgotten in that system. At the
very least the evidence that different forgetting mechanisms govern
short and long term forgetting is equivocal. As was noted in Chapter 4>
the collapse of a criterion for distinguishing short and long term
memozy (through a failure to distinguish the mechanism of rapid and leas
rapid forgetting) entails the collapse of a dichotomous theory of memory
on the grounds of parsimony.
Summary.
This chapter looked at the evidence for claiming that the cause of
forgetting in the short term (rapid forgetting) differed from that in
the long term. It was concluded that all the theories of forgetting
could account for the phenomena of PI and EI, and other evidence
which had been claimed to favour one theory rather than another, and
that it could not reasonably be concluded that any one theory had been
proved in either the short or the long term, to the exclusion of others.
This being the oase, the criterion for distinguishing short and long
term memory collapses, a3 rapid forgetting cannot be taken to be
indicative of the workings of the mechanisms of short as opposed to
long tezm memory. In such a situation, a single system theory of
memory must be held on the grounds of parsimony.
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This present chapter and the following one are eonoerned with
the limited capacity of subjects to recall recently presented infor-
n»tion, in contrast to the normal subjects' capacity to recall large
amounts of learned information. In this chapter it will be 3hown that
in our present state of knowledge it is impossible to •atablish a
dichotomous theory on the basis of this type of evidence. The
following chapter will consider whether the experimental data pre¬
sented by the writer on the question of limited capacity can even be
adequately handled by a dichotomou3 theory of memory, were one to be
tenable on other grounds.
That a distinction can be drawn between ST.. and LTT on the basis
of the limited capacity of the former compared with the unlimited
capacity of the latter has frequently been claimed. Adams (19&7)
puts this distinction forward as one of the three lines df evidence
upon which a dichotomous theory con be based, pointing to the
limitations of the memory span as evidence of our limited capacity in
short term memory, and pointing to our virtually unlimited store of
Ann+.not.rat aterial in this chapter and the next has, in part, been
reported in a paper by Gruneberg (1969 b)
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Learned, material and potential for learning material. Waugh and
Norman (1985) also consider STM to have a limited capacity as do
Hunter (1964) Atkinson and Shiffrin (1988) Miller (1957) and
Slan~er (1968). It should perhaps be noted in passing that Glanzer
and Gunitz (1966) attempted to dichotomise between STM and ITM on the
grounds of the unlimited storage capacity of STM compared with the
limited storage capacity of LTM, "By definition the short term
mechanism is limited, not with respect to capacity, but to the
amount of time it can hold an item". G-lanzer (1968) has since
changed his position to one where STM is limited to 3 - 6 items
storage capacity.
Some writers are not entirely eaqjlicit as to what is limited,
be it capacity to process, store or retrieve, whilst at the same time
there is a great disparity of opinion amongst dichotomous theorists as
to what is limited. Amongst those postulating limited storage are
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) Wexford (1968) KcGhee et al (1985)
Ingles and Ankus (1965) Glanzer (1968) faugh and Norman (1965) to name
but a few at random. Others, such as Baddeley et al (1969), Aurdock
(1985) and Growder (1968) consider that the limitation might be in
terms of processing.
hilst it might be possible to interpret evidence of limited
capacity to take in new information, in terms of storage, of
processing or of retrieval, it is clear that any attempt to establish
a dichotomous theory of memory on the basis of limited capacity must
do so by showing that storage capacity in STM is limited when compared
to the storage capacity of long term memory. That capacity to
process incoming information perse, does not entail a dichotomy
can bo appreciated if one considers that the limitation
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on processing might be due to fec+ors that cause forget*in" in long
term memory e.g. interference. In other words, it might be tha* the
reaaon why processing capacity is limited, is that items are
rapidly forgotten because of a rapid build-up of pro-active, or
inter item interference, i.e. those factors which have been shown to
affect retention over fairly long periods (Underwood 1957). Melton
(196j) and Boatman (19&4) in fact use this type of explanation when
accounting for rapid forgetting and limited capacity, in order +0
attack a dichotomous theory. Alternatively it might be that
capacity to process is limited because items rapidly decay, and
Brown (1953« 1959) opposes a limited storage capacity hypothesis with
a trace decay theory of memory which does not imply a dichotomous
theory. Of course it might be that there are two memory systems, and
the limitation in processing is in terras of processing from one memory
system to the other, as Baddeley et al (19&9) suggest. The point being
made is that in order to show this, it is necessary to show more than
that there is a limitation in processings it would be necessary to
show that there are two memory systems on grounds other than limited
processing capacity in order to establish a dichotomous theory of
memory on grounds of limited capacity. (The grounds that Baddeley e+
al use - the serial position curve's differential reactivity to time -
will be 3hown to be untenable as a basis for holding a dichotoraous
theory of memory in Chapter 10). In this chapter it is not claimed
that it is impossible to interpret evidence of limited capacity over
tne short term in terras of a dichotomous theory of memory, only that




T^e limited qapacifry qf S-ff,
Tulving (1966) has tried to hold a dichotoirous theory of
memory on the basis of dichotomous retrieval systems. That a
dichotomous theory of memory retrieval systems cannot be established
on the basis of the limited retrieval capacity of STM relative to the
unlimited retrieval capacity of LTM needs no experimental support
beyond the conventional forgetting curve. Let one suppose that a
list of 60 words is presented to a subjaotj immediately after pre¬
sentation he will be able to recall perhaps 10 of these. Unless after
a period of time, all, or the great majority of the items become
retrievable, then Long Term Memory has no unlimited retrieval
capacity relative to STM for any given set of items. It is quite
clear that retrieval over long periods of time is not unlimited
relative to retrieval over short periods, as inspection of almost any
forgetting curve indicates, despite the occasional reminiscence effect.
Tulving and Patterson (1968) do in fact suggest that STW! has a
limited retrieval capacity on the evidence of reminiscence effects.
They do not consider the limited capacity of LTM on the basis of lack
of retrieval of all items once in LTM. The experimental evidence
cited by Tulving (1963) that following the presentation of 36 words,
retrieval on three separate occasions showed only 3°/" of word3 in
common, whilst howing the unreliability of memory span as indicating
capacity, is of course irrelevant to the question of whether SIM
retrieval is limited relative to LTAl.retrieval. Almost all the
empirical evidence shows that at be3t, both in the short and the
long term, there is a limited retrieval capacity for any given set of
items. It should be noted that if all items we processed were
permanently stored, and were LTO! unlimited with respect to retrieval,
- 103 -
7/5
one would be able to recall everything in one's post history at any
given point in time that was not short term memory. It might be that
a dichotomous theory can be established on the basis of dichotomous
retrieval mechanisms using other evidence, but this dichotomy of
retrieval systems cannot be established with respect to the evidence
on limited capacity. Thus it may be that retrieval is limited in
LTfv! for reasons different from those which limit retrieval in STW.
To show this, however, it is necessary to establish criteria for
distinguishing STM and LTM other than in tenris of limited capacity.
To show that STM is limited in terms of retrieval, is, in other
words, insufficient to establish a dichotomous theory of memory.
ifhilst Tulving (19&8) has advocated a dichotomous theory of
memory based on differing retrieval mechanisms and points to the
limited capacity of immediate memory, he is not advocating a
dichotomy of systems baaed on the limited retrieval capacity of STK«
Thus in one paper (Tulving and Arbuckle (1966)) he suggests a limited
storage capacity for STM whereas later he denies that any useful
purpose is served by dichotomis&Ag on the basis of differing storage,
as opposed to differing retrieval systems (Tulving 1968). Here he
suggests that material may be added to STM, which later decays,
leaving the original material still in storage. The decay of added
material may be responsible for rapid forgetting in STM.
Tulving goes on to suggest that the use of more efficient
retrieval cues may be responsible for reminiscence effects in LTM,
a ppsition similar to that of Brown (1959) and Peterson (1966c).
Tulving's theory is obviously difficult to classify as being purely
storage-decay theory, or purely a retrieval deficit theory, and
whilst his theory will be criticised in Chapter 12 as lacking
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empirical airport, it is necessary to note at this stage that he is
not advocating a dichotomy, on the basis of the limited retrieval
capacity hypothesis outlined above. This said, the following
quotations taken from his paper "Theoretical issues in Free Recall"
appear appropriate. P 13 "I prefer the view that all input informa¬
tion is stored in the same unitary storage system, whatever its
nature, and that differences in recall of early, middle and late
input items" (which he earlier argued suggest two types of recall
mechanism) "reflect primarily differences in accessibility of
these items." (i.e. retrieval) P. 21. "The limited capacity of
immediate memory is one of the basic puazles " There is a
contradiction, in fact, between regarding immediate memory as having
limited retrieval capacity, and regarding the different sections of the
serial position curve as indicating two dichotomous memory mechanisms,
in which the last part of the curve represents output from SIM, This
is because the percentage of items retrieved from the recency part
of the curve is greater than is the percentage retrieved from the
middle section of the curve. Differences in accessibility there may
be, but it is certainly not in the direction of a dichotomy between
unlimited capacity of LTL and limited capacity of STM. Nevertheless,
as Tulving clearly regards differences between STL and LTM to lie
on the retrieval side, and as he clearly regards 5T5V as having limited
capacity, the implication that he regards STM to be limited with
respect to retrieval unlike ITT is reasonably clear. Indeed, to talk
of the limited capacity of immediate memory is to imply that LTM
is relatively unlimited.
In so far as it is maintained that LIT has unlimited capacity
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relative to SUA, as far as retrieval is concerned* this is true
only in the trivial sense that there is less to be retrieved
immediately than in the whole life history of an individual (1TM).
But then it would be true to say that retrieval of events over a week
is limited relative to the whole of LTK, without this entailing, or
even implying, a dichotomoils theory, of memory.
The limited capacity to iietrieve.
At first sight it might seem that the objection raised against
the limited retrieval hypothesis, as a basis for dichotomising
between STM and LTM, might be true of storage also. There is however,
an essential difference between a limited storage and a limited
retrieval hypothesis; the latter allows that all material is stored,
in which case, as was pointed out, a dichotomy based purely on the
limited retrieval capacity hypothesis is empirically untenable. On
the other hand, the storage capacity hypothesis claims that there is
a limited capacity to store material, thus if material is not stored
in SUL due to limited storage capacity, presumahly it cannot be
stored in LTf.I, This fits in with the empirical data to the extent that
the forgetting curve falls off over tin®. ThU3 if only 10 items can
be recalled in bTL! out of a list of 60, then after a period of an hour
or so, 10 or fewer items are normally recalled. On the other hand the
amount of material which is well learned is almost infinite, and there
seems no limit to the amount of material which can be added to this
stock. Thus whilst supra-span material which is newly taken in is
liable to rapid forgetting which is due to lack of storage after the
capacity has been reached, an almost infinite amount of material can be
stored in Lift!, according to the theory. In other words, if there is
a limitation of storage in STM of A words of a list of A plus B words,
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the storage theory is not expected to require evidence of storage
of A plus B words, as is the limited retrieval hypothesis, but only
evidence of A plus G items, where C items are previously well learned
items.
Tulving's dissatisfaction with this storage hypothesis is not,
however, unjustified, in that reminiscence effects, where items not
immediately recallable are recalled after a period of time, are
extremely awkward for an SIM limited capacity storage theory. An item
not immediately recalled i3 presumed forgotten when assessing limited
storage capacity{ if it is recalled at a later time it must presumably
have been 3tored, throwing doubt on the accuracy of the measure of
limited storage capacity. As noted previously, Tulving found only $0,1
of items common to three successive retrieval trials, throwing
considerable doubt on the accuracy of ar^ measure of limited storage
capacity, Leterson (1966) like Tulving, uses the reminiscence effect
to defend a dichotomous theory of memory, claiming that this remini¬
scence shows a switching from one retrieval system to another,
lissentially his theory assumes storage of all iterr.3 later retrieved, and
like Tulving throws doubt on the veracity of limited storage in STM.
Objection is al30 raised against the memory span showing capacity of
STM storage through experiments showing greater storage than is
revealed by memory span methods. Harrison (19&75 quotes a study in
which a subject recalled; l6 values of attributes in a list presented
in 4 seconds, and concludes that therefore more i3 stored than is
recalled. Bahrick (19&9) has shown substantial retention by prompted
recall and Loess and Harris (1968) in similar vein, note that where
items which are presumed to be in STL. are recallable with one method
but not with another, it means that considerable attention 3hould be
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paid to the method of recall when theoretical statements are based
on recall data. Tulving and Pearlstone (19&6) too have shown in¬
creased recall as a function of cueing with a category word and
conclude that inferences aboufwhat is available cannot be made on
the basis of what is accessible". Nevertheless, it is possible to
argue that these are practical problems involved in accurately
assessing storage capacity, and whilst a serious problem, do not
rule out the possibility that there is a limited storage capacity some¬
what (indeterminatelyJ) larger than obtained by normal recall
procedures. here later evidence of storage is produced, one pre¬
sumably mu3t argue that the immediate recall failure is due not to
storage failure, but to retrieval failure, a somewhat dangerous argu¬
ment in that it can so easily be argued that perhaps all rapid forget¬
ting is due to retrieval failure. Indeed as Schonfield and Robertson
(1966) and others, point out, we make all our inferences about memory
on the basis of what is and what is not retrieved. Thus one cannot
prove forgetting is due to storage or processing rather than
retrieval defect. In the last analysis, then, it can be argued that
the limited storage capacity hypothesis is unprovable.
Jtar^e capacity and the immediate memory a nan
As .-kdams notes, the usual method of assessing the limited storage
capacity of short term memory is the conventional memory span experi¬
ment first investigated systematically by Jacobs as long ago as 1831,
in which, following the single presentation of a series of items,
perhaps digits, subjects are required to recall than immediately in
their correct order. In a typical experiment a subject will be able
to recall about 7 digits without error (Miller 1957)• Above the
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memory 3pan, items are rapidly forgotten, and Conrad (i960) reporta
a rapid fall in the memory, immediately the memory span haa been
reached. However, the requirement of correct order is not the limiting
factor for memory apan, or at least the only limiting factor, in that
in free recall experiments, recall drops off rapidly once *he memory
apan has been reached (Murdoch i960). Thus one cannot distinguish
between free recall and order recall in considering the problem of
rapid supra»span forgetting. As rapid forgetting occurs for supra-
epan items in both conditions, both must be considered as essentially
problems of 3TM.
As noted earlier (Chapter 4) the rationale for presuming that the
memory span defines the capacity of STli rests on two factors,
rapid aupra-span forgetting and the fact that memory span items are
themselves subject to fairly rapid forgetting, the example of the
telephone number rapidly forgotten after use is often used to
illustrate this latter rapid forgetting (e.g. Hunter (19&4) )• That
this rapid forgetting of memory span items is the criterion by which
it is decided the memory apan describes STM can be appreciated if
one considers the theoretical interpretation of the memory span, were
the memory span items always recallable after a period of weeks
e.g. if one did not, for instance rapidly forget telephone numbers.
It could then reasonably be assumed that the memory span represented
material in I/TO.
Essentially then, the explanation of supra-span forgetting in
terras of limited capacity to store information is the basis of the
limited storage capacity hypothesis. Thus whilst some psychologists
e.g. Phillips et al (1967) appear to regard forgetting in the short
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term as due to displacement (i.e. lack of storage capacity), there ia
no incompatibility between this limited storage hypothesis and the
hypothesis that items within the memory span are forgotten because of
trace decay. It is however, necessaiy to show that supra-span items are
forgotten because of lack of storage capacity. (It was noted earlier
(Chapter 5) that one is dealing with the problem of forgetting ,
rather than non acquisition once the memory span has been reached,
as the evidence of Conrad (i960) shows.)
One of the attractions of looking at the memory span in terras
of limited storage capacity comes from analogies with computer systems
where buffer stores are used to hold information briefly. These are
of a push down nature, such that each item coming in displaoes an item
already in store. Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) have suggested this
model for human memory and it appeals to Norman (1968) too, on the
grounds of usefulness. It is, however, interesting to note that
Feigenbaum (1967) recently described a computer which did not have a
buffer store. This computer worked well until the information was fed
in at a greater rate than the computer could deeil with, when there was
a failure to process material adequately, resulting in the equivalent
of retrieval breakdown. It i3 reasonable to point out that the same
sort of behaviour occurs in humans v/hen the memory span is reached.
This of course does not prove there is no buffer store, but it does
highlight the dangers of arguing for the existence of mechanisms by
analogy - one can usually find an analogy to suit most situations.
Apart from supro-apan forgetting being questioned a3 due to
lack of storage capacity (e.g. by Melton (196.5 and Brovvn (1953)
noted earlier) there is considerable question even amongst
dichotomous theorists, as to whether the memory span items
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measures purely short term memory. Sanders and ..chroats (19&8) for
example suggest that the memory span contains an element of LTf/; because
parts of the memory span are able to resist forgetting better than
others. Broadbent (19&7) notes that "even in memory span there i3
long term memory, in that letter frequency effects retentiom". This
of course has been known for a long time. Thus Blankenship (1933)
and Hunter (1966) note differences in retention with different
materials. In a typical experiment, 3uch as Crannell and Parrish (1957)
meaningful words were found to have less of a span than digits. Other
experimenters have found digits superior to letters (Bremner 1940)•
If there is a doubt as to the extent to which memory span i3 a pure
measure of capacity of STM, it seem3 difficult to 3ee how even approxi¬
mate limits of STM capacity can be measured and, how, therefore a
dichotomy of memory systems can be established on the basis of the
limited storage hypothesis, at least if the memory span is used as a
measure of capacity.
further criticism of the use of the memory span as a measure of
limited storage capacity comes from Neisser (1967). He points out
that the memory span may hove no special status in that sub-span units
are also rapidly forgotten under certain conditions of measurement and
that a discontinuity between material "within" and exceeding the
/ ..errington et al (19&6) claim to have shown that memory span for
digits and letters is not different when the probability of occurrence
of each is taken into account.
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memory span disappears with certain measures of memory.
itecoanition v. recall as a measure of retention
Finally, the limited storage capacity hypothesis has been questioned
by psychologists who, using recognition rather than recall as a
measure of retention, have shown evidence of a large capacity to store
Incoming information to the extent that perhaps storage capacity in
5TLI is not limited, provided one uses the appropriate measure of
capacity. Thus Nickerson (19&3) found 87/a recognition following the
presentation of 200 photographs of complex meaningful material. As
presentation rate was one item every 3 seconds, it i3 possible theore¬
tically, to claim that there was sufficient time to transfer the
material from STM to LTfc. Sheperd and Teghtsoonian (1961) found
retention after 60 interpolated items, and Shepard (1967) found 90%
retention in an experiment involving the successive presentation of
340 words. In both ghepard's experiments presentation was self paced,
however, leaving open the theoretical possibility of an interpretation
in terns of LTM. Again, because so many stimuli are involved in
dhepard's 19&7 experiment it might be claimed that the to*al presenta¬
tion time exceeds the bounds of what one might term an STlw experiment.
A final objection to dhepard's experiment requires special
attention. One of the methodological problems in testing retention
by recognition is the increase in response bias which is found
towards the end of a li3t using multiple choice testing, i.e. tnere is
an increase in false-positive recognitions, dhepard and Chang (19&3)
demonstrated that tais problem could be eliminated by using a forced
choice technique, in which an old and new item are presented
simultaneously. As was noted in Chapter 3, however, the forced choice
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technique is a special case of multiple choice testing, differing
fl-om normal multi-choice testing in that there is only one distracter.
In using this technique therefore, Shepard i3 open to the objection
that high recognition rate may come, not from recognising an old item
as old, but from recognising a nev; item as one which is new. Thus if
given the sequence 832964, a subject can readily say that X was not in
the sequencei given the forced choice 2 or X, a subject, by identifying
X as not previously presented, would choose N2" as the old item,
whether he had retained it or not. (It might of course be countered
that to identify an object as new, one must have retained something
of all the old items. If one uses this argument, however, evidence
needed to claim retention for *N* items is evidence that a subject
can identify one item as new. It is not an altogether unreasonable
suggestion).
Aim of the Present Experiments
The present experiments are intended to explore the storage
capacity of STR' taking into account the objections raised earlier
against the experiments on recognition.
This was done in the first experiment by presenting words at the
rate of one per second, approximately, for a total time of two minutes
eight seconds, and testing for recognition by presenting old and new
items successively but in random sequence, rather than simultaneously,
and correcting for response bias by subtracting false positives from
correct identifications, whilst there is evidence (Norman and .augh
1968) that where N> 10 recognition is independent of both stimulus
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and teat position (using the same technique as in the present
experiment), this is not important for present purposes. Even if
response bias were to operate in the way that Shepard and Chang (19&3)
suggest» i.e. by an increase in false positive scores, the effect of
taking wrong answers from correct responses would be to reduce the
retention score, making the estimate of retention a conservative one.
vhilst the aim of the experiment was to take account of possible
objections to earlier experiments in recognition within the framework
of showing the limits of capacity of STM, it was also intended to show«t
that even when these objections are met, recognition is extremely high.
As was noted in Chapter 5» infrequent words are usually (though not
always)better recognised than frequent words. For this reason in¬
frequent words, (according to Thorndike and Lorge (1944) ) were chosen
for the experiment. The experimenter's intuition, that meaningful
infrequent words would be better recognised than meaningless ones
resulted in choosing words which would be known to the student popula¬
tion at large (e.g. Bagpipe). (An experiment by Allen and Gorton
(1963) later substantiated the intuition).
A second experiment was carried out to show that the initial
experiment, described above, must be considered as a short term
memory experiment. It consisted of requiring recall immediately after
the presentation list described above, followed about 30 minutes later
by the same recognition test as in the first experiment
Footnote t The obvious methodological objection that recall
facilitates later recognition e.g. rostman et al (1948) Brown and
JPackbam (1967) or alternatively retards it (Hannawalt and Tarr (1961))
is not relevant with the context of this experiment in that even if
recall facilitates later recognition, it can hardly lead to evidence





Subjects 20 undergraduates and postgraduate students from the
University College of Swansea.
Materials A list of words (Presentation List) of frequency one per
million according to the Thorndike-Lorge word count (1944) in¬
frequently occurring v^ords, whose meaning, however, would be known, to
a student population e.g. Barnacle, Bagpipe, Adage. All words were of
at least two or three syllables, and were recorded on magnetic tape at
an average rate of 1.1 words per second. A second TEST list was also
constructed, consisting of 60 words from the presentation list (every
second word on the presentation list was included on the teat list)
and sixty new words of the same frequency as the presentation list
words. The words were arranged randomly.
Design The subjects, who were tested individually, or in groups of
two or three, were asked to listen passively to the presentation tape
and to make no attempt to learn the items. As soon as the presentation
tape was finished, items on the test list were presented successively,
and the subjects were asked to indicate whether the words were old or
new, andtheir degree of confidence in their decision. The ratings ¥3
and N3 indicated that they were certain that a word was old or new
respectively. Y2 and N2 indicated that they were quite confident but
not certain, that the word was old or new respectively and Y1 and N1
indicated that they thought the balance of probability was in the




fub.ieotai 19 undergraduate students at University (College of
Swansea, who had not acted as subjects in Experiment One.
Materialst The presentation and test list were, as described in
experiment One. The presentation list was recorded with greater
clarity than in Experiment One, on magnetic tape at an average rat®
of 1.1 words per second.
Designi The experiment was divided into two parts. Inmedlately
after the presentation tape had finished, subjects, who had been asked
to listen passively to the tape, were asked to recall as many words
as possible. Subjects were allowed to continue with this ta3k until
either they claimed they could not recall any more words or 30
seconds had elapsed from the time of writing the last word, with no
sign that they could recall any further words. Subjects than took
part in a psychology tutorial during which each was asked a* least
one question of relevance to the tutorial topic. After a minimum
interval of 30 minutes subjects were given the same recognition task
and test list as in Experiment One.
Jiq^lta:
In Experiment One, the mean number of items retained was 5°*10
for the 20 subjects. The range of the number of items retained was
18 - 76. If one removes from the sample four biased subjects with a
footnote: The ®ord lists used in the experiments are contained in






































Number of items recalled immediately after presentation
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high response bias (i.e. with YEB responses greater than 75^) the
mean is 55*12* In Experiment Two, the moan number of items recalled
immediately after presentation wa3 10.53* The mean recognition rate
after 30 minutes was 37*79*
PiscM^ipn
It must be admitted that these results are hardly surprising.
Adams (1967) points out that many studies show recognition superior
to recall by a factor of three. Because of differences in the
quality of the tapes in Experiment 1 and 2 it ia not possible to
conclude that recognition may have been facilitated by recall,
making any conclusions of the nature of the exact superiority of
recognition over recall tenuous.
The importance of the present results lies not in showing the
extent of the superiority of recognition over recall but in the
problems posed for a limited storage capacity hypothesis. Experi¬
mental disproof of the hypothesis is, of course, hampered by the
imprecise formulation of the word 'limited', since Adams (1967) is
thinking in terms of a recall of memory span of some 7-9 items, it
ia obvious that the number of items stored in both Experiment One
and Experiment Two is considerably in excess of this. Perhaps a more
satisfactory approach is to reformulate the problem of limited storage
capacity. If one continues to put in information for what is
considered to be short term memory, say two minutes, (An arbitrary
figure of course, 83 there is no agreed time limit on 3TM i.e. there
is no agreement as to what constitutes rapid forgetting) and one can
produce evidence to show that storage is of a high order and that
there is no evidence to 3how that what forgetting there is, is due
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to factors other than interference or trace decay, then one has good
reason to question that storage capacity is limited, indeed one has
no basis upon which to establish a dichotomous theory of memory on
the basis of the limited capacity to store incoming information.
As table one shows, there is a high order of retention under
the conditions of experiment one outlined above, and the evidence of
retention produced must be considered the lowest estimate of informa¬
tion in store, as there is ample opportunity for intra-list
interference, or trace decay, which will reduce the amount of
information actually retrievable. These results indicate that, unless
recognition is irrelevant as a measure of capacity, the evidence for
establishing a dichotomous theory of memory on the basis of a limited
capacity hypothesis is at the very least, equivocal. It is true, of
course, that there is nothing magical about 40,2 retention as a dis¬
proof of limited storage. £>ut what this data has shown is that a
large amount of forgetting which was previously attributable to
limited storage capacity (i.e. those items not recalled once the
memory span has been reached) cannot unequivocally be accounted for in
such terms. It is possible that what forgetting there is, is due to
interference or trace decay rather than lock of storage capacity.
Again, it is not being claimed that given two systems of memory, one
cannot account for the data, just that the data prevent one from
establishing a dichotomous theory of memory based on a limited
capacity hypothesis.
The critical question, of course, concerns the relationship
between recognition and recall. If, for example, all forgetting is
due to interference as described earlier e.g. Melton (1967a) and
recall is degraded to recognition through interference, then there is
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no forgetting due to limited storage capacity and the basis for
dichotomising is at an end. Even if only the items recognised can
be shown to indicate the storage of items, this will make it that much
more likely that storage capacity is not limited in that rapid supra-
span forgetting to a large extent will not be accountable for in terms
of lack of storage space. This is the point of the present experiment •
not thn+ it will provide a conclusive disproof of limited storage
capacity, but that it makes even more unlikely tha+ a dichotomous
theory of memory can be established on the basis of this type of evi¬
dence. Ae was noted in Chapter 5» whilst various possible relation¬
ships between recognition and recall have been postulated, the most
parsimonious assumption at present is that they both involve the same
memory system.
Again it was argued in Chapter 5 that material which could be
recognised was originally recallable, in normal memory experiments at
least, so that the relationship between recognition and recall was of
such a nature that a degradation of the original trace made
recognition only, possible, where previously recall was possible.
The central problem then becomes, what is the nature of this trace
degradation that lead3 to recognition only being possible?
Three general causes of forgetting were postulated in Chapter
1. There may be autonomous decay of the trace for reasons unconnected
with experience.
2. There may be forgetting due to trace unavailability rather than
storage loss i.e. "classical" interference theory.
3. There may be forgetting due to experiential factors causing trace
degeneration e.g. displacement or overwriting.
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.us will be seen presently* for the purpose of the present
analysis it is useful to divide the third category into theories
which postulate that interference causes trace decay, and other
theories postulating trace degeneration as a consequence of experi¬
ential factors. The implications of the various possible causes for
the limited storage capacity hypothesis are noted below.
1. If forgetting is due to trace unavailability i.e. retrieval
deficit - the limited storage capacity hypothesis is at an end.
Interference theory, as was noted previously, assumes that material
once in store is there permanently. If such is the case, material
even in short term memory is always in store and presumably being
added to by incoming information. It cannot therefore be regarded
as having limited storage capacity.
2. If forgetting is due to autonomous trace decay, then the limited
storage capacity hypothesis is at an end. Autonomous trace decay
theory doe3 not claim a limit in storage capacity; the limit on
retention is iue to failure to prevent the traces decaying past the
point of recall. Evidence that an item had been stored, even with
recognition measures, therefore indicates that storage space was
available for that item, thus recognition of 5° or so items indicates
storage of at least that number of items.
3. If forgetting is due to interference causing trace decay, the
limited storage capacity hypothesis is at an end. This is because
the limit on taking in incoming information is not in terms of
storage capacity; presumably if a test could be devised such that
interference was completely absent, an unlimited amount of material
could be stored.
4. If forgetting is due to displacement or compression, then the
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limited storage capacity hypothesis may be held. However, unless it
can be proved that displacement or compression is the cause of rapid
forgetting, at least of the supra-span forgetting of Experiment 1, and
be shown not to be the cause of forgetting over days and weeks and
years, then it is impossible to establish a dichotomous theory of
memory on the basis of the limited capacity hypothesis. This is
because holding a displacement hypothesis assumes limited storage
capacity. If storage capacity in L1W is also limited (ie. assuming
displacement in LTM) then one cannot hold a dichotomy on the basis
of the limited 3TM storage capacity and unlimited LTivi storage
capacity.
The evidence on the nature of forgetting is dealt with in
Chapter 6. As the review of the evidence showed, it is by no meens
clear what the cause of forgetting is, either in the short or in the
long terra. This is as true of displacement as a cause of short term
forgetting as it is true of other theories. Indeed it was noted that
evidence of associative factors causing short term forgetting, and of
repetition effects increasing short term forgetting,is extremely
embarrassing for such a theory.
If it is accepted that the cause of forgetting is not yet known,
then of course, whilst the evidence might be compatible with a
limited storage capacity hypothesis, a dichotomous theory cannot be
established on the basis of our limited capacity to take in new infor¬
mation. It is possible that short term forgetting is due to factors
such as interference or decay, which do not imply limited storage
capacity. The evidence of this chapter is that a limit in storage
capacity is unlikely because of the evidence of a large number of




It is interesting to note, in conclusion, that a large number
of dichotomist theorists consider that recognition and recall differ
in terms of retrievability of material, not storage.(Kintsch (19&8)
Norman (196QiWickelgren, Jorrnan and Wickelgren (1969) have all
suggested retrieval differences between recognition and recall.) For
these theorists, at least, the evidence of this Chapter is
problematic.
Summary of Chapter
It was first noted that any attempt to establish a diehotomou3 theory
of memory on the basis of the limited capacity to retrieve newly
presented material, demands a demonstration that STM has limited
storage capacity. Limited processing capacity may be interpreted in
terms of a single memory system, and the hypothesis of limited re¬
trieval capacity of Sit; as opposed to unlimited retrieval capacity of
L'B.i for any given set of items, falls in the face of the empirical
evidence.
The main source of evidence for the limited storage capacity
hypothesis comes from the conventional memory span experiments, in
which rapid supra-3pan forgetting defines the memory span, the
memory span being claimed to describe the limits of storage capacity
of STM because it, too, i3 subject to rapid forgetting. In order to
demonstrate limited storage capacity using memory span it is
essential to show that supra-span forgetting, at least, is due to
limited storage capacity.
There are however numerous objections to the interpretation of
the memory span as showing limited storage capacity. These are
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now listed:
1. Supra-spaii forgetting mi^it be due to rapid trace decay or to
interference factors.
2. Reminiscence effects, where items not immediately recallable,
are recallable at a later time, indicate that failure to recall an
item does not indicate it is lost from store, indeed it is impossible
to demonstrate, empirically, that items not retrieved are lost, whether
later recall is possible or not.
3. Prompted recall techniques and cued recall techniques indicate
that immediate recall does not indicate the extent of storage. Hence
supra-span items rapidly forgotten may still be in store, making un¬
tenable the interpretation of such forgetting in terms of limited
storage capacity. 1 \
4. It is even questioned by dichotomous theorists whether the memory
span represents only output from STM, first on the grounds that some
others, second, on the grounds that tne nature or items airects tn^,,
5. Sub-span units are rapidly forgotten under certain conditions, is
the conventional memory span may have no special status.
6. Recognition measure of retention show evidence of storage
considerably beyond the memory span.
In our present state of knowledge, objection 1 on its own, prevents
the establishment of a dichotomous theory on the basis of limited
storage capacity whatever the basis of holding the hypothesis and
sections of the memory span are more
length of the span.
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whether recognition and recall are dichotomoua states or not.
Objections 2, 3 an<3 7 ere positive objections in the sense that
not only do they prevent the establishment of a dichotomous theory oil
the basis of evidence of limited capacity to retrieve newly presented
material, they positively make it less likely that limited storage is
the cause of supra-apan forgetting. For this reason the author
conducted the experiments on recognition, considering it important that
minor theoretical objections to earlier work should be removed.
The First Experiment involved a recognition test after a
presentation list of 120 words, presented at approximately 1 per
second. The second experiment involved immediate recall from the list,
towgether with a recognition test $0 minutes later. The results indi¬
cated that there was approx. recognition in Experiment 1$
10.53 items were recalled and 37«3 items recognised in Experiment 2.
Basically the experimental results make it more difficult
hold that there is limited storage capacity by showing considerable
retention amongst supra-span "forgotten" items. Perhaps the mo3t
likely relationship between recognition and recall, in terms of trace
deoay or interference, also makes the holding of a limited storage
capacity hypothesis more difficult. Certainly the evidence for a
displacement or compression hypothesis, is far from unequivocal.
Even if there wore evidence which supported a displacene nt or com¬
pression hypothesis in the short term, it would not be possible to
establish a dichotomous theory of memory on this basis, until it could
be shown that this was not the cause of forgetting in LTM also.
It seems clear that dichotomous theorists are far from
establishing a dichotomous theory on the basis of the limited
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capacity hypothesis i.e. they are far from being able to claim that
evidence of the limited capacity of the memory system to deal with
incoming information is explicable only in terms of a dichotomous theoiy.
The next chapter will be ooncerned to show that it ia not at all clear
thet a dichotomous theory can even adequately handle the experimental




THE I IT. ITSD CAPACITY HYPOTHESIS 2t
Iqtrp^uqt^oft
The last chapter wus concerned to show that a dichotogous theory
of memory cunnot be established on the basis of the limited capacity of
subjects to retrieve incoming information, because this limited
capacity is explicable in single system theory terms. Thus whilst one
explanation might be in terras of two distinctive memory systems
(i.e. the immediate memory capacity might be in terms of storage,)
it might also be in terras of other factors which do not entail a
dichotomous theory of memory. Indeed the last chapter shoved that
there was evidence of large amounts of stored information in immediate
memory after the traditional measure of capacity had been used,
questioning the assumption that the prima facie evidence is consistent
with the limited storage capacity hypothesis (LGH)
It is however, one thing to prove that the evidence i3
insufficient to establish a dichotomou3 theory of memory on the
grounds of LGH, quite another to show that the evidence is totally
inconsistent with such a nypothesis. Lor this reason, the question of
whether a dichotomous theory can be established on the basis of limited
capacity, or whether the evidence is even interpretable in terms of a
dichotoraoua theory, are treated in separate chapters. Thus +he author is
concerned lest some ingenious ad hoc assumptions, enable an interpreta¬
tion of the experimental evidence to be made in terms of a
dichotomous theory. These in turn might be used to refute the far more
important argument of the previous chapter, i.e. the baby might be
thrown out with the bath water.
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Various arguments can be used to claim that the experimental
evidence of the last chapter can be accounted for in terms of a
dichotoraous theory of memory; these are considered b low.
1.. Information enters directly into lona term memory store
The first possibility is ■♦•hat information enters direc+ly into
long term memory store, by-passing the short term memory store. This
of course raises a fundamental problem for dichotomous theorists, the
criterion under which it is claimed material i3 in one system rather
than another. As has been noted in Chapters 4 and 6, rapid for¬
getting mu3t be assumed to take place in short term memory if a
dichotomous theory is to hold. To allow that items in Experiment 1
and 2a entered long term memory direct is to allow that rapid
forget+lng can take place in long term memory, as the recall of only
10.53 out of 120 items indicates. At the very leas+ +o take the
position tha+ items entered LTM direct, i3 to admi* tha+ rapid recall
loss of digits is no criterion for establishing the limited capacity
of storage of short term memory. The items may well enter LT?-'
direct and be rapidly forgot+en in that system. Indeed even failure
to recognise digits may indicate only the extent to which rapid
forgetting has occurred in LTLi. It appears necessary therefore
to regard the items recognised in .Experiment 1 as residing in short
term memory store, if one is not going to compromise the major
criterion for deciding whether or not material is in STM, rapid
forgetting.
If it is to be held, then, that the information in Experiment 1
enters LTM direct, on what grounds can one unequivocally maintain
that any material does not enter LTM direct, making the postulation
of a short term memory system redundant. (It is, of course
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unparsimonious to argue that a distinction must be drawn between
serialised material and non-serialised material in considering the
theoretical implications of the data presented, one has then to
postulate two mechanisms for rapid forgetting as the evidence from
this study is that even for non-seriali3ed material, forgetting as
measured by recall loss is rapid.
2. Information is transferred yapidly tg„ iQW term macqpry.
If it is claimed that all material enters SU& where it is
either lost or transferred to LTM rapidly, a central problem remains.
Material which at one stage could be recalled in Experiment 1 is to
a large measure only recognisable at the time of the retention test.
The forgetting which results in recognition only being possible must
however have taken place in STMj (rapid forgetting, as was previously
noted, must be considei'ed to take place in SI?"). This is not a very
radical position for a dichotomist} many regard forgetting in SIM to
be due to some extent to trace decay, yet, it raises a very severe
problem for the status of rehearsal if material which is presented at
the rate of 1.1 items per second, and which then decays in STi such
that it cannot be recalled, is rapidly transferred to LTM. Thus, if
material cannot be recalled, it is difficult to see how it can be
rehearsed, at least in the sense of some form of repetition, as it is
commonly regarded, e.g. by Murdoek (19&7) Waugh and Norman (1965)* and
Norman (1969). These writers regard rehearsal as critical in trans¬
ferring material from SIM to LTM. It cannot however be critical in
Experiment 1.
A second problem also presents itself - regarding rehearsal.
Whilst it has been argued that delivery of two and three syllable
- 129 -
3A
words at the rate of approximately one per second cannot preclude the
possibility of rehearsal of material as it comes in, it should be
noted that this objection can be raised against many STR;: experiments
using the same rate of presentation including many allegedly supporting
dichotomous theory e.g. Baddeley (1966 b) presentation rate one per
sec. Conrad (1964) letters presented at one evexy .75 sec. Cohen
and Johansson (1967) digits presented at one per sec. to name but a
few. Nor can speeding up of presentation rate control for the
possibility of rehearsing material at the same rate as fresh material
is coming in» one may have a shadowing phenomenon such that rehearsal
can begin before the item is wholly in. Indeed if this phenomenon is
not occurring it becomes almost impossible to rehearse multi-syllable
words presented at one per sec.
The problem of rehearsal was discussed in Chapter 6, where it was
noted that the function of repetition in increasing retention was open to
question. It appears more likely that the opportunity for reorganising
material is critical in improving retention, ./hi1st it is not being
claimed that such processes did not operate in the present experimental
situation, it is claimed that they do not take the form that is
claimed by those holding a diohotomous theory, namely in terms of
active repetition of items. Any process which might have been taking
place was of such u nature that it could not reasonably be described
as rehearsal} at best it must have involved some automatic integration
of new and old material, without the intervention of a control mechanism.
Yet to hold as critical to a theory, a process which can have no
behavioural effects that distinguish it from other processes which
equally well account for the data (e.g. the integration of material
with the pre-existing cognitive framework), is clearly unsatisfactoiy.
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It may be thet rehearsal is critical in transferring material from
SW to LIS. , but not if by rehearsal is meant the overt or covert
repetition of an item.
In summary then, it is quite clear, that items of experiment 1
can be claimed to be in LIM only at the price of denying any critical
part to "rehearsal" in the transfer process. This is a somewhat
difficult position for a diehdtomou3 theory to be in as it allows
transfer to be an automatic process. This makes untenable the
intuitive basis for a dichotomy, that there is a decision mechanism
as to usefulness or otherwise of material which is then discarded or
transferred. Rehearsal, as Tulving and Madigan (1970) have pointed
out, may well lead to better retention because it aids reorganisa¬
tion within the cognitive frameworR, not because any transfer of
material from one system to another is in evidence. A methodo¬
logical problem must also be faced if it is claimed that material
recognised in experiment 1 is in long term memory (if it is claimed
to be in short term memory then the limited storage capacity
hypothesis is of course compromised). 1b be in long term memory
the items in experiment 1 must have been rapidly forgotten to some
extent, transferred and then retrieved from long term memory within
the space of 0 - 4 minutes. It is extremely difficult to see how
one can distinguish this hypothesis from one which claims that rapid
forgetting took place in "long term memory". In other words, a
theory which postulates that items can be rapidly copied into long
term memory from short term memory, in the absence of rehearsal,
such that material can be recognised, but not recalled, seems indis¬
tinguishable from a theory which claims that all material enters
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LTM, where rapid forgetting of some items takes place such that
recognition only is possible, where once recall was possible.
5. -vhort and long term memory can exist simultaneously
It might be argued that STO and LTM can eaist simultaneously and
in experiment 1# one is measuring a composite of output from ST! and
XT'. (This is the position, for instance, taken by Waugh end
Norman, 19^5)• However as the limit of 5TT." is claimed to be about
4-6 items, the vast majority of items must again be assumed to be in
LTM. Again the problem of transfer of material from short to long
term memory in the absence of rehearsal is posed, as is the methodo¬
logical problem raised in the last section.
4. Recognition does not indicate unlimited capacity
It might be argued that recognition involves compression of items
in "short tern memory" andthat when SIT." is overloaded there is a loss
of some information from each item. Thus whilst one may be able to
store a great number of items in 3TM, this is on information which is
equivalent to allowing for recall of only a few items. For example in
experiment 1, the recognition of 5° item3 is based on the same amount
of information as the recall of 10,53 items. This suggestion is put
forward by burdock (1968 b).
As was noted in the chapter on recognition and recoil (Chapter 5)
the fact that 27 extra items could be recognised after a recall task
is a refutation of thl3 position. Insofar as a dichotomy is claimed
on the basis of compression being a short term memory phenomenon
(it can hardly be claimed to be an LTM phenomenon if LTM has unlimited
capacity), it must be shown that forgetting after 30 minutes or so,
such that recognition only is possible where recall wasppreviously
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possible, is not due to compression. There appears to be no
empirical basis upon which such a distinction can be made.
1'inally a compression theory is faced with the problem of re¬
hearsal in explaining the data of experiment 2. If only 10 - 53 items
are immediately recallable and other items which are reoognised
immediately are in i>Tti, how are an additional 27 items retrievable
from "long term" memory after JO minutes? As was noted previously,
items which cannot be recalled presumably cannot be rehearsed. How
could these items therefore, which were recognisable only in STM, be
transferred to LTM if rehearsal is critical in the transfer process,
as Murdock (19&7) claims.
nummary of chanter
The main points of this chapter can now be summarised.
The evidence and discussion of the previous chapter (Chapter 7)
might be questioned on the grounds that Experiments 1 and 2 a, b,
discussed in Chapter 7 are interpretable in terms of a dichotomous
theory. It is noted that whilst this may be so, that is far removed
from establishing a dichotomous theory of memory. Certain difficul¬
ties are then noted even in interpreting the evidence of Chapter 7
on the basis of a dichotomous theory. These are»
1. It cannot be claimed that all items have entered LTivi direct,
a
without undermining the basis for/dichotomy between short and long
term memory, rapid forgetting being essentially a short term memory
phenomenon. Thus if all items entered LUC direct, all but 10.53 can
be regarded, as, to some extent, being rapidly forgotten.
2. If it is claimedthat the items recognised in experiment 1 have
been rapidly transferred from STtv to LTM, then rehearsal, which is
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often claimed to be critical in the transfer process, cannot be
regarded as being critical in this experiment. At best an automatic
transfer process can be postulated, which strikes at the intuitive
basis for postulating a dichotomous theory,
3» The view that recognition scores do not indicate greater storage
than recall scores is refuted as recognition exceeds recall after the
recall test. Thus more is stored than is available through recall
test procedures.
finally it. should be noted that this chapter is relatively
unimportant. It does not matter too much if the experimental evidence
is compatible with a dichotomous theory. What is important i3 that
a dichotomous theory cannot be established on the basis of empirical
evidence which claims to show the limited capacity to store incoming
information. As the previous chapter showed, this is not the only
interpretation of the data, indeed it is not the likely interpretation
of the data in view of the large number of items which could be
recognifcod following a single exposure of items at 1.1 per second.




o£I. *KTIC jJMJD ACOUSTIC CODING IN ..HQRT AND LONG TERM MEMORY
Introduction
Adams (1967) considers that a major line of evidence for a
dichotomous theory of memory comes from studies (e.g. Baddeley (1966b)
and Wickelgren (1965a) which indicate that acoustic confusion occurs
in short term memory, whereas semantic confusion occurs in long term
memory. From this it is inferred that STf.i storage of information is
in terms of an acoustic code, in LTM it is in terms of a semantic
code. Many psychologists apart from Adams were,until recently at
least, also willing to draw a distinction between short and long
term memory, on the basis of this type of evidence. Thus Baddeley
(1966a) i 502 "Unlike SIM, LTM proves to be impaired by semantic
similarity, and (1963) i' 162. "Further evidence of two separate
processes is provided by the results of Baddeley (1966) in which
learning word sequences was influenced by acoustic oonfusion but not
semantic similarity, when recall was immediate. When recall was
delayed for one minute, however, the position reversed and semantic
similarity became crucial while acoustic similarity had no effect."
Norman (I969) also makes similar claims - F 127 - "In later
experiments (e.g. Baddeley 1966b) it has been shown that LTk is
affected by semantic similarity of the learned items but not by
acoustic similarity. Thus it appears that acoustic coding is a
temporury phenomenon restricted to primary memory." Again
Wickelgren (ly69 b) iJ 127. "The evidence from studies of human
memory strongly supports the hypothesis that long term verbal
memory is in a semantically encoded system whilst short
terra verbal memory i3 predominantly encoded phonetically."
Two sub-problems concerned with semantic and acoustic confusion can be
identified, first, what do these confusion effects involve and what
can legitimately be inferred, assuming their empirical veracity?
Second, is the evidence upon which a dichotomy of operations is based,
adequate? In this chapter it will be 3hown that not only is the
evidence upon which a dichotomy of operations is based inadequate, even
the production of adequate evidence could not be interpreted as
entailing a dichotomous theory of mei&jry.
It is not too clear what those who argue for a dichotomy of
memory 3y3tems are claiming when a dichotomy is made on the baai3 of
different coding systems. Presumably what ia meant is that relation¬
ships among different items of information in STM are in terms of an
acoustic dimension, whereas relationships among items in LT: are in
terms of meaningfulness. A3 operationally the inferences are
normally made on the basis of confusing items which either sound alike
or mean similar things, e.g. Baddeley (I9^6a, b) this indicates that
acoustic interference in 3fM involves the rapid forgetting of items
stored in an acoustic relationship with each other, whereas semantio
interference effects involve the slower forgetting of items stored
in meaningful relationship (or associative) to each other. (Presumably
dichotomous theorists account for the 3low nature of forgetting of
semantically related i+ems, to their not being in a semantically
related system for a period of time after presentation.). The storage
in terms of acoustic relationship must decay rapidly, if it is to be
claimed an STfv" characteristic, on the other hand, forgetting of a
semantic nature cannot be said to have taken place within the time
period described by STfcl as this would allow one to olaim that
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rapid forgetting of 3emantic material had taken place. Empirically,
then, a disproof of a dichotomy based on semantic and acoustic
coding in LTf/i and STM involves evidence of semantic processing within
the time limit of ST".' and evidence of acoustic coding outwith the
time limit desoribed by SIM. These are now considered in turn below.
short Term Memory
Three workers were initially involved in the experimental
demonstration of aooustic confusion in STM, Conx'ad (IJ&k)
Baddeley (1966 a, b) and .»ickelgren (1965 a» b, 1966). Conrad (1964)
who, it must be stressed, has at no time held a dichotomoua theory on
the basis of differing interference effects, showed rapid forgetting
of letters which were acoustically related, to the extent that letters
which sounded alike were confused more than those which did not. His
experimental proceedure consisted of presented sequences of six
letters, in which the population of letters was confined to two aet»
of acoustically similar letters e.g. fVC, MNF. After presentation,
recall was asked for immediately, and it was found that where errors
occurred these were of an acoustic nature i.e. errors were acousti¬
cally related to the original presentation. Conrad was concerned at
the implications of these results for a trace decay theory, and made
no statement about evidence fox* a dichotomous theory of memory on the
basis of his evidence, indeed he specifically notes that Woodworth
(1933) has provided evidence of acoustic confusion in LTfc. Further
he notes that acoustic confusions for this type of material were not
surprising (in spite of visual presentation) in that the type of
material used is normally dealt with acoustically.
Beddeley (1966a, b) has taken a different line from Conrad in
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that he interpreted hia findings in terras of a dichotomous theory of
memory.
Baadeley (1963. 1966a) presented subjects with sequences of five
similar sounding words# e.g. Man, Mad, Map etc., at a rate of 1 word
per second and contrasted the correct recall of such sequences with
similar length sequences of aeraantically related words and non-related
words. He foundconsiderable evidence for acoustic interference, and
also statistically significant effects of semantic interference. Erom
these results he concludes that STM and LTM use different coding
systems (p 3^2. It must be admitted that he later states that what
constitutes the difference between HIM and LTM time in store, number
of repetitions or Coding system employed, remains to be seen.
Elsewhere, however, he isless cautious, (1968) and as noted above,
concludes that the evidence supports a dichotomy on the basis of
acoustic cohfusion characteristic of STTvl and semantic confusion of
LTY/i. The further inference is that STM uses acoustic coding and LTM
semantic coding only. More recently, evidence claimed to support
the hypothesis that acoustic coding is confined to ahort term memory
comes from the studies of Graik (1968) and Kintsch and Buschke (1969),
Both studies utilised free recall techniques and showed that acoustic
confusion effects were confined to the recency part of the serial
position curve, claimed by dichotomous theorists to represent
basically output from an HTM store.
Ivan were the evidenoe produced to indicate that semantic and
acoustic codin& are dichotomously divided by time, it is dubious
whetner the hypothesis of STM being an exclusively acoustic system
stands up against the empirical evidence of visual storage.
Thus leaving aside evidence that in STM confusion may be
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articulatory and not acoustic (Hintzman 1967 ). evidence of visual
storage in ST!' coma3 from such studies as those of Rosa (1969).
Ross found that deaf 'S's are not necessarily inferior to hearing
•S's when visual sequences are presented, and suggests that the
translation of visual sequences into auditory storage is a more
common strategy, not a necessity:,. Conrad and Rush (1965) ^00 provide
evidence that acoustic factors are not operating in deaf subjects.
Their subjects did not make errors of an acoustic nature where
non deaf subjects do.
Of greater importance, however, are the large number of studies
which indicate semantic processing in short term memory, An early
example of such experimental evidence is in the "classical" paper of
viokens, Born and Allen (19&3) who showed release from Proactive
Inhibition (PI) by switching from one category of i+ems to ano+her.
Whilst these authors were concerned with PI release, it is quite clear
that this release depends on the subject perceiving the new category
(e.g. letters) as one which semantically (or at least associatively
differed from the previous one. Without semantic processing such
release from PI would no+ have been possible.
A second experiment which showed statistically significant
semantic interference effects is +hat of Baddeley (19&3) and in
view of this it is most surprising tha+ he is willing +0 dichotomise
on the basis of differing interference effects. Further papers
showing semantic processing in STM are these of Barkowski and Eisner
(1968) who find degree of abstractness a major variable in STI" reten¬
tion. l/ale and Gregory (19&5) who found interference effects for paired
associates in STMj Calfee and Peterson (1968) who found that list
organisation facilitated memoryj Srhard (1968) found superior
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retention of familiar meterial over unfamiliar material; Henlev.
Nerves and Peeae (1969) like Calfee and Peterson, found that semantic
structure facilitated recall in 3TP. Loess (1968) showed semantic
interference effects in a PI design. He presented 3 item sequences
of semantically related categories, followed by interpolated
activity; after this interpolated activity a further 3 item sequence
was presented which was semantically related to the first sequence,
Her antic interference effects resulted. : urdock and Van Haal
provided evidence of semantic processing by showing transformation
errors are greater where category classes are similar in STtl
experiments, ^urnaae (196?) found that high and low frequency words
were forgotten at a differen+ rate over a 30 second interval.
He interprets the results as showing that in 9IM, like LTM, forgetting
io due to PI. Two papers by W j.ckens (Wickens and Glark 1963, and Vickens.
Clark Hall and /ittlinger 1968) show semantic processing in 8TH. In
the first experiment, evidence of release from PI is produced using
words of a different semantic class. In the second experiment, release
from PI was demonstrated switching from adjectives to verbs, sickens
et al (1963) claim the experiment was not adequate as the possibility
existed that the release was due to semantic factors. Vhen these
semantic factors were removed the switch from adjective to verb did
not result in releacq from PI. It might be suggested that even if
the results had been due to a switch from adjective to verb, this
would have indicated processing of a semantic (as opposed to acoustic)
nature. Finally, as far as this review is concerned, using a
Peterson and Peterson type design, ."himbev and ffischof (1969)
found that PI effects resulted from semantic similarity.
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Whilst these studies indicate semantic processing in STM,
Tosner (19&7) has noted that there has been a universal failure to
produce evidence of RI as a result of semantic similarity# and
Glanzer et al (1969) having failed to produce HI using semantic
similarity, concludes that forgetting is not due to the nature of
interpolated items, merely the number, despite the considerable
evidence reviewed in Chapter 6, showing the contrary to be the case.
Nevertheless evidence has now been produced by Corman and Wiokens
(1968) using a Peterson and Peterson design, 'which indicates the
semantic confusion in short term memory.
Whilst almost all the studies just quoted in support of the
view that semantic processing occurs in SIM, have been recall studies,
there i3 evidence of semantic processing in recognition studies.
Thus one of the studies quoted in Chapter 5 (Young et al 1968)
indicates semantic processing in SIM. Evidence that recognition
memory involves semantic processing in SIM is not only important as
evidence of semantic processing in SW! per se, but also for the impli¬
cations it carries for a dichotomy between recognition and recall.
First a demonstration of the effect of semantic factors in SIM recog¬
nition makes it impossible to hold that recognition memory is somehow
a literal perceptual trace. Semantic processing indicates that
integration has taken place between incoming information and old
information before recognition has taken place. Secondly it is
unparsimonious. though not logically impossible, to suppowe that two
memory systems exist in which the same semantic associations are
stored quite independently of each other.
As well as evidenoe of semantic processing in 3hort tenn
memory, however, it was thought that evidence of actual semantic
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confusion in the short term, using recognition, should be
demonstrated if possible.
Experiment 3 i3 a demonstration of semantic confusion in short
term memory.
- 'WiQP
Sub ieotst ^he subjects were 5° undergraduate and research
students at the University College of Swansea.
25 subjects were assigned to a control and the other 25 subjects were
assigned to an experimental group, in a random manner.
Materials: The materials consisted of English words recorded
on magnetic tape at the rate of 2 words per second, and English words
read aloud by the experimenter from a list.
Designt If semantic confusion does occur in "STr1"*, then the
presentation of two 3emantically related words separated by about 6
seconds should result in errors of confusion with a third semantioally
related word in a test list, the whole being presented in an interval
normally considered to lie in the range of "STM". To test thi3
hypothesis, the experiment was designed in the following wayi-
Footnote8 Gince the experiment was conducted, an almost identical
experiment was published by Underwood and Freund (1963) as were the
experiments of loess (1968) and Gorman and Wickena (1963) referred to
above. This present experiment can best be regarded, perhaps, as
confirming the findings of these Studies.
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Two presentation lists were constructed from English words
recorded at a rate of seconds per word on magnetic tape. (See
Table I)
table i
Constitution of presentation and teat lists.
Groups of words from which Presentation Lists Teat List (T)
lists were constructed











related words 20 - -
10 words, each semantically
but not acoustically related
to one of the pairs
«» «■> 10 (R words)
20 words, each acoustically








The experimental presentation (EP) list contained 6o words. Of these
20 consisted of 10 pairs of semantioally related words (e.g., "slug"
and "worm") scattered throughout the list in such a way that at least
twelve words intervened between the members of a pair. Of the other
40 words, 20 had a frequency of 1 per million (low frequency) and 20
a frequency of 100 per million (high frequency), according to
Thorndike and lorge (1944). Subjects were instructed to listen to
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this tape passively and to make no attempt to learn it. Immediately
after presentation, the test (T) list was read out by the experimenter,
and the subjects were asked to give a rating for each word on the test
list, after that word had been read out, according to how confident
they were that the word had or had not occurred in the presentation
list. The following scale was usedi-
Y3 Y2 Y1 N1 N2 N3
Certain that Fairly Balance of Balance of fairly Certain
word was old certain probability probability certain that word
that that word that word that was new.
word was was old was new. word was
old. new.
For scoring purposes, the scale extended from 1 (N3) to 6 (Y3). The
presentation of the T list took an average of 180 seconds.
The constitution of the T list ia indicated in Table IJ Of
the 40 words, 10 (R words) were semantically related to the pairs in
the BP list, so as to form triads of words with related meanings
(e.g. "snail" to go with "slug" and "worm"). The other 3C words
consisted of 10 of the frequent and 10 of the infrequent words on the
EP list (0 words) and 10 words (3 frequent and 3 infrequent) which
were new words (HH words), unrelated acoustically or semantically to
the words on the EP list.
It was hypothesised that the R words would be given a higher
rating than the NR words.
^Footnote» Bee Appendix II for the actual lists used.
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Since it was possible that the R words would tend to receive
a higher rating than the MR words due to factors other than semantic
confusion (e.g. frequency^ it was decided to run a control group of
subjects who received a presentation (CP) list which did not contain
pairs of semantically related words. The pairs of words in the EP
list were replaced by words which were acoustically but not aeman-
tieally similar to them, but were of approximately the same frequency.
Thus "slum" and squirm" replaced "slug" and "worm". The test list and
all other conditions were identical with those for the experimental
group. If there was no semantic confusion effect in the experimental
group, then the differences betvfeen the ratings of the R and MR
words for the two groups should not have been significantly different.
RESULTS
Table II summarises the results for the three sets of words in
the test list
TABLE II




















1. v.ilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test
2. Large sample approximation to randomisation
test. (Siegel 19j>6)
for both groups of subjects.
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For the experimental group. R words were rated significantly
higher (p^.GC.j)) than NH words. For the control group, this was not
so (p^.05), indicating that the significant difference must have been
due to some factor present in the ISP list, but absent from the CP list.
That this difference is caused by semantic confusion is supported
by the sighifioant difference between the mean ratings of R words by the
E and C groups (pfC .001). That there was e significant difference
between the ratings given to the NP words by the two groups of subjects
(P>C.005) indicates that some of the difference for the R words could
have been caused by factors other than semantic oonfU3ionj in all
probability, one of these would be the inevitable differences in the
acoustic properties of the two tapes. However, the difference between
the R words is significantly greater than that between the NR words
(p^.05). This provides strong evidence for the general hypothesis,
"able II also indicates that the old (0) words received the same
ratings in the two conditions.
It might be objected that the semantic confusion produoed was
a rapidly appearing UTfvi phenomenon. To argue this, however, is to
admit that forgetting can take place rapidly in LTfri, contrary to
the view that LTM is a relatively stable memory system. This is
because, as noted previously, confusion effects involve forgetting.
as this experiment was conducted in a total time of not more than
220 seconds, forgetting in LTivi, sufficient to have causedconfusion,
must be supposed to have occurred.
The evidence so far produced indicates that semantic processing
occurs in SIM and that STM cannot be considered as being exclusively
acoustic. The evidenoe of semantic processing comes from
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studies involving semantic facilitation, semantic interference (both
PI and RI), and using both recognition and recall.
Baddeley and Dale (1966) do in fact admit some slight effects
of semantic confusion in short term memory, but have tried to hold a
dichotomous theory on the basis of quantitative differences between
acoustic and semantic confusion, claiming that the former occurs in
far greater quantity in "STM", the latter in far greater quantity in
"LTP.Apart from the problems involved in comparing, quantitatively,
two possibly unrelated processes, it is neoessary, in order to
postulate a dichotomous theory to show a dichotomy. At the very
minimum, evidence of a dichotomous function over time is required in
one or both processes of interference, actual quantitative differences
between the two being irrelevant.
V.hilst it is clear that there is adequate experimental evidenoe
of semantic processing in STM it is perhaps surprising that 3uch
evidence is required in order to refute the hypothesis that LTt:. does
not employ semantic coding. That the words before one as one reads
are almost instantaneously meaningful, indicates that they are almost
instantaneously being semantically processed, but since many words are
rapidly forgotten, these rapidly forgotten words must be considered to
have been in SIM only as noted in Chapter Thus any attempt to
claim that semantic processing of items is taking plaoe on their
entering LTM directly, is untenable. An experimental demonstration
of rapid forgetting of ordinary English sentences is contained in a




As with the importance of acoustic factors in STM experiments, there
is no questioning of the importance of semantic factors in long term
memory experiments. Thus McG-eoch and McDonald (1931) and Johnson
(1933) provide two early studies which show the effects of semantic
factors in longer term forgetting, and more recently Baddeley (1966 b)
has demonstrated the same. The critical question concerns the presence
or absence of acoustic factors in "long term memory". Woodworth (1938)
certainly considered that there was such evidence, and Conrad (1964)
who is often misquoted in this connection, points to oodworth 's
evidence as evidence of acoustic coding in LTM. In fact the
'evidence' provided by .oodworth, a list of words that had reportedly
been confused, does not come up to modern day experimental requirements.
In order to provide evidence of acoustic confusion in long term
memory runeberg and Sykes (1969) devised an experiment in which a
presentation list was followed, after a period of 20 - 25 minutes, by
a test list containing words acoustically similar and words acoustically
disci. Alar to words on the presentation list. Subjects were eked
to rate, on a six point scale, whether they thought the test list word
was old or new. The finding that acoustically similar words were
rated significantly higher than non related words was taken to
indicate acoustic confusion in "LTM".
his experiment, was, in fact, also similar to one conducted by
u:,k • OO-I:. and reund(l968) and like Underwoods and 'round'3 experiment,
was open to the objection that despite the care taken, certain
inelegancieft were present in the structure of the lists. These
inelepolicies involved the possibility of semantic association
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factors, making it desifable to conduct a further experiment using
redesigned lists. 3xperircent 4 is a report of this confirmatory
I
experiment.
g P J'L.JJg 4
I.STHOD
Subjects
21 Undergraduate students of University Oollege Swansea.
The experimental design employed was basically the same as that
of Gruneberg and iiykes (19&9 *>)• A presentation list (Table 4) was
read to S's at a speed of approximately 1 word every second, followed,
2u-23 minutes later by a test list consisting of words acoustically
related, words unrelated, and words identical to words on the
presentation list (Table £)• Subjects were required to rate, on a
six point scale whether they thought a test list word had or had not
been, on the presentation list. On the te3t list, the words "fear"
and #blood" always occurred in the first and eleventh positions
respectively. The order of the other words was randomised for each
group of subjects.
The present experiment differed from that of Gruneberg and Sykes
in three respects only. 1) The presentation list consisted of 35
rather than 40 iteaa. 2) The test list consisted of 9 rather than 10
acoustically related items, 9 rather than 10 unrelated items, and
The original experiment was also conducted with the explicit
purpose of being used in this thesis.
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* and 2 rather than 10 items identical to
those on the presentation list. Finally
the order of presentation of test list





(in order of presentation)
1. Pear 13. Judge 25. North
2. Sleep 14. Hole 26. Grass
3. Note 15. Camp 27. Art
4. loss 16. Storm 28. Hoof
•> ish 17. Tie 29. Crowd
6. week 18. Cake 30. Hand
7. Lift 19. Chair 31. Train
8. Mile 20. Can 32. God
9. Cause 21. Step 33. Branch
10. ohape 22. Laugh 34. Blood
11. Ping 23. »ord 35. Deal
12. orink 24. Pit
TAB?# 5
Mr H&T
0 Pear A Lake N Fact
N Dish A Bit A Work
N Bridge N Soil A Fly
N Wife 0 Blood N ^iUeen
A Coal N Town A Class
A Shade A Hair N Height
N News N Priend
0 - words on Presentation List.
A = words acoustically related to words on the
presentation list.




Using 21 a*8, it was found that acoustically related items on the
test list were confused to significantly greater extent with items on
the presentation list, than were non-acoustically related test list
items, (.<0.002 sign teat), indicating acoustic confusion in Lift!.
Discussion
Whilst the lists of words in Table 4 an<3 5 contain no is in
the same semantic category as far as the authors are aware, there is
clearly the possibility that associative factors play a part in any
memory task involving high frequency items, and to this extent the
claim of Gruneberg and Dykes (19&9 I1) that semantic relationship
between items had been eliminated in their experiment was unjustified.
However, the critical question is whether such associations can
account for acoustically similar items being confused to a signifi¬
cantly greater' extent than non-acoustically similar items. A3 there
is no reason to suppose that in the present experiment, idiosyn¬
cratic semantic associations oocur to a greater extent in acoustically
related as opposed to acoustically unrelated items, differences in
confusion rates between these two groups of items cannot reasonably
be attributed to semantic factors. This experiment therefore, in
confirming that of Gruneberg and Dykes (19&9 b) gives clear empirical
backing for the hypothesis that acoustic confusion occurs in LT".
Despite the fact that the previous experiment indicates acoustic
confusion in long term memory, it was thought desirable to conduct
an experiment in which th3 ppssibility of semantic associations
between items was minimised. It was also thought desirable to
investigate the possibility of acoustic confusion in terms of hours
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rather than minutes, after presentation. The following experiment,
conducted by three undergraduates, Stephen Colwill, Paul Winfraw and
Robin vVoods, under the supervision of the writer, was an attempt to




25 Undergraduate students of University College of Swansea,
living in a hall of residence. Subjects were tested individually.
Materials
These consisted of a presentation list and a test list of
nonsense CVC's. All but three of the CVC's were taken from Hilgard's
Tables 8 and 9 "Tables of Associative Values" (otevens 1951)* The
three other CVC'a were added by the experimenters. Two forth
Instruments memory drums were used to present the lists.
DELiIGN
If nonsense CVC Trigrams are confused with acoustically similar
CVC's presented 10 - 12 hours earlier to a greater extent than are
non-acoustically similar CVC's, then one has evidence of acoustic
confusion in long term memory.
Nonsense CVC Trigrams were chosen for the experiment because,
despite the possibility of semantic associations between the trigrams
and real words, there is, almost by definition, only the remotest
possibility of semantic associations between nonsense CVC'3 them¬
selves. Hence any differences between acoustically related and
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aoou3tically unrelated items could not readily be accounted for in
terms of semantic confusion effects between nonsense GVC's themselves,
furthermore, even if some idiosynoratio semantic associations do exist
there is no reason to suppose they occur to a greater extent in acous¬
tically related as opposed to acoustically unrelated items. Thus,
differences between acoustically related and acoustically unrelated
nonsense CVG'a could not reasonably be attributed to semantic factors.
The presentation list (see Table 6) consisted of 20 CVC*3 with
each vowel equally represented, Each item was typed 5 times along a
single line e.g.
DAJ DAJ DAJ DAJ DAJ
The test list consisted of 10 "old" GVC's which occurred in the
presentation list ('P' items), 10 CVC's aooustically related to GVC'a
on the presentation list ('A* items) e.g. MEF for MEV, and 10 "new"
GVC'3 acoustically unrelated to CVC's on the presentation list
(•N* items), each item being presented only once (see Table 7)«
The experimental procedure was as followss-
Each fc> was seated before a memory drum and told to concentrate on
reading silently each "unusual" word as t appeared. Each GVC waa
exposed for a total of 4 seconds, thus the total initial exposure
of the presentation list was 80 seconds. There was then a pause of
4 seconds before the presentation list was again presented in exactly
the same manner. Thus the total presentation time was 164 seconds.
All ia's were given the presentation list between 21.05B.&.T.
and 23.li B.&.T., and following presentations subjects were
instructed not to write down any of the words, not to discuss the
experiment with others, and to return the following morning.
All subjects were tested the following day between the hours
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of 08.40 and lO.Qjj B.S.T. The mean interval between presentation
and test list exposure was 10.83 hours, with a range from 10 hours to
12 hours 10 minutes. The test list was presented at the same speed
as the presentation list i.e. one item every 4 seoondsj £>*s were
provided with a sheet of lined paper and were instructed to work down
a column, entering a tick for an item which they recognised as having
occurred previously on the presentation list, and a cross for any item
not so recognised.
The prediction was that 'A' items would receive more false
positive responses than 'N* items.
HBbULlb
The number of false positive responses to the items on the test
list which were acoustically related to items on the presentation list,
('A* items) was significantly greater than the number of false positive
responses to CVC's on the test list unrelated to CVC's on the presen¬
tation list ('N' items) (P^O.OGl . ileoxon's matched-pairs signed-rank-;
test). The exclusion of the three CVC trigtams added by the experimenters,
from statistical calculations made no difference to the significance of
the results.
DL.CUc,I0N
It might be objeoted that with trigrama it is impossible to ensure
that the acoustically unrelated ('N' items) on the teat list are not to
some extent acoustically related to presentation list items, parti¬
cularly as all the vowels were used in the presentation list. This
may be so but the effect of having 'W* items to some extent acoustically
related to presentation list items would be to reduce differences
between 'N* item and 'A* item false positive scores and hence work
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Table 6. resentatlon list













(1) ZAV e JEX n FEP p
YIN n YEM p WOF a
TUZ p SUF a JUC p
KEF a BIi p TLB n
YAG p LIJ n MIZ p
HIF n ZQL p VUP a
iirfj p xwAo a HEL 11
itlB a JOiVi n FEJ a
»<UQL n GIP a GUK n
TOJ a JiiT n (30) YOD p
•pf * syllable on Presentation List
•a' s syllable acoustically related to Pres. List syllables,




Again it may be objected that the results are due to visual
similarity factors, in that the acoustically similar items are also
visually similar. It is certainly a possibility but one which is
extremely awkward for a dichotomous theory. Dichotomous theorists 3uch
as Adams (19&7) maintain that visual material is encoded in acoustic
form in before transfer to a long term memory, which employs a
semantic coding. It therefore hardly seems possible for a dichotomous
theorist to argue that the present results can be accounted for in
terms of visual confusion and coding effects in long term memory.
These results then, confirm the earlier findings of Gruneberg
and Sykes (19&9 b) that acoustic confusion occurs in LTM, and indeed
extend the findings by showing that they occur some 10 - 12 hours
after presentation.
The results of these two experiments, together with a recent
experiment of Bruce and Crawley (1970) showing "long term" acoustic
confusion using a recall, rather than recognition technique, and indeed
an earlier experiment by Brown and McNeil (19&6) indicates quite clearly
the presence of acoustic confusion in UM. (Brown and MdKiel found that
when subjects guessed the word for which a meaning was supplied, on
acoustically similar, but incorrect word was often given). As with
evidence of semantic processing, however, in STM experiments, the
evidence for acoustic processes at work in LTM hardly needs experimental
support. That any subject can on request, produce a list of words
acoustically similar to any specified word, indicates that the
organisation of long term memory involves acoustic coding.
.apart from the empirical evidence for semantic and acoustic
coding in both ATM and LTM, there are such problems in holding that
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a dichotomous theory of memory can be based on differing coding
systems, that it is surprising that the hypothesis has ever been
seriously entertained. If short term memory uses acoustic coding
only, and long term memory semantic coding only, then transfer from
short term memory to long term is impossible without the intervention
of a mechanism which translates auditory coding into semantic coding.
Such a mechanian would hove to be as large as short and long term
memory stores combined, which makes the postulation of a short and
long term memory separate from such a compiler unparsimonious.
-•uch a compiler entails LTM being able to use an auditory coding system
at any time, and makes the distinction between STM and LTr", on the
basi3 of acoustic coding being an Sit* characteristic only, untenable.
A further difficulty in holding the hypothesis that only STM
is subject to acoustic confusion concerns the empirical evidenoe
provided by Baddeley (1966 a) that long term learning of acoustically
confusing material can take place, and at approximately the same rata
as non-confusable material. It is generally held by dichotomous
theorists that material in short term memory is either transferred
to long term memory or lost. As acoustic confusion is confined to £>TM,
acoustically confused material must, according to the dichotomous
position, be lost - a finding, as peinted out above, not borne out by
empirical evidence.
General Considerations
Even were evidence of acoustic confusion being confined to SIM
empirically justified, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that
one can make a general statement about the nature of two memory
systems, otherwise it is difficult to see how the deaf or indeed any¬
one can learn verbal material. As noted aarlier, Rosa (19&9) found nc
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difference in memory span between deaf and non-deaf subjects* and
Conrad and Rush (1965) found that the congenitslly deaf do not make
errors of acoustic confusion in 319.1 where non-deaf subjects do.
Again more than making untenable a dichotomy on the basis of
differing interference effects, the evidence for semantic processing
in STL" has serious implications for any dichotomous theory of memory.
For semantic processing to occur at all, the items processed must
functionally have entered LIT!, in that meaningfulness or even
non-sensory associativity is a function of the previous history of the
individual. Thus any theoretical interpretation of memory in terras of
two "boxes", a short term and a long term "box" is untenable.
Norman (1963) has recently attacked a "box" dichotomous theory
on similar grounds to those above, although he appears unwilling to
allow that semantic similarity can effect retention in Primary memory
and maintains a dichotomous theory on the grounds of such operational
distinctions, as the exclusive presence of ecoustio similarity factors
in Primary memory and semantic similarity factors in Secondary memory.
Apart from the empirical evidence against such operational distinctions,
it is difficult to reconcile these operational distinctions with
Norman * a view of Primary and Secondary memory as having such "direct!1
and complete intercommunication that a formal distinction between the
two is difficult to make". If such intercommunication is possible, it
must he because both systems use the same doding system, otherwise auoh
communication would not be possible. Furthermore, if as Norman claims,
the items in Primary memory are affected by acoustical similarity
are those "which are to be retained", it follows that one cannot
account for differences between forgetting rates for acoustically
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similar and acoustically dissimilar material in terms of acoustic
interference, (Baddeley i960) as the "extra" items forgotten in the
acoustically similar groups must according to Norman's formulation,
be forgotten for reasons other than their acoustic features.
It mu3t be admitted that the question of whether acoustic and semantic
coding are confined to STM and LBS respectively is now something of a
non issue; a diversion in the study of memory which will be forgotten
in the course of time, except perhaps to exemplify the way in which
psychological explanation and common 3ense parted company, and how
common sense won. Thus Baddeley (Baddeley end 'arrington (1970) now
concedes that common sense dictates the postulation of acoustic coding
in LB. - as well a3 empirical data, and ,'ickelgren (1969 a) even
predicts that acoustic confusion in LTM will be shown in due course.
It is to be hoped, however, that the papers of Gruneberg and Bykes
(1969 a. b) and Gruneberg et al (1970) will do something to put beyond
resurrection this particular issue.
Bummarv
This chapter, then was concerned to show that evidence to
support a diohotomoua theory of memory cannot come from a deraonstration
of dichotoraoua coding systems in SIM and LB/1. Empirically such a
distinction is unjustified in that experimental evidence was produced
of acoustic confusion in LTM and of semantic confusion in SBi. In
addition to the experimental evidence of the present writer, a large
number of studies were quoted showing evidence of semantic processing
in BTM, and the evidence of v«oodworth (1938) was tentatively suggested
as evidence for acoustic coding in LTM. It was however stressed that
the need for experimental evidenoe to support the hypothesis that
- 159 -
9/26
acoustic coding occurred in LIT. and semantic coding occurred in SUA
was unnecessary; words are almost instantaneously meaningful to
almost all *S's, yet many are rapidly forgotten, indicating semantic
processing in oTL. Again almost all 'S's can produce a list of worda
which sound similar to any specified word, indicating acoustic coding
in LT. . This does not mean of course that it i3 impossible to
interpret the data in dichotomous terms, were a dichotomy provable
on other grounds. hat is being claimed is that a distinction between
LTI.. and LTM cannot be established on the basis of differing coding
systems as between STL. and LTM.
Apart from empirical objections, there is a major logical
objection to dichotomising on the basi3 of differing coding systems
being employed by the two purported systems. It would not be possible
to--transfer material from one system to another unless a con-ion coding
system were used and stored in LIT .
Finally,two points of importance stem from the demonstration of
semantic processing in STL* using recognition. Firstly it is difficult
to dichotomise between recognition and recall in the face of such
evidence; secondly, it is impossible to hold any dichotomous theory
which looks at memory in terms of two 'boxes' - a short and a long





THE SERIAL POSITION CURVE
The Nature of the Evidence
In recent years the shape of the serial position curve has taken
an important place in the theoretical context of the number and nature
of memory systems. This is particularly true of free recall experi¬
ments, where alterations in the shape of the serial position curve as
a result of experimental manipulation have been used by many writers as
evidence ,f a dichotomous theory of memory. Baddeley and arrin< :ton
(1970) regard this type of evidence as one of the three main lines of
evidence for a dichotomy, burdock (1967) discusses it when looking at
characteristics of short terra memory. G-lanzer and his co-workers
(C-lauzer and Cunitz (1966) ), G-lanzer (1969), G-lanzer and einzor (1967),
and ulaneer et al (1969) base their assumptions of a dichotomy between
short and long term memory on the different reactivity of the serial
position curve to various variables. augh and Norman (1965) use ^ie
shape of the serial position curve to distinguish operationally between
short and long term memory and Tulving (1968) regards the evidence as
providing - P 12 - "strong support for the hypothesis that at least
two different recall mechanisms are involved in free recall."
Peterson (1966 b) on the basis of paired associate studj.es, also sup¬
ports a dichotomy on the basis of the differential reactivity of the
early," and later part of the forgetting curve to such variables as
repetition. As opposed to these views, Adams (1967) considers that
free recall lacks the requirement for preservation of order so that
there are ample opportunities for material to enter LTM. A conaidera-
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-tion of the implications of free recall studies for a dichotomous
theory is hotably absent from his book. Yet the importance placed
on the serial position curve by many dichotomous theorists requires
an examihation of the data.
There is, in fact, little dispute that various variables alter
the shape of the serial position curve, burdock (1962) found that the
list length and rate of presentation of items did not affect the
recency part of the serial position curve, but did affect the primacy
and middle parts of the curve. Glanzer and Gunitz (1966) also found
that rate of presentation affected only the earlier part of the curve,
and in a second experiment noted that a delay, filled by interpolated
activity for about 30 seconds, resulted in a loss of items at the
end of the serial position curve, but not for earlier items, a finding
confirmed by Postman and Phillip (19&5)• Grlanzer and f.leinzer (19^7)
showed that overt repetition of items between presentation,depressed
the earlier, but not the later part of the serial position curve.
Craik (1968) showed the effects of acoustic similarity on the recency
part of the curve. Kintsch and Buschke (1969) also succeeded in
showing the effects of acoustic similarity on the recency part of the
curve, and in addition showed the effects of semantic similarity on
the earlier part. Glanzer et al (1969) succeeded in showing that
the nature of the interpolated activity following the presentation
of items did not, in their experiment, affect the rate of forgetting
of the terminal items, but that the number of items alone was
critical and did affect the recency part of the curve. Graik (1970)
found that with long interpolated activity the end part of the serial
position curve fell ^uat the level to which the rest of the curve
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(asymptote) had fallen, and claimed that this evidence, too, indicated
two memory systems. Finally Raymond (19&9) confirmed many of the
findings in showing that presentation rate, nature of stimuli, and
frequency, for instance, affected the first part of the curve, hut that
delay affected ohly the recency part of the curve.
i. win,, le system Theory Interpretation
In order to understand the reason why these lines of evidence do
not establish a dichotomous theory of memory, it is necessary to recall
the argument put forward in Chapter 4 to show that lines of evidence,
based on the serial position curve, are based on the assumption that
rapid forgetting distinguishes between short and long term memory* The
argument put forward in Chapter 4 was that, as rostman and neppel (1968)
noted, tne later in a sequence an item was presented, the closer it waa
to the retention test. Furthermore, as the most recently px^eaented
items are the first reoalled, this is accentuated, and the serial
position curve can thus be viewed as a forgetting curve of sorts. The
recency part of the curve represents probability of recall for items
newly presented, as one progresses "baek " from the recency part of the
curve, so items are relatively longer in store up to the point of the
retention tost. The decline in the recency effect with time therefore,
mex^ely is an indication of the early part of the forgetting curve,
which also, like the serial position curve, reaches an asymptote,
it is true that the primacy part of the aerial position curve is missing
from the forgetting curve, but items retained from the early part of the
serial position curve merely serve to raise the asymptotic level of the
forgetting curve. The recency part of the curve in other worus,
indicates the time course of rapid forgetting, and indeed there is no
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reason to suppose that this supposition is unacceptable to those
■/
holding a dichotomy. They would argue that this rapid decrement in
recall probability is affected by factors other than those affecting
recall probability in long term memory and that this indicates two
underlying memory mechanisms. The main underlying assumption is
that those factors which cause forgetting in one system are different
from those which cause forgetting in the other.
In holding a single system theory one also views the recency
part of the serial position curve as indicating rapid forgetting of
recently presented items. It is the interpretation of the earlier part
of the curve which differs. Dichotomous theorists view this as basically
output from a different memory system, those holding a single system
theory regarding the serial position curve as showing the rate of
forgetting (the slope of the recency part of the curve) and the extent
of rapid forgetting (the point at which the curve becomes asymptotic).
In other words, it is suggested that rather than acting differentially
on two different storage mechanisms, each variable considered above,
acts on incoming information either to affect the rate or the extent
of rapid forgetting.
There still, of course, remains the problem for a single system
theorist, of why some variables affect the rate, but not the extent of
rapid forgetting, and vice versa, tfhy in other words, are the rate and
extent of rapid forgetting independent? It may be a difficult question
footnote: Peterson (i960 b) presents his data in the form of a
forgetting curve rather than a serial position.
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to answer, but it does appear to be one to which a dichotomous theory
provides no obvious solution. The various lines of evidence are now
considered in order to examine their possible interpretation in single
system theory terms.
List lom-'th
The first line of evidence to be considered is that whilst list
length does affect recall of items from input positions preceding the
•recency' range, 'it does not affect the recency part of the curve.
(Murdoch 19&2). This is a case in which one is required to ask why
increasing the length of a li3t should result in increasing the extent
of rapid forgetting, but not the rate, i.e. the greater the list length,
the lower is the asymptote.
It is not unreasonable to suggest that either an autonomous trace
decay or an interference model of forgetting can handle the fact of the
lower asymptote, by assuming the greater the amount of material, the
greater will be interference, whether caused by, or the cause of,
forgetting. Indeed an increase of interference can be expected with
greater list length, in that there is a greater interpolation of material
between presentation and recall for more of the items. In order to
account for a failure to affect rate of decay, however, it must be
assumed that the greater interference produced as a result of increasing
the number of items, takes a short time to operate - whether this time
is due to neurological degeneration or subsequent experiential factors.
Peterson (1966 c) in noting that the most recently presented items have
not had time to go through their period of steepest decline is making the
same point. This, as was noted earlier, is because the most recently
presented items are the earliest recalled (e.g. Deese and Kaufman 1957)*
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(In theory, therefore, an immediate free recall task should involve
no delay between presentation of the last item and its recall).
hate of Ireaentation
Murdock (1962) Glanzer and Cunitz (1966) and Raymond (1969) have
all found that differences in rate of presentation of data affects the
earlier part of the serial position curve, but has no effect on the
recency part of the curve. Again the question is posed as to why
decreasing the rate of presentation of items should decrease the extent
of rapid forgetting, but not the rate.
There is again little problem in explaining why rate of presenta¬
tion should affect the extent of rapid forgetting. The greater the
oppprtunity for rehearsal, the greater is retention, and as rate of
presentation increases, so do opportunities for rehearsal decrease.
Thus with slower rates of presentation the extent of forgetting is
reduced, i.e. the forgetting curve is prevented from falling below
the level to which it would otherwise fall.
In noting that rehearsal does not alter the rate of decay one is
merely restating Brown's (1953) comment that rehearsal serves merely to
prevent decay. It must again be assumed that those factors which
prevent decay or interference do not operate immediately but require a
period of time. It is in fact common experience that rehearsal does
not necessarily prevent rapid forgetting.
It must be presumed thatthose holding a dichotomy would interpret
the increase in level of the early part of the serial position curve
with increased rehearsal opportunities, as evidence that increasing
rehearsal in ohort term memoiy enables better transfer to long term
memory to take place.
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Interpolation of .activity between Presentation and Recall
The next line of evidence put forward, by Glanzer and Cunitz (l?66)
and .Postman and rhillip (19&5) is that interpolation of a task between
presentation and recall reduces the recency part of the curve to the
level of the asymptote, and Craik (1970,) bas shown that large amounts
of interpolated activity in fact reduce the recency part of the ourve
still further, 30 that it is below the level of the asymptote. On the
other hand Peterson (1966 c) shows that for paired associates, there is
a recovery of the last items as a result of interpolation of activity,,
yet he too interprets the evidence in favour of a dichotomous theory
(on the grounds of switching from one retrieval mechanism to a more
efficient long term mechanism).
Again one comes back to .Peterson's *1966 c) point that the last
few items presented when immediate recall is required in a free recall
experiment, have not had time to go through their period of steepest
decline, (the steepest decline being early in the forgetting curve)
whereas items presented earlier in the list have. Therefore, inter¬
polating activity between presentation and recall will give items
the opportunity to go through their period of steepest decline. The
evidence on the effect of interpolation of activity clearly does not
explain the reason for the steep decline; it merely describes what is
already known, that forgetting i3 sometimes rapid. Craik'a (1970)
finding that the recency part of the curve falls below the asymptote
is not difficult to account for if one uses his own arguments for the
phenomenon. He argues effectively that 3ince the last items in a list
remain in a rehearsal buffer for less time than other items, there will
be less opportunity for rehearsal for the terminal items, and tuat
therefore there will be less chance to maintain processes which
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serve to prevent decay. Even Mams (196?) however, notes that the effects
of rehearsal can be accounted for by both theories, so that if there
is less rehearsal time available to the last items, both a single and a
diohotomous theory would predict a fall in the recency part of the
curve below the level of the asymptote.
The iffects of Repetition
uraik goes on to claim that the strength of registration in LTM
depends on the length of an item's stay in the buffer. The evidence
Of Glanzer and Meinzer (1967) flatly contradicts this assertion.
Their experimental evidence consisted of two conditions, a control
condition which was a normal free recall experiment, where theae was
no interpolation of activity between the presentation of each item,
and .r. en >erimental condition, in which each item was repeated rather
than allowing free activity. The result was that whereas there was no
effect on the recency part of the curve, the earlier part of the curve
was depressed by this repetition. Yet on Craik's argument, and on the
•...do f tkinson and Shiffrin (1968), one would expect that repetition,
bp keeping each item in short term store, at least as long as any other
Strategy, is likely to increase the strength of registration in LTM.*
j,s .as noted in Chapter 7, there is a growing body of evidence
which supports G-lanzer and Meinzer's findings that repetition does not
footnote: Tulving and Madigen (1970) note that Atkinson and
.hiffrii. (1968) produce the same sort of result, and consider t at far
from supporting Atkinson and Shiffrin's dichotomous model, it is a
severe embarrasment, as it is to all dichotomous theories.
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of itself lead to permanent storage. (e*g. Eagle (1967) found that
those who associated in a free recall situation performed better than
those who repeated items to themselves, and Dalrymple and Alford (196?)
similarly found no advantage in mere repetition). As Neisser (1967)
and others suggest, there is more to rehearsal, therefore, than mere
repetition, and more to preventing decay than repetition, Koisser's
suggestion that organisational factors are critical seems reasonable
in view of the evidence. The evidence of Glanzer and ^einzer (1967)
therefore, is somewhat more uncomfortable for a dichotomous theory than
for a single system theory. At least a single system theory makes no
claim that the longer an item "resides" in "STM" the greater is its
s in LTM.
The ■ture of Rapid Forgetting
Glnnser et al (1969) use the serial position curve to try to
clarify the cause of rapid forgetting. They completely reject tko
earlier view of Glanzer and Cunitz (1966) that time per se causes
fo getting, and conduct an experiment in which they show that the
number ' items interpolated between presentation and test is the criti¬
cal factor, a finding earlier reported by laugh and Norman (1965).
They further reject the role of similarity in rapid forgettir ,
finding as they do that formal similarity of interpolated activity
t the original items has no measurable effect on rapid forgetting.
This finding is of course, a restatement of the position of Bro ibent
(1963). As noted in Chapter 5» this is contradicted by the findings
of .cvalren (1965 a, b) on acoustic similarity affecting short
term memory, and Gorman and ickens (1968), who found semantic
si. '.I; rity affected short term memory .
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Glanzer et ol reject the experimental evidence of Wickelgren
as showing similarity effects, on the grounds that the interference
effects produced might be operating in LTM, as might any interference
effects in Peterson and Peterson (1959) paradigpis. As wa3 noted in
Chapter 6, however, it is impossible to claim that one can have rapid
forgetting from LTM i.e. within about 30 seconds, without compromising
the criterion for distinguishing long from short term memory. Either
long term memory is a stable system, in which case once in store, items
are relatively free from loss, or alternatively items in LTS are sub¬
ject to rapid loss, in which case one cannot claim that any forgotten
material is not lost from LIS.
The argument of Glanzer et al, con in fact be turned round. If
there is a possibility of the experiments of .(ickelgren indicating loss
from LT3, it must be possible that retro-active factors can cause a
depression in recall of items from earlier parts of the serial position
cux've, within a short period of presentation of such items. Thu3, all
sections of the serial position curve being susceptible to retro-action
causing rapid forgetting, one cannot dichotomise between S7T.: and Llfcl on
the basis of experiments on the shape of the serial position curve.
Even if one were to reject the evidence of Yickelgren (1965$) and
Coxroon end Sickens (1963) as showing associative interference effects
in the short tern, the evidence of Kintsch and Buschke (1969) and
Crsik (1963) cannot be easily dismissed, because they used the criterion
of Glanzer in deciding whether acoustic confusion was or was not
confined to short tem memory. In other words, they showed that the
recency part of the serial position curve was decremented by the
presence of acoustically similar material, furthermore, the evidence
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of Baddeley (1966 b) showing acoustic confusion after presentation
of 3 items can hardly be considered a long term memory experiment'
a.cou.:,tic und wauantic similarity
The evidence of Kintsch and Buschke is perhaps the most difficult
for a 3ingle systGm theorist to account for. Yet the fact that the
conclusions based on the shape of the serial position curve for this
experiment* have no generality, is fatal for the dichotomous theory
position based on the serial position curve. The difficulty in
explaining the data, as far as a single system theorist is concerned,
arises from the fact that acoustic similarity affected the recency
part of the curve - the rate of forgetting, but not the asymptotic
level - the extent of forgetting. Possibly acoustic interference attacks
only those items unduly susceptible to forgetting. For present purposes
it does not, in fact, matter. Bruce and Crawley (1970) have shown that
whatever the difficulties for a 3ingle system theory, the evidence is
impossible for dichotomous theorists. They found that massed presenta¬
tion of acoustically similar items did affect the earlier part of the
serial position curve, whereas spaced similarity (the Kintsch and Buschke
experiment) did not. It cannot be claimed therefore that failure to
show a difference in the action of a variable on one part of the ourve
as compared to another establishes a dichotomy. It merely indicates
that the effect is too small to measure by means of the technique
employed. Even without the experiment of Bruce and Crawley (1970)
however, the generality of the findings of Kint3ch and Buschke, and of
Craik, were suspect, as the evidence of Underwood and Freund (1963),
Gruneberg and Sykes (1969) and Gruneberg et al (1970) have shown. As
was noted in Chapter 9, it is logically impossible to dichotomise on
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the basis of acoustic coding being confined to short term memory only.
Amnesic and Hon amnesic subjects
A further finding, based on the serial position curve, which is
an embarrassment to dichotomous theorists, is reported by Boddeley and
V.arrington (1970). They show that whereas the performance of amnesics
on the early and middle section of the curve is inferior to non amnesics,
there is no difference between the two groups on the recency section of
the curve. Vhilst Baddeley and Warrington interpret this data to
indicate that amnesics hove an unimpaired short term memory, the results
are an acute embarrassment to those many dichotomous theorists, e.g.
>;augh and Norman (19&5) wtl° postulate that short and long term memory
can exist simultaneously. If this is the case, and if the recency part
of the curve represents output from both short and long term memory, as
is claimed, then the amnesics should perform less well than non amnesics
on the recency part of the curve. This is because they have, it is
claimed, no long term memory component to supplement output from short
term memory, for the recency part of the curve.
Conclusion
It ha3 to be admitted that the account given by the writer, of the
interpretation of the various serial position curves, in terms of a
single system theory, lacks conviction at times, yet as the above para¬
graph indicates, so d.oe3 the alternative view. Whilst therefore it is
allowed that the serial position curve oan perhaps be interpreted in
terms of a dichotomous theory, an interpretation in terms of a single
system theory is equally ppssible. The evidence from the serial
position curve however, merely reposes many of the problems found by
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other experimental means, e.g. why rapid acoustic confusion? why the
difficulty in showing similarity effects over the short term? why does
rehearsal improve retention? why does mere repetition not help ? and
of course the main question, why rapid forgetting? It does not answer
these questions beyond stating a possible hypothesis i.e. two memory
systems.
Summary
This chapter has reviewed the evidence for a dichotomous theory
of memory based on the differential reactivity of the serial position
curve to a number of variables. These variables included repetition,
rate of presentation, list length and similarity. It was noted that
the problem posed for a single system theorist is why do some variables
affect the extent, but not the rate of rapid forgetting. ..hilst it was
relatively easy to account for the differences due to extent of rapid
forgetting, it was more problematic to account for the reason that
rate wa3 unaffected. It was assumed that those factors which cause
forgetting require time to operate. An analogy might be two different
sizes of wave, moving mat the same speed.
This explanation of the serial position curve contrasts with
that of the dichotomist theorist who claims that the differential
effects of variables indicate two separate memory systems. Yet many
of the findings are merely restatements of what is already known, and
can be regarded in one form or another, as posiag the question as to
the cause of rapid forgetting, rather than answering it.
At least three of the findings reported, that of Glanzer and
!»leinzer (19&7) and Kintsch end Buschke (19^9) and Baddeley and
Warrington (1970)are embarassments to a dichotomous theory, the first
- 173 -
10/14
because a dichotoraous theorist should hypothesise contrary results#
the second because its generality is questionable on the basis of the
experiment of Bruce and Crawley (1970) and others, and opens up the
possibility that all failures to find differences in the shape of
certain parts of the serial position curve, as a consequence of an
experimental variable, may be due to the variable being too weak an
effect to measure, not due to its absence. Finally the experimental
evidence of Baddeley and errington (1970) indicates that it ia not
possible to interpret the recency portion of the serial position curve
in terms of output from both short and long term memory.
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■t l IY-;J OLOOICAL E7IDE-GE AND A DICHOTOHOUS THEORY OF MEMORY
Perhaps the first possibility which should be considered in a
chapter of thi3 nature is the possibility that physiological evidence
has no direct relevance to the question of whether, at a psychological
level, one can use explanations in terms of one memory system or two.
There are two reasons for this. The first, pointed out by McGeoch
(1942) and more recently by Reynolds (19&5) *"or instance, is that
evidence which is obtained on the basis of physiological abnormality
is not necessarily of relevance to the psychology of normal behaviour,
because insult is an ipruption into the normal process of memory and
cannot be used to draw inferences about normal functioning.
•ithin the context of memory, therefore, all those many papers
showing evidence of a dichotomy between short and long term memory on
the basis of illness (Korsakoff's syndrome) Hippocampal lesion, intro¬
duction of drug3, electro-convulsive shock and so on, are subject to
this objections they do not necessarily tell what normal functioning
involves, the effects may be the direct result of the abnormality.
The second query of relevance concerns evidence of a more
molecular level. Can 'oiowledge of physiological processes over time,
per se, help in the solving of the problem? Here, mahy psychologists,
even those holding a dichotomous theory e.g. Shiffrin and Atkinson
(1969). Norman (19&9)• 0re agreed that the answer is no. Shiffrin and
Atkin on, for instance, do not mind what structural form short term
memory takes, whether it is in a separate part of the brain from LTM
or whether it is just the activity phase suggested by Hebb (1949). It
does not matter to the psychologist, as such, how information is
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stored, whether in tape recorders, plastic discs, neurons or whatever,
provided a transformation from one form of storage to another is of a
one to one nature, or that losses from any form of storage are due to
the same factors as in any other storage form. Thus if experiential
factors e.g. acoustic similarity, cause a memory loss in one physio¬
logical state, and also a loss in the other physiological state, then
tne actual physiological states are irrelevant to a consideration of
j the problem. Only if a physiological state is of such a nature that it
causes information loss for reasons other than the cause of information
loss in another physiological state, can one regard the consideration
! of hysiological evidence relevant. After all, in any chemical
I
reaction in the brain, there are probably millions of transformations,
yet it is not parsimonious to regard these as millions of memory systems,
from the psychologist's point of view.
i-'or these reasons, then, a detailed account of physiological
changes consequent upon learning, will not be considered in this chapter.
Only those lines of evidence which suggest that underlying physiological
states may involve different forgetting phenomena will be considered.
There are, in fact, three major lines of physiologiesl evidence upon
which claims of a dichotomy have been based» the effects of electro¬
convulsive shock, the effects of drugs, and the effects of
physiological lesions, on behaviour. These are now considered in turn.
Electro-convulsive shock
eiskrantz (1966, 1967) has suggested that the memory changes
which result from electro-convulsive shock (ECS) are grounds for
holding that short and long terra memory are diehotomous, although he
concede# that it is impossible to prove that retention impairment is
not solely a function of failure to retrieve.
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behaviourall/ the effects of ECS involve the production of
reti'ogruae amnesia such that events recently learned are mo3t
susceptible to forgetting. Such amnesic effects can, however, cover a
span of several weeks, as a study by Bickford et al (quoted Weiskrantz)
shows. Typically there is a shrinkage of memory loss with the older
memories returning first but not necessarily in chronological order.
Thus "Islands of memory" are often reported.
That ECS (and indeed other mechanical shock) can have effects
extending over long periods of time is indicative that such shock is
affecting "long" as well as "short" term memory, as .'eiskrantz notes,
Thu3 the fact of retroactive interference as such does not indicate a
dichotomy. Yet there are features of ECS which have led Tei3krantz to
I postulate a dichotomy. These features centre round studies which
indicate the irreversable nature of ECS for material learned up to
about 5 seconds before shock e.g. Chorover and Schiller (1965). On thia
basi3 ..eiskrantz argues that after a period of about 5 seconds, the
trace i3 irreversable and 3hook serves to increase the amount of
interfering noise in the system. As this subsides, so retrieval again
becomes possible. On the other hand, the irretrievability of recently
taken in information, even after a long lapse of time, can be taken to
indicate an irreversible loss of information.
Various experiments make such an interpretation equivocal.
Jarvick and Kopf (19&7) showed that increasing the level of shock
increased amnesia. Earlier 7/eiasman (19&3) had shown no amnesic effect
for sub convulsive shock and following on this Pag no et al (19&9)
showed that 0 complete recovery of memory was possible following amnesia,
provided that the intensity of the shock was not too great, a finding
similar to that of Zinkin and Miller (1967). With greater intensity
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amnesia did appear to be permanent. This is an extremely important
finding, because it tends to indicate that, as for the longer term
forgetting produced by ECS, the underlying memory trace is laid down
but not available. Whether thi3 i3 the correct interpretation or not.
it seems reasonable to claim that the data does not compel an
acceptance of a two stage model.
A-rotein -.vntheai.. Inhibitors
The second line of physiological evidence put forward - the
effect of protein synthesis inhibitors on memory - has been reviewed by
Eeutseh (1969). The type of evidence which is claimed to support a
dichotomoua theory is of the type by Flexner et al (19&7)• in which the
injection of iuromyein (a protein synthesis inhibitor) interferes with
memory. Thus, trained mice injected with puromycin 1 - 6o days after
training aire retested 3 ~ 4 days after the injection. A memory defect
is inferred from saving on leoi'ning scores. As Deutsch, not unreasonably
points out, if relearfcing is impaired, this would give a score which
could indicate a non existent memory defect. Again the time interval,
1 day after training, is too long to have implications for a
dichotomous theory of memory, in which minutes rather than hours are
assumed to indicate long term memory.
Finally an experiment by Flexner and Flexner (19&7) indicates
that their experiments are not concerned with a dichotomous theory of
memory. Injections of saline solution after puroraycin treatment abolished
puromycin-induced amnesia; the saline not being injected until at least
23 hours after training.
The experiments of Barondes and Cohen (1966) however, go some
way towards meeting the time criteria, in that they injected puromyoin
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immediately after learning, rather than 1 - 60 days after training,
as in the Ylexner experiments. They found that memory loss did de¬
velop within a relatively short period of time (3 houcs), so that it
is possible that purornycin can affect memory formation. Yet again
however, 3aline injected within $0 hours of puromycin (xlexner and
F'lexner) resulted in almost unimpaired memory. Animals other than
rats or mice have been examined after injection with protein synthesis
inhibitors. Agranoff and Klinger (19^4) found that after training on
shock avoidance immediate injection of puromycin in goldfish caused
forgetting after 3 days. Apart from the time discrepancy between these
results and those of general experimental psychology, Deutsch points out
that such results may be due to diminution of fear, rather than any
memory effects.
An experiment by Barondea and Cohen (19&7) is extremely awkward
for those who would interpret the evidence in terms of protein
synthesis inhibition disrupting a transfer from short to long term
memory. They injected a protein synthesis inhibitor, cyclohexamide,
five hours before training, in such quantities that protein synthesis
would be inhibited for at least eight hour's, yet retention was not
impaired at 3, 13 or 70 hours after training. They conclude that
protein synthesis is not required either for organisation or consolida¬
tion.
"hese workers (Cohen et al 1966) had previously found that
puromycin, but not cyclohexamide induces abnormal electrical activity
in the brain. It is not unreasonable to conclude that puromycin
involves active interference with memory response.
On the basis of experiments on protein synthesis inhibitors
Centach remarks P 39 "the fact that no one has devised an experiment
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capable of deciding between a single process and a multi-process
theory." On P 91 he summarises the work on the relevance of protein
synthesis inhibitors to memory as follows. "It must be shown that they
affect memory at all, let alone whether they affect retrieval or storage."
It seems reasonable to conclude at this stage of our knowledge that a,
diehotomous theory of memory on the basis of evidence from protein
synthesis inhibitors hasnot yet been established. (It might be added
I
that the time course of forgetting produced by cholinergic drugs
raises similar objections to those abofe. Deutsch (1966) 3howed that
whilst memory was unimpaired for 3 days following injection of such a
drug, it did affect memory lij days after training - a time course too
Ion; to be intepretable in terms of a dichotomous theory of memory.)
Br^in Lesions and '"eroorv
ierhops the most important physiological evidence upon whioh a
dichotomy i3 based, rests on the nature of memory disorder following
temporal lobe and hippocampal lesion. A great deal of evidence i3
available which suggests that subjects with such lesions have
unimpaired "short term memory", and unimpaired "long term memory",
but the ability to learn new material is very much impaired.
.any psychologists rely heavily on this type of evidence in
postulating a dichotomous theory of memory. Atkinson and Shiffrin
(1968) P 97 describe the effects of hippocampal lesions as perhaps the
single most convincing demonstration of a dichotomy of memory systems."
They go on to quote a section from Milner (1966) describing the effects
of lesions in the hippocampal region, and note its relationship to
Korsakoff's syndrome, which is also associated with hippocampal lesions
(Barbizet 19&3)• Buddeley and Harrington (1970) advance temporal
lobe lesion affects as one of the three major lines of evidence for a
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dichotomy. Adams (1967) also advances this type of evidence in favour
of a dichotomy, and Jickelgren (19&3) considers evidence of this sort
as strongly indicative of a dichotomy.
Descriptions of the defects are well documented e.g. lilner O.96Q,
(1963), Talland (19^8) Barbizet (19&3) and others. The defects have of
course been known in psychology for a considerable time. The effects
of hippocsmpal lesions were shown by Jafcosen (193&) and Korsakoff's
syndrome is documented in the last century (Dee Barbizet). Clearly
this evidence presents a problem for those wishing to hold a single
system theory. As the evidence to bo reviewed presently show®,
however, there are also problems of interpretation for a dichotomoua
theory.
The interpretation normally put forward of the defect is in terms
of a breakdown in the ability to store new information in long term
memory i.e. transfer from short to long term memory. Indeed only
thi3 interpretation is possible for a dichotomous theorist. If it is
claimed that the forgetting is due to an adcentuation of forgetting
factors in ATM, this i3 the interpretation that a unitary theorist
would give i.e. in terms of an accentuation of those factors which
universally cause forgetting. If an interpretation is made in terms
of ite- s entering LTM and being rapidly forgotten in that system,
then, as has been pointed out in Chapter kt the criterion for dis¬
tinguishing between short and long term memory collapses, because
long term memory rau3t be regarded as a relatively stable memory
system. How can one be sure that all forgetting is not due to items
entering IT, and being lost by reason of universal forgetting factors?
Yet despite the olaims made, the evidence is not unequivocal.
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Douglas (1967) quotes a number of studies showing normal learning
rates for rats with hippocampal lesions, on simultaneous black-white
discrimination, on stimuli differing in size, etc., and concludes that
hippocampal lesions do not impair learning in general, even when the
learning involves retention for long periods of time. Douglas does
admit that the data on humans and on animals appears to differ.
However, the results of experiments by Baddeley and arrington
(1970) give rise to doubts as to how unequivocal human research findings
are, and Talland (1968) too, notes that investigations of Korsakoff
patients have given rise to contradictory results. Baddeley and
,,arrington agree that whilst the evidence broadly suggests that the
evidence favours a defective LTM, it is far from clear because most of
the evidence is baaed on techniques which are not directly comparable
with those currently used for studying normal memory. Using
current techniquestthey do in fact find that long term learning of
digits in one kind of task at least (Sxpt VI) is possible at roughly
the same rate a3 a control group. The experiment involved presenting
strings of digits in such a way that 3ome of the strings were identical
to earlier strings (The Hebb 19&1 experiment). This fits in with the
finding of Kimble and Pribra (1963) that monkeys with hippocampal
lesions can learn, even with trials spaced six minutes apart.
As against this Baddeloy and Harrington found that his amnesic
patients had poorer recall in a free recall task. Differences in recall
could be attributed to the items presented early in the sequence, and
foiming the earlier section of the serial position curve. This whuld
indicate that a delay between presentation and test had a greater
effect on amnesics than normals, and this was confirmed in a delayed
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recall task. Yet in a task involving sub-span units i.e. three word
trigraros, an interpolated activity between presentation and recall
lasting 60 seconds, still gave over retention both for amnesics
and controls.
It does in fact Appear that for sub-span units, retention over the
short term at lea3t, is not greatly impaired, as Drachman and Arbit
(1966) found, using digit sequences of varying lengths, a finding
confirmed by Baddeley and Warrington. In other words, the memory span
appears to be unaffected by the underlying physiological defect, whereas
retention over longer periods is adversely affected. Baddeley and
Warrington conclude on the basis of this, and other evidence which shews
no difference between amnesics and controls, that STf.i is normal, an
interpretation also arrived at by Wiokelgren (1968).
There is evidence,however, which leads one to question whether
"short term" memory is in fact unimpaired relative to long tern memory.
Thus Drachman and Arbit also found that memory loss was severe if a
distracting task was presented between presentation and recall. Stepian
and Berpinski (1964) had also found this, even in those periods where
recall was normally possible, and Milner (1966) also notes the severe
effects of distraction in the short term.
Various interpretations of these data are possible. It is for
instance possible to argue that the effect of a distractor is to
prevent rehearsal and so let the trace decay at its normal rate, the
function of rehearsal being to prevent decay. Yet the effects of an
interpolated task of 3 sees, duration on the first item in Baddeley
and Warrington's experiment II was very small} retention was almost
80,o. If prevention of rehearsal alone were responsible for the
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catastrophic effects of distraction one would not have expected
such a high retention score. It seems more probable therefore that
distractors have a positive part to play in forgetting, and as this
affect3 forgetting within the normal "tinB span" for "short term
memory", it is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the deficiency
is not one which involves blocking of transfer from short to long term
memory. In other words it is reasonable to assume that the defect
results in distractors accentuating rapid forgetting.
This last point is critical if a single system theory is to be
able to handle the data. For a single system theory the answer, as
given above, must be in terms of an accentuation of those factors
which universally cause forgetting. Yet if one hypothesises a general
increase in those factors which universally cause forgetting, why is
learning alone affected? why are immediate retention and long teim
retention not also affected?
The discussion so far has answered this question by pointing to
experimental evidence which suggests that not only is learning possible
in certain types of task, (which again questions an interpretation in
terms of damage to a transfer mechanism) but short term retention is
also affected by Certain tasks to a greater extent than is the case
with control subjects. Douglas (1967), on the basis of such evidence,
(particularly the evidence of disruption of "short term memory" by
distractors,) suggosts that the effect of the lesion is the distruction
of a mechanism which suppressed interfarence - a suppressor mechanism.
Douglas al3o considers the possibility that many of the experi¬
mental results can be interpreted in terms of increased perseveration
effects as a result of hippocampal lesion. A comparison of studies
in which hippocampally lesioned rats showed superior performance
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with studies in which hippocampally lesioned rats showed inferior
performance to normals could be accounted for by task differences,
here perseveration helped problem solving, hippocampally lesioned
i
rates were inferior, and vice versa. This further suggests that the
function of the hippocampus is inhibitory in nature - a suppressor
mechanism.
ow then, can one interpret the data in terms of universal
forgetting factors being accentuated as a result of temporal 1 be
lesion? In order to account for the preservation of the memory span
it is only necessary to postulate that forgetting factors require
time . - a number of items to operate.
q estion remains unanswered; why is there no los from
"long tern" memory if universal forgetting factors have increased?
hilst no definitive answer can be given to this, it might be that
because a' the non integrated nature of new material within lie
memory system, a lesser amount of interference is required in order
to cause memory loss. For instance any material which has been pre¬
served in the memory system for a matter of weeks must be presumed
to be fairly immune to those factors which universally cause forgetting.
A relatively large amount of interference or trace decay, therefore,
would be necessary to cause Joss, say "10" interference units. n
the other hand, newly acquired information may require only "2
interference units" before forgetting tak©3 place, in such a
situation, en increase of interference in the system of 3 units





It must be admitted that in many respects this chapter has been
speculative, and that no unequivocal evidence to refute a dichotomous
theory has been put forward. Yet this was not "the aim of the chapter.
It was the aim of the chapter to show that an interpretation f the
"physiological" data in terms of a single system theory was equally
possible, allowing that data on abnormal subjects are relevant, in
any case, to questions involving normal functioning.
The first type of physiological data considered was based on
experiments with electro-convulsive shock, where many investigations
have shown the amnesic effects of such shock on human and animal
subjects. Some studies had shown the reversibility of the amnesic
effect up to about 5 seconds before shock, and on this basis it has
been held that a dichotomy between short and long term memory might
be justified. Yet recent evidence by Pagano at al (l969) for instance,
shows the complete reversibility of amnesia and indicates that the
amount cf reversibility depends on the strength of the shoe' .
The second type of evidence was based on experiments with
protein synthesis inhibitors. An analysis of evidence by Deutsch
revealed that it is not at all clear whether these drugs affect
memory at all, let alone short and long term memory different!aly.
h.
The third line of evidence was based on the effects of temporal
lobe and hippocampal lesions 0x1 memory, where it is frequently reported
t . t suck damage affects long term learning, whereas "short" and long
ten memory are left intact i.e. it affects the mechanism for trans-
fe Tn; terial from short to long term memory. This lino' of'
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reasoning has been questioned by Douglas (19&7) for instance, who
Bo be a evidence that distraction degrades memory rapidly, within the
time span of possible recall. Evidence from Baddeley and Warrington
(1970) indicates that mere prevention of rehearsal i3 not sufficient
for immediate forgetting in amnesic patients, so that the distractor
tasks presumably have an active effect on forgetting. Again
Baddeley and Warrington produce evidence of long term learning under
certain experimental conditions.
This type of evidence leads to the suggestion that the failure
to retain new information may be due to an accentuation of those
factors which universally cause forgetting. The last point of the
chapter tried to show how such a position could account for findings
which seem problematic for a single system theory. Whilst admitting
that such interpretations in terms of a single system theory are
speculative, an interpretation of the data in terms of disruption of
the mechanism which transfers material from 3hort to long tern
memory is equally speculative in view of the empirical data
considered. As such an interpretation is essential, however'* for a
dichotomous theory, it can reasonably be claimed that evidence based




THEORETICAL 1 CSITICI'H ?JTCONSIDERED
In Chapter 2, the theoretical positions of the following were
considered Kebb (194V) Broadbent (19&3) Bower (1967) Peterson (1966a,
1966 b) Glanzer (1969) Waugh and Norman (1963) Norman (1968, 1969)
Wiokelgren (1969) eiskrantz (196?) Adams (1967) Atkinson and Shiffrin
(1963) Tulving (1963). These positions ore now considered in turn in
tne light of the subsequent analysis and evidence of the thesis. Only
the main aspects of their theoretical positions are discussed.
1. Hebb's and Broadbent'a theoretical position. The theoretical
position of Hebb (1949) and Broadbent (1963) rests on the assumption
that autonomous trace decay underlies short term forgetting. hilst it
is possible that this is the case, it is also possible that all forget¬
ting is due to autonomous trace decay, in which case a dichotomy between
short and long term memory is untenable. As was noted in Chapter 4*
the basis for claiming that *3TMn was subject to autonomous trace decay
rests on the evidence that forgetting is sometimes rapid, whei-eas once
material is well rehearsed its forgetting is slow if not absent. Again
it is claimed e.g. Broadbent (196j>) that forgetting over the short tens
is not subject to associateive interference, as it is in the long term,
"hilst the first argument merely poses the cause of rapid forgetting -
rapid forgetting might be due to factors which universally cause
forgetting - Melton (1963) &ud Keppel and Underwood (1962) have shown
the importance of other items for fox'getting in the short term and
lickelgren (1963a)and Gorman and V/ickens (I968) have 3hown the effects
of similarity of materials on forgetting in the short teim. On the
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surface, therefore, autonomous trace must be abandoned in favour of
interference. As Brown (195?') has argued however, autonomous trace
decay can account for the effects of similarity on forgetting in that
interference may be the result, not the cause of forgetting of an under¬
lying trace. As was pointed out in Chapter 6, however, to take this
position entails the possibility that all forgetting, whether in tho
short or the long terra, is due to autonomous trace deoay, and this
makes a dicnotomous theory untenable»
The psychological evidence, then, does not unequivocally support
a dichotamous theory in which short term forgetting is due to autono¬
mous trace decay whereas long term forgetting is due to associative
interference.
Bower'g) theoretical posits
The interesting aspect of Bower's (19&7) theoretioal position is
trie clear statement he makes as to the criterion for distinguishing
short and long term memory, short tern memory being labile, long term
memory being stable. He relies on evidence of the effects of shock on
newly acquired material to indicate a distinction between short and
long term memory (e.g. P 122.) The evidence reviewed in Chapter 11,
however, indicates that this type of evidence is by no means unequivo¬
cal, in that recovery of newly acquired information following shock is
possible (after amnesia) providing the extent of the shock is not too
gfeat, as is the case with "long term" material, which is also subject
to amnesic effects following shock (e.g. ECS).
Bower also regards items as residing in Bib. at the risk of being
lost in an all or nothing manner, unless rehearsal results in it being
e
copied into long term memory. Expt. 1 and 2 of this thesis
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(Chapter 7) on the limited capacity hypothesis, whilst not perhaps
fatal for this formulation, are an embarrassment, in that a large
amount of material was retained following a single exposure at a rate
which can reasonably be taken to exclude the possibility of rehearsal.
In that Bower regards LT. as a stable system, the forgetting of items
such that recognition only was possible must have taken place in 9JM*
It is difficult to see that items which could only be recognised but
not recalled could be rehearsed, (at least in the normal sense of the
word) and transferred to long term memory. This is a particularly
embarrassing point if it is claimed that forgetting of items in 8TE.1
is an all or nothing manner, as Bovver does, and that the long-short
model has no natural way to accomodate within its conceptual framework
any distinction between recognition and recall.
Peterson's theoretical position
Peterson (1966 a, b) like Hebb and Broadbent, is a decay theorist,
holding that the difference between auditory and visual presentation
effects in the experiment of Keppel and Underwood (1962) indicates that
trace decay operates over the short term, but may be masked by inter¬
ference effects which also occur. Specifically the fact that the first
item visually presented did not show decay is taken to ihdioste the
operation of trace decay in the former situation. Chapter 6 pointed to
various other possible interpretations in terms of Interference theory,
and perhaps a more major objection is that if trace decay operates in
the short term along with interference, on what grounds can it be olaimed
that it is absent from long term memory, rather than being difficult
to detect over the longer term.
Other evidence which Peterson uses is based on the different
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reactivity of sections of the serial position curve to different
variables. The most recent part of the serial position curve reacts
differently to the early and middle part of the serial position curve as
a result of such variables as rate of presentation, interpolation of
activity between presentation and recall etc.
Chapter 10 involved an analysis of the serial position curve.
It was conceded that the evidence was compatible with a dichotomous
theory of memory, although for the most part it involved restating
evidence produced by other- means. It was also pointed out, however,
that the evidence was compatible with a single system theory, and that
furthermore, the generality of findings based oh. serial position cux-ve
evidence was open to the most serious doubts. This questioning of
generality arose out of experiments on acoustic onfusion, which draik
(1963) and Klntsch and Buschke (19&9) shown to affect only the
recency part of the serial position curve. Yet as Baddelsy and .iarring-
ton (1970) admit, and a3 experiments in the cotr se of this thesis
(Chapter 8) and elsewhere have shown, acoustic confusions do occur in
the long term, and furthermore long term storage must logically involve
acoustic storage. Therefore evidence based on the serial position curve
is not necessarily indicative of a dichotomy, effects in the short and
long term may be present but weak, or counteracted by other variables
which alter in strength over the 3hort and long term.
Furthermore, evidence which Peterson puts forward in support of a
dichotoraou3 theory, and based on serial position curve effects, involves
x-eminiscence effects. Peterson (1966 c) showed that the last few items
showed a reminiscence effect when their recall probabilities were
compared immediately after presentation, and a short time after presen¬
tation. Peterson interpreted this in terns of switching from one
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retrieval mechanism to another. Yet, whilst a possible interpretation,
the evidence does not entail a dichotomy in that both interference
theory and autonomous trace decay theory can also account for the data.
(See Chapter 6).
finally Peterson's evidence for a dichotomy based on evidence of
a recency mechanism which inhibited only the production of responses
recently given, was seen to be merely a restatement that rapid for¬
getting occurs. It is in other words an operational consequence of
rapid forgetting for which a dichotomous theory of memory is only one
possible exnlanation,
nor's theoretical position
As v/as noted in Chapter.2, G-lanzer's theoretical position has
changed somewhat since his first theoretical paper, on a dichotomous
theory of memory. (G-lanzer and Cunitz 1966). He now considers short
term forgetting is due to non associative factors, particularly dis¬
placement of items in the short terra store by later incoming items.
The empirical evidence upon which G-lanzer rests his theoretical
position comes entirely from studies of the effect of variables on the
she.)o A the serial position curve. Evidence that interpolation of
activity between presentation and recall affects the recency art but
not the earlier part of the serial position curve, for instance, is
taken as evidence of the effects of this variable on short but not long
term memory.
the empirical objections to frlanzer's position have already been
noted in this chapter. The evidence on acoustic confusion indicates
that free recall studies involving the serial position curve have no
special status in establishing a dichotomous theory of memory, and the
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evidence that only the number of items not their relationship causes
short terra forgetting-, is even refuted by serial position curve studies,
(bee Chapter 10). Furthermore, as was noted in Chapter 6, a traoe decay
model for SIT is not negated by this type of evidence.
■augh aa<j ..prpqft's tffrooretiwl ,>99iU9P
The evidence upon which Waugh and Norman (19&5) base a dichotomous
theory is in many ways similar to other dichotomous theorists already
discussed e.g. Glanaer et al (19&9)« As well as basing their conclusions
on the evidence that the shape of the serial position curve is differen¬
tially affected by such variables as repetition, waugh and Norman, like
Glanzer et al, claim that the short term element is affected by the
number of items interpolated between presentation and recall, unlike
secondary memory.
As far as basing a dichotomy on the evidence from free recall
studies is concerned, objection to this has already been considered. Yet
for theories which claim an overlap between short and long term memory,
such that the recency position of the curve indicates output from both
short and long term memory, at least one experiment based on free
recall is a particular embarrassment. The experiment of baddeley and
Harrington (1>7G) which failed to show differences between amnesic
subjects with "impaired LTK" and control subjects for the recency part
of the curve raises questions as to whether the recency part of the
curve can have any "long term memory" component. '
That the "long term" memory component is not affected by
footnote: The term "impaired LTM* is somewhat inaccurate; it would
be better to talk of impaired learning capacity, as LTM per se is not
clainBd to be impaired.
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interpolation of items between presentation and recall whereas the
"short tarn" component is affected, can hardly be taken as definitive
evidence of a dichotomy. As was noted above and in Chapter 6, the
evidence upon which such a claim is made does not preclude the
possibility of autonomous trace decay in the short term. ..gain,
serial position curve experiments may be too insensitive to measure
loss duo to interpolation of items in "long term memory". It is,
after all, too insensitive to measure acoustic confusion!
The "echo box" argument, used by augh and Norman, (i.e.
introspective evidence of the fleeting nature of such of our exper¬
ience, to gether with the introspective evidence that we rarel. fail
to recall the last few items of a sentence, and can "parrot" then
back) was noted to be merely a statement that forgetting is sometimes
rapid, which is of course not in dispute. The implication that
material enters a short term box, is later rejected by Norman himself
(196b) because of the necessity of postulating massive interaction
between "short" and long" term memory.
\ \ \
K.<r. usi' . theoretical position
ihraan's theoretical writings (1968), 19&9) carry little evidence
of conviction ever the question of a dichotomous theory of memory, as
has bejs noted in Chapter 2. He admits that a formal distinction between
the two systems is difficult to make, and admits too (1969) 1 , "It is
of curse very difficult to distinguish a theory which postulates decay
in tine from one which postulates decay caused by interference, because
it 1not oossible to do the one critical experiment which everyone
would acce t." The discussion in Chapter 4 made it clear that such a
dist i.nction is at the heart of the resolution of the present problem,
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liorman (1963) does, however, hold a dichotoraous theory of sorts,
on the basis of differing interference effects as between short and long
term memory. The experimental evidence and the review of the literature
on this topic however, in Chapter 9, makes the holding of a dichotomous
theory of memory on this basis, untenable.
..ipkelgren's theprqUffiH PWltjOB
iiickelgren's theoretical position rests basically on two lines of
evidence; evidence of differing decay rates over periods of time for
differing materials, and physiological evidence based on amnesic
patient3.
'hickelgren (196j a) does himself state the objection to inferring
a dichotomous theory of memory from evidence of differing decay rates over
time P 33 "On the contrary if interference in £>TM can be shown to depend
on the nature of interfering activity in the same way as in L1T.'i, then it
will be plausible to assume that bTm and LTM are performed by the same
system operating in a qualitatively different manner under different
degrees of learning." it follows from this that one will have different
decay rates for different materials, which makes the inference of a
dichotomy on the evidence of different decay rates untenable, .ickelgren
goes on in that paper to show the effects of associative interference
in the short term (a3 in the long term).
The oentral issue is whether one or a few instances are enough
on which to draw conclusions, concerning evidence of interference effects
in the 3hort term. The argument put forward in Chapter 4 was that if it
is merely possible that rapid and less rapid forgetting cah have the
same cause, then it becomes impossible to be sure that rapid forgetting
does not take place in "LTIM*. Even if, for certain types of material
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(e.g. acoustically related material or material in the centre of a
supra span list) forgetting is always rapid, this does not entail a
dichotomy. Certain types of material may be especially susceptible to
those factors which universally caus e forgetting, because of the
relationship of this material to the rest of the cognitive framework.
The physiological evidence upon which Wickelgren relies has been
criticised in Chapter 11. Whilst evidence of learning impairment is
awkward for a single system theory, particularly the evidence which
Wickelgren (1963) himsdlf puts forward, the evidence of the effeot of
distractors on retention is awkward for a dichotomous theory, at least
to the extent that it allovfs a single system theory interpretation of
the data.
Wickelgren (19&9 a) does differ from many other diohotomist
theorists in denying a distinction between short and long term memory
on the basis of acoustic coding being confined to short term memory.
Indeed he predicts empirical evidence in support of acoustic coding in
long terra memory. Furthermore he is not convinced of the evidence
denying a role to semantic processing in short term memory, and quotes
many of the same studies quoted by Gruneberg and Sykes (1969 a) which
indicate semantic coding in short term manory. Whilst it is fair to
point this out, it must be admitted that his position has not always
been clear, as was noted in Chapter 9*
aakflteaasalfl
'.eiskruntz's theoretical position rests on evidence that electro
convulsive shock has irreversible effects over the short but not the
long term. Kecent evidence of fagano et al (19&9) however, casts
serious doubts on this view. They have shown that amnesia following
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shock might well be completely reversible, provided the shock is not
too great#
liven without the evidence of Pagano et al, however, the evidence
does not force a dichotomous position. Permanent forgetting might still
be due to en increase in those factors which universally cau3c forgetting.
New material may be susceptible to forgetting factors because it has not
been adequately integrated within the memory system.
' tneorqticaj- pqgit^gfi
.idams' theoretical position rests on three lines of evidencet
physiological evidence, the limited capacity to take in new information,
and differing coding systems employed over the short and the long term.
Chapter 11 dealt with the physiological evidence, indicating that
it did not force a diohotomous theory. Chapters 7 and 8 dealt with the
limited capacity hypothesis, indicating that limited capacity to take in
new information did not of itself entail a dichotomous theory of memory,
and CJh^ter 9 indicated that a dichotomous theory could not be
established on the basis of evidence whioh purports to show that short
and long term memory employ different coding systems.
Further objections have been raised against Adams' theoretical
position. His claim that interference accounts for forgetting in both
short and long term memory entails the collapse of a dichotomous theory
because of the empirical impossibility of distinguishing between
greater susceptibility of certain materials to those factors which cause
forgetting i.e. interference and two different memory systems. For
instance acoustic confusion occurs to a greater extent over the short
then the long term, whereas semantic confusion is the other way round.
It is impossible to establish whether this indicates the greater
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3U3ceptibility of acoustic material to those factors which universally
oause forgetting, or whether acoustic codin is confined to one system,
semantic coding to another. (This makes the unwarranted assumption
that the evidence supports such a dichotomy in any case.)
That Adams allows rapid forgetting per se is not necessarily a
characteristic of 31k! also entails the collapse of a dichotomous theory
of memory, as has been pointed out previously. This is because rapid
forgetting is the criterion by which one decides whether material is
in one system or another.
Finally, Adams' views on the relationship between recognition and
recall, in which he views the relationship as involving dichotomous
memory systems, is 3een to be unparsimonious in Chapter 5*
Atkinson's and ohiffrln's theoretical position
the theoretical statement of a dichotomy by Atkinson and
ohiffrin (1963) is more explicit than any other, it is important to
high light the fatal weaknesses in their formulation.
The greatest weakness in their formulation concerns the possibility
that material can be transferred from short to long teiro memory without
tne intervention of a central process such as rehearsal. This entails
the possibility that any material retrieved may be retrieved from MM.
Together with the admitted possibility (P 127), that rapid forgetting
can take place in MM, this theory is indistinguishable firom one which
claims that all material enters one memory system (LTM) where rapid
forgetting can take place due to those factors which universally cause
forgetting. This possibility is supported by evidence that associative
interference causes both rapid and le33 rapid forgetting, ahd that




There is, in fact, in Atkinson and Shiffrin'3 ovra writing, a
great deal of equivocation over the relationship between short and long
term memory. At one point U 115) they admit that information entering
STB comes from LTS, which as pointed out before, entails material
entering LTS directly, and presumably being forgotten from LTS. How is
it lost from LTS, if LTS does not involve a mechanism in which material
is subject to trace decay through displacement?
There is one other major area in their formulation which is subject
to direct empirical disproof. They claim, P 111 and P 128, that the
function of rehearsal is to regenerate the STS and prolong decay and that
the longer an item is in STS, the greater trill be its strength in long
term memory. Yet Glanzer and 1,'einzer (19&?) have shown that repeating
an item reduces its long term retention. Indeed their own empirical
evidence confirms this.
As Atkinson and Shiffrin base their case on the explanatory power
of their theory, these weaknesses must be regarded as fatal for the
theory in its present form, at least.
Tulving's (1968) theoretical position differs from other
dichotomous theorists in that he does not consider a dichotomy of
storage systems justified by the empirical data, but Instead supports
a dichotomy of retrieval systems in the complete absence of supportive
data. His suggestion that acoustic cues aiding retrieval are confined
to short term memory receives no empirical support from the literature,
Footnote t Like Wiokelgren, Atkinson and Shiffrin do not entertain the
possibility of a dichotomy on the basis of differing ooding systems
as between short and long term memory.
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and indeed evidence of acoustic confusion in LTO makes such a
hypothesis untenable. The view that STF.* is limited in retrieval
capacity whereas LTM i3 relatively unlimited has been shown to be un¬
tenable, at least as the basis for holding a dichotomous theory of
memory. Finally his views on recognition and recall being dichotomous
states are seen to bo unparsimonious (Chapter 5)» Tulving and Madigan
(1970) recently undertook an analysis of the contribution of publications
to knowledge in the field of memory. As two thirds of the papers
considered were classified qs "utterly inconsequential", it is reasonable
to assume that Tulving's own contributions to knowledge lead the majority.
The Writer's theoretical position
The writer's theoretioal position can now be explicitly stated,
material, once post-categorised is in a memory system in which various
possible processes result in forgetting. Forgetting will vary in rate
according to factors which relate newly aoquired material to older
material within the memory system.
Older material will have survived the influences of those factors
which result in forgetting, and will be leas susceptible therefore to
any increase in universal forgetting factors than will newly acquired
material which is still in a relatively unintegrated state. Rapid
forgetting of newly acquired material may be inhibited however, by
increasing the rate of integration, through such control processes as
rehearsal, which will then tend to lessen the susceptibility of newly
acquired material to forgetting.
Differences in forgetting rates for different types of material
e.g. acoustically and semantically related materials can be accounted
for by differences in susceptibility to forgetting, of the materials;.




It is not claimed that this is an original position or the only
possible interpretation of the data, or that all the data have been
satisfactorily explained in terms of this theoretical framework. It
in claimed that, being the more parsimonious model of memory, it must




This thesis has been concerned with an analysis of differences
between short and long term memory, and has tried to show that the
holding of a diohotomous theory of memory is, at this stage of our
knowledge, at least, unjustified. It is also the writer's view that a
dichotomous theory of memory is unprovable, so that one must accept the
more parsimonious single system theory of memory.
The thesis began by outlining the various approaches and theories
of those maintaining a dichotomous theory of memory (Chapter 2), and
those holding a single system theory (Chapter 3«) There followed then
(Chapter 2j) an analysis of the njajor problems confronting a dichotomous
theory of memory, in particular its reliance on evidence that rapid
forgetting could distinguish 3hort and long term memory. The following
chapter (Chapter 5) looked at-the further theoretical problem of the
relationship between recognition and recall, and concluded that a
dichotomy between recognition and recall was not called forth by the
evidence. This, it was noted, had implications of both a methodo¬
logical and theoretical nature, in particular it made unnecessary a
dichotomy between short and long term recognition memory as distinct
from a short and long term redall memory.
The rest of the thesis concerned itself with the empirical
evidence whidh is claimed to support a dichotomous theory. Chapter 6
looked at the psychological evidence on the nature of forgetting, and
it was concluded that no theory of forgetting could be shown con¬
clusively to operate in the short but not in the long term, a point




Chapters 7 and 3 looked at the evidence for a dichotomy based
on the limited capacity hypothesis, and it was concluded that this
cannot be U3ed to establish a dichotomous theory of memory. Indeed it
was thought (Chapter S) that the experimental evidence produced by the
writer was an acute embarrassment to dichotomous theorists.
Chapter 9 considered the evidence for a dichotomous theory of
memory based on different interference effects in short and long term
memory, from which it is inferred that short term memory uses acoustic
coding and long term memory semantic coding. Experimental evidence
produced in the course of the thesis contradicted this position, and
a logical analysis revealed its logical weakness.
Chapter 10 involved an analysis of the serial position curve, and
it was concluded that such evidence is for the most part merely a
restatement of other findings, which poses the question of the cause
of rapid forgetting, but does not answer it. The generality of
findings based on the serial position curve was also questioned.
Chapter 11 considered the physiological evidence for a dichotomoua
theory of memory, and it was noted that the evidence could not be taken
as establishing a dichotomous theory of memory. Not only is it dubious
that evidence which depends on insult or injury is relevant to nornal
functioning, the evidence itself, whether from studios of the effects
of drugs, of electro convulsive shock or of hippocampal lesion, did
not force an interpretation of memory in terms of two separate systems.
Chapter 12 returned to view the various theories supporting
dichotomy of memory systems, in the light of the evidence presented in
the course of the thesis. No theory appeared able to stand up, at
least in its present form, to the evidence presented,
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A dichotomous theory of memory then, appears to be improved and
unprovable. It i3 unproved because no single line of evidence
unequivocally supports a dichotomous theory of memory, to the exclusion
of single system theory explanations. It is unprovable because proof
depends on showing different mechanisms of forgetting over time. As
long as this cannot be demonstrated, and such writers as Hilgard and
Dower (1966) consider this a serious possibility, then a diehotomoiB
theory becomes unprovable. One cannot argue, as Adams (19^7) has,
that different forms of the same mechanism underly short and long tern
memory, because one cannot empirically distinguish between differing
susceptibility to those factors which universally cause forgetting
for different materials, and different underlying memory mechanisms,
us long as different mechanisms of forgetting over time cannot be
proved, a dichotomous theory of memory is unprovable.
In conclusion, the writer would like to suggest what he regards
as the main contributions of this 3tudy of memory.
1. It has been demonstrated that one cannot establish a dichotomy
on the basis of the limited capacity to take in new information. ?«iany
writers are of course sceptical about the value of the memory span as
indicating: capacity limits of short term memory, but none, as far as
the writer is aware, has gone 30 far a3 to demonstrate that a
dichotoraous theory cannot be established on the basis of the limited
capacity to take in new information.
2. It has been demonstrated that one cannot dichotomise on the
ba3i3 of differing coding systems as between short and long term
memory, specifioejlly that acoustic coding is confined to short terra
memory, semantic coding to long term ®mory.
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3. It has been demonstrated that evidence for a dichotomy based
on the serial position curve is not sufficient to establish a dichotomy,
in that single system theory explanations ore as parsimonious.
4. It has been demonstrated that if short and long term memory are
both subject to the same forgetting process, then a dichotomy between
3hort and long term memory cannot be established.
To what extent the writer has succeeded in establishing a single
system theory of memory remains to be seen. whatever the response to
the main conclusion that a single system theory must be held, it is
hoped that those holding a dichotomous theory of memoiy will at least
respond to the objections and problems raised in the thesis« so that
an advanoe, one way or the other, can be made. This writer is not
concerned with establishing a lied, and hopes that enough x-eal
problems for a dichotouwus theory have been raised to protect him
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EXPERIMENT I and II: THE LIMITED CAPACITY HYPOTHESIS
Presentation List
1 Toxin 41 Mucous 81 Rostrum
2 Bagpipe 42 Galleon 82 Zealot
3 Gaiter 43 Torso 83 Elixir
4 Koran 44 Abbreviation 84 Giraffe
5 Mantel piece 45 Panacea 85 Affray
6 Clemency 46 Concerto 86 Periwinkle
7 Rayon 47 Impotence 87 Hawthorn
8 Forceps 48 Harpsichord 88 Parsonage
9 Refinery 49 Baton 89 Autocrat
10 Abbess 50 Dualism 90 Plasma
11 Lavatory 51 Heraldry 91 Passover
12 Conifer 52 Claret 92 Scrimmage
13 Sahara 53 Easel 93 Cauldron
14 Tartan 54 Keyhole 94 Digression
15 Clique 55 Appellation 95 5 Rabies
16 Tantrum 56 Seesaw 96 Porthole
17 Platoon 57 Khaki 97 Bigot
18 Acrobat 58 Faggot 98 Toadstool
19 Midwife 59 Settee 99 Geyser
20 Gladiator 60 Deviation 100 Vanguard
21 Dysentry 61 Lintel 101 Obesity
22 Helmsman 62 Pagoda 102 Wallop
23 Interlope 63 Termite 103 Jackdaw
24 Paganism 64 Scarecrow 104 Chromium
25 Bobbin 65 Belfry 105 Sinus
26 Ignition 66 Nutshell 106 Halibut
27 Polyp 67 Mirage 107 Felony
28 Milliner 68 Repository 108 Gizzard
29 Crocus 69 Albino 109 nhalebone
30 Nicotine 70 Tiddlywinks 110 Adage
31 Haystack 71 Bedouin 111 Poultice
32 Teacup 72 Limpet 112 Contest
33 Deoimal 73 Tirade 113 Lunacy
34 Artichoke 74 Cobra 114 Bison
35 Gangplank 57 Reverie 115 Rupee
36 Hailstone 76 Tungsten 116 Hexagon
37 Gangrene 77 Archway 117 Mimosa
38 Lifeboat 78 Repertoire 118 Vampire
39 Orphanage 79 Invoice 119 Enigna
40 Barnacle 80 Carnage 120 Beaker
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EXPERIMENT I And II; THE LIMITED CAPACITY HYPOTHESIS
Test List
0 1 Scarecrow 0 41 Carnage 0 81 Nicotine
0 2 Pagoda 0 42 Clemency 82 Priority
3 Ablution 43 Arrowhead 83 Brack
0 4 Deviation 0 44 Forceps 0 84 Milliner
5 Saga 45 Creeper 85 Retaliation
6 Bauble 46 Roulette 0 86 Ignition
0 7 Faggot 0 47 Abbess 87 Citation
8 Talcum 0 48 Zealot 88 Goldfinch
9 Ellipse 0 49 Giraffe 89 Diction
0 10 Seesaw 50 Tiara 0 90 Concerto
11 Pennant 51 Regency 0 91 Teacup
0 12 Keyhole 0 52 Periwinkle 92 Dissection
13 Tarpaulin 0 53 Parsonage 0 93 Artichoke
14 Sinecure 54 Lethargy 0 94 Abbreviation
0 15 Claret 55 Assessment 95 Gazelle
16 Flottilla 56 Pathology 96 Cabal
0 17 Dualism 0 57 Conifer 0 97 Hailstone
0 18 Harpsichord 0 58 Tartan 0 98 Lifeboat
0 19 Bagpipe 59 Pariah 99 Bequest
20 Parsnip 60 Manslaughter 100 Hairpin
21 Alacrity 0 61 Tantrum 101 Juggler
22 Wedlock 0 62 Plasma 0 102 Beaker
0 23 Koran 63 Assizes 0 103 Hexagon
24 Serenade 64 Benig£x 104 Guffaw
25 Mohair 65 Metabolism 0 105 Vampire
0 26 Nutshell 66 Ligament 0 106 Bison
0 27 Repository 0 67 Acrobat 0 107 Cortex
0 28 Tiddlywinks 0 68 Gladiator 108 Gloworm
29 L&ama 0 69 helmsman 109 Incisor
0 30 Limpet 70 Cynic 0 110 Wallop
31 Arcade 71 Gullet 0 111 Chromium
32 Dentistry 0 72 Scrimmage 112 Handcuffs
0 33 Cobra 0 73 Porthole 0 11* Barnacle
0 34 Tungsten 74 Liason 0 114 Adage
33 Pigtail 0 75 Digression 0 115 Gizzard
36 Pugalist 76 Graveyard 0 116 Halibut
0 37 Repertoire 77 Jaundice 117 Hebrides
38 Fauna 0 78 Toadstool 118 Cannibalism
39 Scimitar 0 79 Vanguard 119 Turbine
40 Globule 0 80 Paganism 0 120 Galleon




EXPERIMENT III: SEMANTIC CONFUSION IN SHORT TERM MEMORY
Presentation List: Experimental
1 Faggot 31 Kitchen
2 Spot 32 Winkle
3 Box 33 Drudge
4 Pennant 34 Tin
5 Lake 35 Norway
6 Moon 36 Station
7 Parsnip 37 Robin
8 Koran 38 Ground
9 Dog 39 Sizzle
10 Arcade 40 Tree
11 Perch 4i Duct
12 Carnage 42 Tantrum
13 Zealot 43 Barnacle
14 Thrush 44 Worm
15 Oboe 45 Snow
16 Meat 46 Flute
17 Chair 47 Grass
18 Slug 48 Gullet
19 Wife 49 Lead
20 Soil 50 Teacup
21 Dress 51 Pike
22 Cobra 52 Denmark
23 Giraffe 53 River
24 Hat 54 Doctor
25 Scorch 55 Hailstone
26 Bank 56 Handcuffs
27 Crypt 57 Market
28 Stream 58 Baby
29 Gate 59 Gizzard
30 Wrack 60 Harpoon.
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EXPERIMENT III: SEMANTIC CONFUSION IN SHORT TERM MEMORY
j ' lo "
Presentation List: Control
/
1 Faggot 31 Kitchen
2 Spot 32 Wrinkle
3 Box 33 Drudge
4 Pennant 34 Bin
5 Lake 35 Fairway
6 Moon 36 Station
7 Parsnip 37 Robber
8 Koran 38 Ground
9 Dog 39 Muzzle
10 Arcade 40 Tree
11 Search 4L Duct
12 Carnage U2 Tantrum
13 Zealot 43 Baronet
14 Hush 44 Squirm
15 Noble 45 Snow
16 Meat 46 Fluke
17 Chair 47 Grass
IB Slum 48 Gullet
19 wife 49 Head
20 Spoil 50 Teacup
21 Dress 51 Pine
22 Cobra 52 Dent
23 Giraffe 53 Quiver
24 Hat 54 Doctor
25 Scorch 55 Hailstone
26 Bank 56 Handcuffs
27 Crypt 57 Market
28 Street 58 Baby
29 Gate 59 Gizzard
30 Wrack 60 Harpoon
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EXPERIMENT III: SSlv-ANTIC CONTUSION IN SHORT TERM MEMORY
Test List
1 Chair 21 Bank
R 2 Shall NR 22 Vampire
3 Carnage R 23 Singe
NR 4 Dance NR 24 Sea
R 5 Zinc 25 Duct
NR 6 Creeper 26 Tree
7 Zealot 27 Snow
8 Wife 28 Gate
NR 9 Page R 29 Cello
NR 10 Pagoda 30 Tantrum
11 Gdraffe 31 Grass
R 12 Brook NR 32 Car
R 13 Earth 33 Gullet
14 Wrack 34 Kitchen
15 Dress R 35 Roach
NR 16 Bird NR 36 Invoice
17 Crypt R 37 Limpet
R 18 wren 38 Teacup
19 Drudge NR 39 Gangerine
20 Hat R 40 Sweden
R = New Items related to Experimental Presentation List Items.
■■ ■ ■ V\ ■
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THE LIMITED CAPACITY HYPOTHESIS AND
SHORT TERM MEMORY
MICHAEL M. GRUNEBERG
Psychology Department, University College of Swansea, Glam., England
Abstract
This paper attempts to show that a dichotomy between short term memory (stm)
and long term memory (ltm) cannot be established on the basis of evidence which
claims to show that stm unlike ltm, has a limited capacity to hold information for recall.
Introduction
A theory which postulates one system is more parsimonious than
another which postulates more than one. On the criterion of parsimony,
therefore, it is only necessary to show that no evidence exists
which can distinguish between a one memory and a two memory system
theory, in order to obivate the need for a dichotomous (2-system) theory
of memory. In other words, it is not necessary to show that data can
only be handled by a single system theory, it is enough to show that
it can be handled by a single system theory, in order to dispense with
a dichotomous theory of memory. One way, therefore, of demonstrat¬
ing the untenability of a dichotomous theory of memory is to make
it clear that differences advanced in support of a dichotomous theory
of memory, can in fact be explained by a single system theory. That
stm is limited with respect to capacity has recently been claimed as an
operational distinction between stm and ltm. Thus Waugh and Norman
(1965), Adams (1967) and Phillips et al. (1967) among others, have
recently distinguished between short and long term memory, on the
grounds of the limited capacity of short term memory compared to
the unlimited capacity of long term memory, and indeed Adams has
tried to establish a dichotomous theory of memory partly on the basis
of the limited capacity hypothesis (lch). This paper aims at showing that
the lch cannot be used to establish a dichotomous theory of memory.
While some writers are not entirely explicit as to what is limited,
whether it is capacity to process, store or retrieve, clearly any attempt
to establish a dichotomous theory of memory on the basis of limited
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capacity rests on a limited storage capacity for short term memory as
opposed to a relatively unlimited storage capacity for long term memory.
Thus the limited capacity to process incoming information may be due
to a massive build up in interference or rapid decay of non-rehearsed
material, neither of which entails a dichotomous theory of memory.
Melton (1963) in fact uses the former explanation when accounting
for rapid forgetting, in order to attack a dichotomous theory ofmemory,
and Brown (1958) opposes a limited capacity hypothesis with a trace
decay theory of memory which does not imply a dichotomous theory
of memory. Whilst Baddely et al. (1969) in a recent paper, have
suggested that the limited capacity is in terms of processing infor¬
mation into long term memory, this makes the assumption that the di¬
chotomy between short and long term memory already exists, and has
been proved on other grounds. This may be so, and in this paper it is
not claimed that it is impossible to interpret data in terms of a dichot¬
omous theory of memory, but only that it is not possible to establish
a dichotomous theory on the basis of limited capacity.
Furthermore, different retrieval capacities can hardly be taken serious¬
ly as a basis for establishing a dichotomous theory of memory. Let
us suppose that a given list of words, presented once, consists of A
words which are retrievable immediately and B words which are lost
immediately to retrieval. Unless these B words are all retrievable after
a period of time, together with all the A words, then ltm has no unlimit¬
ed retrieval capacity compared to stm and one cannot hold a dichotomous
theory on this basis. Indeed all the experimental evidence points the
other way, that after a rapid fall off retrieval becomes progressively,
if slightly, worse over time, despite the occasional reminiscense effect.
It is quite clear that retrieval over long periods of time is not unlimited
relative to retrieval in stm, for any given set of items, hence any attempt
to establish a dichotomy based on differing retrieval capacities of stm
and ltm is untenable. This, as was pointed out earlier, leaves differ¬
ences in capacity to store information as the essential prerequisite of
establishing a dichotomous theory of memory on the basis of the limit¬
ed capacity hypothesis.
The usual method of assessing the storage capacity of short term
memory is the conventional memory span experiment, in which follow¬
ing a single presentation of a series of items, for instance digits, subjects
are required to recall them immediately in their correct order. In a
typical experiment a subject will be able to recall about 7 digits without
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error; above the digit span, items are rapidly forgotten; indeed rapid
supra-span forgetting defines the memory span. It should be noted that
memory span items themselves are rapidly forgotten in the absence of
rehearsal. For Adams at least, this memory span defines the property
of short term memory that does not apply to long term memory. Short
term memory has a distinct limit in its capacity to hold material for
recall, whereas long term memory has a large and unknown capacity.
Apart from questioning memory span as showing limited storage
capacity as opposed to limited processing or retrieval capacity, memory
span, as Neisser (1967) for example points out, may have no special
status, in that sub-span units are also rapidly forgotten under certain
conditions of measurement; the discontinuity between material 'below'
and 'above' the memory span thus disappears in certain measures of
memory. Whilst Neisser makes this point with reference to the rapid
forgetting of sub-span items the same point is made in another way
by Shepard (1967), who has shown 90 % recognition in an experiment
involving the successive presentation of 540 words; in other words he
suggests that storage capacity may be relatively unlimited, provided one
uses the appropriate measure of capacity. Apart from the theoretical
problems involved in employing recognition rather than recall which
will be dealt with later in the paper, certain objections to Shepard's
experiments may be made on three grounds. (1) Presentation of stimuli
was self-paced by the subjects, thus making transfer to ltm a theoretical
possibility. (2) Because so many stimuli were involved, the total present¬
ation time exceeded the bounds of what one might term an stm experiment.
(3) Recognition consisted of the identification of the old item in a pair
of new and old items presented simultaneously, leaving open the possi¬
bility that the high recognition rate resulted, not from the identification
of the old item but from identifying the new item as one which was new.
Aim of the present experiment
The aim of the present experiment was to explore the storage capacity
of stm, taking into account the objections raised against Shepard's
experiment. This was done by presenting words at the rate of one per
second, approximately, for a total time of two minutes and eight seconds,
and testing for recognition by presenting old and new items successively,
but in random sequence, rather than simultaneously (correcting for
response bias by subtracting errors of inclusion from correct identifi¬
cation of old items).
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A second experiment was performed to show that the initial experiment
described above must be considered a short term memory experiment,
as defined by dichotomous theorists, and to counter certain other theoret¬
ical objections to the initial experiment which are considered in the




University College of Swansea.
and postgraduate students from the
Materials. A list of 120 words (presentation list) of frequency one
per million according to the Thorndike-Lorge word count (1944) i.e.
words occurring infrequently, the meaning of which, however, would
be known to a student population e.g. barnacle, bagpipe, adage. All
words were of two or three syllables, and were recorded on magnetic
tape at an average rate of 1.1 words per second. A second test list was
also constructed, consisting of 60 words from the presentation list
(every second word in the presentation list was included on the test
list) and sixty new words of the same frequency as the presentation list
words. The words were arranged randomly.
Design. The subjects, who were tested individually or in groups of
two or three, were asked to listen passively to the presentation tape
and to make no attempt to learn the items. As soon as the presentation
tape was finished, items on the test list were presented successively,
and the subjects were asked to indicate whether the words were old
or new, and their degree of confidence in their decision. The ratings
Y3 and N3 indicated that they were certain that a word was old or
new respectively. Y2 and N2 indicated that they were quite confident
but not certain, that the word was old or new respectively, and Y1 and
N1 indicated that they thought the balance of probablity was in the
appropriate direction. There was no neutral rating.
The measure of items retained was calculated by taking yes and no
answers only into account. False positive items were subtracted from
correct responses, and as the total number of old items on the test list
was only half the number of items on the presentation list, the figure
was multiplied by two to give a measure of the items retained.
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Method
Experiment 2
Subjects. Nineteen undergraduate students at University College of
Swansea, who had not acted as subjects in experiment 1.
Materials. The presentation and test lists were as described in experi¬
ment 1. The presentation list was recorded with greater clarity than in
experiment 1, on magnetic tape at an average rate of 1.1 words per second.
Design. The experiment was divided into two parts. Immediately after
the presentation tape had finished subjects who had been instructed
to listen passively to it, were asked to recall as many words as possible.
They were allowed to continue with this task until they either claimed
they could not recall any more words or 30 seconds had elapsed from
the time of writing the last word, with no sign that they could recall
any further words. They then took part in a seminar on a psychological
topic during which each was asked at least one question of relevance
to the topic. After a minimum interval of 30 minutes they were given
the same recognition task and test list as in experiment 1.
Results
In experiment 1, the mean number of items retained was 50.10 for
the 20 subjects. The range or the number of items retained was 18-76.
If one removes from the sample four subjects with a high response bias
(i.e. with 'yes' responses greater than 75 %) the mean is 55.12. In ex¬
periment 2A, the mean number of items recalled immediately after
presentation was 10.53. The mean recognition rate after 30 minutes was
37.79.
Table 1







1 2 (1-2) X 2
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
col
42.95 7.21 17.90 11.02 50.10 15.72
Discussion
It must be admitted that these results are hardly surprising. Adams
(1967) remarks that many studies show recognition superior to recall
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Table 2
Experiment 2. Number of items recognised after 30 minutes (19 subjects).
No. correct yes
responses













of items recalled immediately after
19 subjects).
presentation (for




by a factor of three. The importance of the present results lies in the
problem posed for a limited storage capacity hypothesis. Experimental
disproof of the hypothesis is, of course, hampered by the imprecise
formulation of the word 'limited'. Both Adams (1967) and Waugh and
Norman (1965) are thinking in terms of recall of some 7-9 items. It
is obvious, however, that the number of items stored in both experiment
1 and experiment 2 is considerably in excess of this. Perhaps a more
satisfactory approach is to reformulate the problem of limited storage
capacity. If one continues to feed in information for what is considered
to be short term memory, say two minutes, (an arbitrary figure of course,
as there is no agreed time limit on stm i.e., there is no agreement as to
what constitutes rapid forgetting) and one can produce evidence that
storage is of high order and, at the same time, there is no ground to
suppose that what forgetting there is, is due to factors other than inter¬
ference or trace decay, then one has good reason to question that storage
capacity is limited. Indeed one has no basis upon which to establish
a dichotomous theory of memory on the basis of the limited capacity
hypothesis.
As table 1 shows, there is a high order of retention under the condi¬
tions of experiment 1 outlined above, and the degree of retention must
be considered the lowest estimate of information in store, as there is
ample opportunity for intra-list interference, or trace decay, which will
reduce the amount of information actually retrievable. These results
indicate that, unless recognition is irrelevant as a measure of capacity,
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the evidence for establishing a dichotomous theory of memory on the
basis of a limited capacity hypothesis is, at the very least, equivocal.
It is true, of course, that there is nothing magical about 40 % retention
as a disproof of limited storage. But what the data have shown is that
a large amount of forgetting which was previously attributable to limit¬
ed storage capacity (i.e. those items not recalled once the memory span
has been reached) cannot now unequivocally be accounted for in such
terms; what forgetting there is may be due to interference or trace decay
rather than to lack of storage capacity. As noted in the introduction
it is necessary to establish a dichotomy, otherwise a dichotomous theory
cannot be held. Again it is not being claimed that given two systems
of memory, one cannot account for the data, just that the data prevent
one from establishing a dichotomous theory of memory based on a
limited capacity hypothesis. The critical question of course is, 'Is recog¬
nition irrelevant as a measure of capacity?' Keppell (1968) and Adams
(1967) have recently pointed to this possibility, and evidence that re¬
trieval cues help recall but not recognition tends to support the hypo¬
thesis that recognition and recall are dichotomous processes.
Hunter (1964) has, however, pointed out that as one moves from giving
few cues to retrieval to givingmany, one is going from a recall to a recogni¬
tion task - presumably giving the actual item to be recognised is provid¬
ing the ultimate cue: if this cannot be recognised, no further retrieval
cues are likely to help. Thus it seems totally unnecessary to hold that
recognition and recall are dichotomous on the basis of differential effects
of retrieval cues. Again a review of work on pattern recognition by
Neisser shows quite clearly that the recognition process is an extremely
complex one, and is not the simple template matching that Adams
appears to be considering. It may be that recognition and recall do
reflect differing habit states, but as this assumption is at present un-
parsimonious at an explanatory level, and seemingly unparsimonious
at a biological level, it cannot reasonably be maintained.
Given that a dichotomous theory cannot be established on the basis
of limited capacity, can a dichotomous theory even adequately handle
the experimental data of this paper? Four possible interpretations are
considered below.
1. Information enters directly into long term memory store
The first possibility is that information enters directly into long term
memory store, bypassing the short term memory store. This, of course,
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raises a fundamental problem for those theorists who claim that material
is in one memory system rather than another. The most common crite¬
rion which dichotomous theorists put forward is rapid recall failure
and the results of experiment 2A indicate that according to this criterion
at least the information of experiment 1 is in short term memory. A
second criterion, time, is one which most dichotomists would accept,
and it is met by the conditions of experiment 1. To argue that the items
of experiment 1 have entered ltm direct is to allow that rapid recall
failure and hence rapid forgetting is a characteristic of ltm as well as
of stm and to remove the fundamental criterion for establishing the
presence or absence of material in ltm. At the very least, to take this
position is to admit that rapid recall loss of digits is no criterion for
establishing the limited capacity of storage of short term memory. The
items may well enter ltm direct and be rapidly forgotten in that system.
Indeed even failure to recognise digits may indicate only the extent
to which rapid forgetting has occurred in ltm. It appears necessary
therefore, to regard the items recognised in experiment 1 as residing
in short term memory store, if one is not going to compromise rapid
forgetting, the major criterion for deciding whether or not material
is in stm. It must be admitted that at least one dichotomous theorist,
Adams (1967), has rejected rapid forgetting as a criterion for distinguish¬
ing short from long term memory The untenability of this position
becomes apparent in the light of the fact that rapid forgetting is used
by Adams as the criterion for deciding whether differing interference
effects are in short or long term memory, and memory span (which is
used as evidence for limited capacity in stm) is only regarded by him
as indicating limited capacity in stm because of the rapid forgetting
of supra-span sequences and the fact that memory span is itself subject
to rapid forgetting. In other words if it is to be held that the information
in experiment 1 enters ltm direct, on what grounds can one unequivocally
maintain that any material does not enter ltm direct, making the post-
ulation of a short term memory system redundant? (It is of course
unparsimonious to argue that a distinction must be drawn between
serialised material and non-serialised material in considering the theoreti¬
cal implications of the data presented. One has then to postulate two
mechanisms for rapid forgetting, as the evidence from this study is to
the effect that even for non-serialised material forgetting, as measured
by recall loss, is rapid.)
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2. Information is transferred rapidly to long term memory
If it is claimed that material enters stm where it is either rapidly for¬
gotten or rapidly transferred to ltm, the central problem still remains.
Material which cannot be recalled in experiment 1 is rapidly forgotten
and this rapid forgetting must have taken place in short term memory,
long term memory being a stable memory system. One has, therefore,
to suppose that the material recognised is in short term memory, in
which case the limited capacity hypothesis is compromised; or it is
in long term memory, in which case one must allow that the results
of rapid forgetting can be measured after a very short period of time
in long term memory, making it difficult to apply the criterion by which
it is decided that material has not progressed beyond short term memory,
i.e. rapid forgetting. One can always argue, in other words, that rapidly
forgotten material is in long term memory.
A second problem also presents itself - the status of rehearsal. Whilst
it has been argued that delivery of two and three syllable words at the
rate of approximately one per second cannot preclude the possibility
of rehearsal of material as it 'comes in', it should be noted that this
objection can be raised against many stm experiments using the same
rate of presentation, including many allegedly supporting dichotomous
theory, e.g. Baddeley's (1966) presentation rate was one per second;
Conrad (1964) letters presented at one every 0.75 second; Cohen and
Johansson (1967) digits presented at one per second, to name but a
few. Nor can speeding up of presentation rate allow for the possibility
of rehearsing material at the same time as fresh material is entering,
one may have a shadowing phenomenon such that rehearsal can begin
before the item is wholly 'in'. Indeed if this phenomenon does not occur
it becomes almost impossible to rehearse three syllable words pre¬
sented at one per second. Even if rehearsal were possible, however,
its value as an attack on the present experiment is very dubious as
rehearsal is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for items to
enter ltm. (It is not a necessary condition if items can enter direct:
it can hardly be claimed a sufficient condition for items to enter ltm
direct, otherwise all rehearsed items would be available for recall, ltm
not being susceptible to rapid forgetting.) As was pointed out previously,
experiment 2 shows that there is rapid recall loss, hence any rehearsal
present cannot be regarded as having successfully introduced material
into ltm. It might be made clear that subjects were asked to listen pas¬
sively and that the mean recall in experiment 2, 10.53 items, being lower
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than might be expected according to Murdock (1960) (i.e. 14-17 items
approx.) indicates that it is reasonable to suppose subjects did obey
instructions and did not rehearse.
3. Short and long term memory can exist simultaneously
It might be argued that stm and ltm can exist simultaneously, and
that in experiment 1, one is measuring a composite of output from stm
and ltm. (This is the position taken for instance by waugh and norman
(1965).) The central problem remains; rapid recall loss, i.e. rapid for¬
getting cannot be said to have taken place in ltm; thus the items of
experiment 1 which can be recognised only and not recalled, must be
considered to be in stm. On the other hand experiment 2 indicates that
a large number of items can be recognised after 30 minutes, in which
case they must be considered to be in ltm. As with the previous object¬
ion either rapid forgetting must be said to have taken place in ltm,
compromising the criterion by which a distinction between stm and ltm
can be made, or the items recognised must be considered to be in stm,
compromising the limited capacity hypothesis.
4. Recognition does not indicate unlimited capacity
It might be argued that recognition involves compression of items
in stm and that when stm is overloaded there is a loss of some inform¬
ation from each item, with the effect that whilst one might be able to
store a great many items in stm, information is displaced from each
item such that only recognition of each item is possible. In other words,
as far as the present experiment is concerned the recognition of 50
or so items is based on the same amount of information as the recall
of 10 items.
This possibility cannot be discussed in isolation from other possible
mechanisms of rapid forgetting. At least four mechanisms have been
put forward, interference, trace decay, displacement and compression.
If, as Adams suggests, in reviewing the literature on forgetting, inter¬
ference must be regarded as the only empirically defensible theory of
forgetting then, of course, the limited storage capacity hypothesis must
be rejected. Interference accounts for memory loss in terms other than
loss of material once in store.1 It must be emphasised that as inter-
1 Adams and others regard the erosion hypothesis, in which interference between
items causes trace decay, as an interference theory. Whether it is a trace decay theory
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ference is the most generally accepted theory of forgetting, the most
plausible explanation of the present experimental data is that storage
capacity in short term memory is not limited. Unless interference theory
can be refuted, the evidence for limited storage capacity is equivocal.
Several psychologists, e.g. Brown (1958), hold that forgetting is due
to trace decay. As has been previously pointed out, however, even this
theory, if applied to the present experimental data, does not imply
limited storage capacity, as Brown points out in drawing a distinction
between a limited capacity storage hypothesis and a trace decay theory
for short term memory.
The third theory of forgetting, displacement, put forward by Phillip,
et al. (1967) advances the hypothesis that after the limit of short term
memory is reached, items are displaced from it, i.e. there is a total loss
of all information from some items. Murdock (1968) has questioned
this hypothesis on the basis of probe experiments, and the experimental
evidence of this paper makes a displacement hypothesis seem untenable,
as the loss of information is clearly not complete once the memory
span has been reached.
Murdock's attack on displacement involves putting forward a com¬
pression theory in which there is some information loss for all items
once the memory span has been reached, and presumably he would
argue that the present experimental data support this hypothesis.
It is not clear, however, that the concept of compression differs in
essence from the concept of displacement. If, as a result of compress¬
ion, some information is pushed out of the memory store, this then
is a form of displacement and differs from the position of Phillips et al.
only in detail of what is pushed out of the store. By postulating that
forgetting in short term memory is due to compression, Murdock, is
of course postulating a further mechanism of forgetting in addition
to interference and decay, but as far as the present experimental results
are concerned there is no reason to suppose that what forgetting there
is is due to compression rather than interference or decay. The evidence
for compression is, in other words, still equivocal.
Elsewhere Murdock (1967) argues that rehearsal is a critical variable
or an interference theory, is to a large extent a matter of semantics. As the theory is
noted by Adams as being 'unashamedly offered without a whit of support', inter¬
ference 'not involving trace decay', must according to Adams be regarded as the
only empirically defensible theory of forgetting.
lch and stm 337
in transferring material from stm to ltm. As experiment 2A shows
that only 10-53 words can be recalled immediately after presentation, one
is faced with the problem of explaining how so many words are in
ltm as measured by recognition after 30 minutes. (As pointed out earlier
to take this position is problematic in that rapid forgetting may be
said to have taken place in ltms. However, if it is argued that the words
recognised in experiment 2 are still in stm the time criterion for dis¬
tinguishing between stms and ltms collapses as the amount ofmaterial
which can be retained within 30 minutes is patently greater than 7-9 digits.)
To maintain that the material is in ltms one must presume that transfer
can take place without rehearsal in that what one cannot recall one
presumably cannot rehearse. Only 10.53 items were immediately recal¬
lable, whereas over 30 items were recognised after 30 minutes.
A second problem Murdock is faced with is to show that the mechanism
of forgetting which he describes as compression is a short term memory
phenomenon only. If compression is also a long term phenomenon it
becomes impossible to decide on the basis of information loss such
that recall is absent and recognition only is possible whether items are
in stm or ltm. In the context of the present experiment to dichotomise
between stm and ltm on the basis of compression entails claiming that
forgetting which results in recall loss but not recognition loss immediately
after presentation is due to compression, while after 30 minutes it is due
to some other mechanism perhaps decay or interference. There appears
to be no empirical ground upon which such a distinction can be based.
This paper has been concerned to show first and foremost that a
dichotomous theory of memory cannot be established on the basis of
the limited capacity hypothesis. The second part of the paper has pointed
out some difficulties involved in interpreting the data presented in terms
of a dichotomous theory of memory, even if such a dichotomy could
be shown on other grounds.
The main problems are summarised below.
(1) If the items recognised in experiment 1 are claimed to have entered
long term memory direct, rapid forgetting, as indicated by rapid recall
loss, must be regarded as having taken place in long term memory,
thus undermining the criterion by which it is 'established' that material
has not entered ltm, i.e. rapid recall loss is the criterion by which it
is claimed by dichotomous theorists that items have not entered ltm.
(2) If it is claimed that the items recognised in experiment 1 have been
rapidly transferred from stm to ltm, then rehearsal, which is claimed
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to be critical in the transfer process, cannot be regarded as being critical
in this experiment. Again, if it is claimed that by the time recognition
takes place the items are in ltm, it becomes impossible to establish
where rapid recall loss has taken place and this undermines the criterion
by which material is claimed not to have entered ltm.
(3) If the cause of forgetting in stm is claimed to be due to interference
only, the limited capacity of stm cannot then be in terms of storage
capacity, as interference theory accounts for forgetting in terms other
than through storage loss.
(4) If the number of items recalled immediately after presentation
is a measure of the storage capacity of stm (10.53 items in the case of
experiment 2A), it appears difficult to account for an additional 27
items in store after a period of 30 minutes (experiment 2) and presumably
in ltm. An explanation in terms of the extra items being displaced into
ltm once the memory span is reached encounters the difficulties out¬
lined in 2, above.
(5) If recognition in experiment 1 is claimed to be due to compres¬
sion in stm, some means must be found of showing that recognition
after 30 minutes i.e. in ltm is not due to compression, if a dichotomy
between stm and ltm is to be established on the basis of limited storage
capacity of stm.
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SEMANTIC AND ACOUSTIC CODING IN SHORT- AND
LONG-TERM MEMORY
MICHAEL M. GRUNEBERG AND ROBERT N. SYKES
University College of Swansea
Summary.—This paper considers the evidence for semantic processing in
STM. It is concluded that there is sufficient evidence of semantic processing
in STM to make it impossible to dichotomize between long- and short-term mem¬
ory on the basis of semantic coding being exclusively employed by long-term
memory.
One of the main arguments put forward recently in support of a dichotomous theory
of memory systems concerns differing interference effects in what is alleged to be short-
and long-term memory. Thus Adams (1967) and Baddeley (1966) claim that semantic
confusion occurs in (LTM) only and acoustic confusion in (STM) only and draw the
conclusion that STM is an auditory system, distinct from LTM. Gruneberg and Sykes
(1969) have recently provided empirical evidence for the presence of acoustic confusion
in long-term memory and have pointed out the logical impossibility of distinguishing
between STM and LTM on the basis of differing coding systems being exclusively em¬
ployed by the two purported systems.
A great deal of evidence has now accumulated which indicates semantic processing in
STM. Thus evidence for semantic processing in STM can be found in the work of Loess
(1968), Wickens and Eckler (1968), Murdoch and Vom Saal (1967), Henley, Noyes,
and Deese (1968), Turnage (1967), and Dale and Gregory (1965) among others and
Baddeley (1966) himself provides evidence of semantic processing in STM. Baddeley
and Dale (1966) do in fact admit some slight effects of semantic confusion in short-term
memory but have tried to hold a dichotomous theory on the basis of quantitative differ¬
ences between acoustic and semantic confusion, claiming that the former occurs in far
greater quantity in 'STM,' the latter in far greater quantity in 'LTM.' Apart from the
problems involved in comparing, quantitatively, two possibly unrelated processes, it is
necessary, in order to postulate a dichotomous theory, to show a dichotomy. At the very
minimum, evidence of a dichotomous function over time is required in one or both proc¬
esses of interference, actual quantitative differences between the two being irrelevant, al¬
though in view of the logical problems involved in dichotomising between STM and LTM
on the basis of different coding systems in the two purported memories, it is not clear how
this evidence could be used. As noted above, there is empirical evidence that semantic and
acoustic processing occur in both purported systems, in any case, and thus a dichotomy
between STM and LTM cannot be made on the basis of short- and long-term memory
employing differing coding systems.
While it is clear that there is adequate experimental evidence of semantic processing
in STM, it is perhaps surprising that such evidence is required in order to refute the
hypothesis that 'STM' does not employ semantic coding. That the words before one as
one reads are almost instantaneously meaningful indicates that they are almost instantane¬
ously being semantically processed, but since many words are rapidly forgotten, these
rapidly forgotten words must be considered to have been in STM only (Gruneberg, 1969).
Thus any attempt to attribute semantic processing to items entering LTM directly is unten¬
able. An experimental demonstration of rapid forgetting of ordinary English sentences is
contained in a paper by Martin, Roberts, and Collins (1968).
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One important implication of the demonstration of semantic processing in 'STM' con¬
cerns the nature of any dichotomous theory of memory. For semantic processing to occur
at all, the items processed must functionally have entered 'LTM' in that meaningfulness or
even non-sensory associativity is a function of the previous history of the individual. Thus
any theoretical interpretation of memory in terms of two "boxes," a short-term and a long-
term "box," is untenable.
Norman (1968) has recently attacked a "box" dichotomous theory on grounds simi¬
lar to those above, although he appears unwilling to allow that semantic similarity can
affect retention in Primary memory and maintains a dichotomous theory on the grounds
of such operational distinctions as the presence of acoustic similarity factors in Primary
memory and semantic similarity factors in Secondary memory. Apart from the empirical
evidence against such operational distinctions, it is difficult to reconcile these operational
distinctions with Norman's view of Primary and Secondary memory as having such "direct
and complete intercommunication that a formal distinction between the two is difficult to
make." If such intercommunication is possible, it must be because both systems use the
same coding system, otherwise such communication would not be possible. Furthermore,
if, as Norman claims, the items in Primary memory which are affected by acoustical simi¬
larity are those "which are to be retained," it follows that one cannot account for differ¬
ences between forgetting rates for acoustically similar and for acoustically dissimilar mate¬
rial in terms of acoustic interference (Baddeley, 1966), as the "extra" items forgotten in
the acoustically similar groups must, according to Norman's formulation, be forgotten for
reasons other than their acoustic features.
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THEORETICAL NOTE: LOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO A
DICHOTOMOUS THEORY OF MEMORY
MICHAEL M. GRUNEBERG
University College of Swansea
J. Adams (1) in a recent defence of a dichotomous theory of memory has
suggested that rapid forgetting cannot distinguish between short- (STM) and
long-term memory (LTM); in other words, rapid forgetting is not a sufficient
condition for allocating material to STM and stable retention is not a necessary
condition for allocating material to LTM. He then goes on to distinguish be¬
tween STM and LTM on the basis of two operational differences: (1) lim¬
ited capacity of short-term memory as opposed to the unlimited capacity of
long-term memory and (2) acoustic confusion occurring in short-term memory
only and semantic confusion in long-term memory only.
It must be pointed out that the basis for holding these operational differ¬
ences between short- and long-term memory rests in rapid forgetting of su-
pra-span digit sequences in the former case; the rapid forgetting of acoustical¬
ly similar material in the case of acoustic confusion and slow forgetting of se¬
mantic material in the case of semantic confusion, i.e., those aspects of a stimu¬
lus which distinguish one item from another are forgotten, rapidly in the case
of acoustic confusion and slowly in the case of semantic confusion. It may be
further pointed out with respect to the limited storage capacity hypotheses that
it is incompatible with interference theory of forgetting which Adams holds to
be the only empirically justified theory of forgetting in that interference spe¬
cifically disallows that the cause of forgetting is loss of material once in
store. (It is clear that Adams is referring to a limited storage capacity, as lim¬
ited capacity to process information does not entail a dichotomous theory of
memory.)
It is difficult to see how any dichotomous theory of memory can avoid
making operational differences on the basis of rapid forgetting being a neces¬
sary and sufficient condition for material being STM.
To argue that relatively stable retention is only a sufficient condition for
LTM entails the possibility that all material enters LTM direct and makes any
measurement of operational differences between STM and LTM impossible. It
seems clear that, if Adams is correct, as he appears to be, in assuming that rapid
forgetting cannot distinguish between STM and LTM, dichotomous theory can¬
not be verified and being less parsimonious than continuity theory must be aban¬
doned in favour of the latter.
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ACOUSTIC CONFUSION IN LONG TERM MEMORY
MICHAEL M. GRUNEBERG and ROBERT N. SYKES
University College of Swansea, Psychology Department, Singleton Park,
Swansea, Wales
Abstract
Adams (1967) and Baddeley (1966a, b) amongst others, have recently claimed
that short and long term memory can be distinguished on the basis of differing
interference effects between the two systems, indicating that short term memory
uses an auditory coding system, unlike long term memory. Specifically, it is
claimed that short term memory is subject to acoustic confusion only and long
term memory to semantic confusion only, despite evidence put forward by
Woodworth (1938) showing acoustic confusion in long term memory. The
present paper reports an experiment in which a presentation list was followed,
after a period of 20-25 min., by a test list containing words acoustically similar
and words acoustically dissimilar to words in the presentation list. Subjects were
asked to rate, on a six point scale, whether they thought the test list word was
old or new. The finding that the acoustically similar words were rated significantly
higher than the non-related words, indicates acoustic confusion in LTM. In
addition, the paper considers the theoretical problems involved in holding short
term memory to be an auditory system.
Introduction
Adams (1967) has recently defended a dichotomous theory of
memory to a large extent on the basis of differing interference effects
between short and long term memory. On the basis of the work of
Baddeley (1966b) and others he suggested a definitive operational
difference between STM and LTM in terms of acoustic confusion being
characteristic of STM only and semantic confusion characteristic of
LTM only. Because of these differing interference effects, it was con¬
cluded that STM employs an auditory coding system, LTM a semantic
coding system, by which is meant that information is stored in such a
way that, in STM, forgetting leads to a failure to discriminate along an
acoustic dimension, in LTM a semantic dimension is involved. In other
words, short term storage is in terms of acoustic coding and long term
storage is in terms of semantic coding.
Baddeley (1966b) despite his conclusions has, in fact, demonstrated
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statistically significant semantic confusion effects in STM and
Woodworth (1938) has shown acoustic confusion in long term memory.
The aim of the present experiment is to provide supportive evidence for
Woodworth by showing acoustic confusion in long term memory, using
recognition of auditorily presented material, and to consider the
theoretical problems involved in holding that short term memory storage
employs an auditory coding system only.
Method
Subjects
Twenty-two undergraduate students at University College of Swansea.
5s were tested in groups of three to five.
Materials
These consisted of two lists of English words, a presentation list of
40 words and a test list of 30 words.
Design
If acoustic confusion occurs in long term memory, then words
acoustically similar to those heard some 20-25 min previously will be
confused to a larger extent with these earlier words, than will words
acoustically unrelated to earlier words.
To test this hypothesis, 5s were asked to listen, passively, to a presen¬
tation list of 40 single syllable words of high frequency (i.e., frequency
of 100 per million according to Thorndike and Lorge (1944)). The
words were read out at a rate of approximately 1 per sec. (Care was
taken to ensure that all words were both semantically and acoustically
unrelated.) Upon completion of the reading of the presentation list,
5s took part in a psychology tutorial. After 20-25 min the tutorial
was interrupted and a test list was administered, consisting of 30 single
syllable words of the same frequency of occurrence as words on the
presentation list. Ten of the words on the test list were identical to words
on the presentation list, 10 of the words were acoustically related, e.g.,
'cloud' on the presentation list, 'crowd' on the test list, and 10 of the
words were new. Care was taken to ensure that neither the acoustically
similar nor the new test list words were in the same semantic category
as other words on the lists. 5s were instructed to give a rating for each
word on the test list, immediately the word was read out, according to
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how confident they were that the word had or had not occurred in the
presentation list. The following scale was used:
Y3 Y2 Y1 N1 N2 N3
Certain that Fairly Balance of Balance of Fairly Certain that
word was certain that probability probability certain that word was
old. word was that word that word word new.
old. was old. was new. was new.
For scoring purposes the scale extended from 1 (N3) to 6 (Y3).
Administration of the test list took approximately 120 seconds.
Results and discussion
The ratings for words on the test list acoustically related to words on
the presentation list were significantly higher (p < 0.01 sign test) than
ratings for words on the test list unrelated to words on the presentation
list. (The results of 18 out of 22 Ss are in the direction of the hypothesis.)
The possibility that these results might be due to misperception of words
on either the test or presentation list was tested by having 10 new Ss
repeat back each item on the presentation list as it was read out at the
rate of 1 per sec. The mean misperception rate, 1 word out of 40, indeed
the maximum error rate of any 5s, 2 words, would not have altered the
significance of the results. Again it might be argued that the experimental
procedure allows the possibility of rehearsal both during presentation
and during the interval of 20-25 min before the test list was presented.
This, of course, is true, but as the function of rehearsal, according to
dichotomous theory, is to transfer material from STM to LTM, this
objection is not relevant.
Again, as acoustic confusion occurs within 4 sec of an item on the test
list being presented, it might be argued that these results show only the
effect of acoustic confusion in short term memory. However, it must be
pointed out that the confusion is with words that have been stored for
at least 20 min, a time criterion that is considered by Baddeley (1966a)
and by Adams (1967), at least, as indicating that material is in LTM.
These results then, together with those of Woodworth (1938)
indicate that acoustic confusion occurs in long term memory, and hence
make an operational distinction between STM and LTM on the basis of
differing interference effects untenable.
It is perhaps surprising that the hypothesis that STM employs an
exclusively auditory coding system and long term memory an exclusively
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semantic coding system, has ever been seriously entertained. If short
term memory uses acoustic coding only, and long term memory semantic
coding only, then transfer from short term memory to lbng term memory
is impossible without the intervention of a mechanism which translates
auditory coding into semantic coding. However such a mechanism
would have to be as large short and long term memory stores combined,
which makes the postulation of a short and long term memory seperate
from compiler unparsimonious.
Furthermore such a compiler entails LTM being able to use an
auditory coding system at any time, and makes the distinction between
STM and LTM, on the basis of acoustic coding being an STM charac¬
teristic only, untenable.
A further difficulty in holding the hypothesis that only STM is subject
to acoustic confusion concerns the empirical evidence provided by
Baddeley (1966a) that long term learning of acoustically confusing
material can take place, and at approximately the same rate as non-
confusing material. It is generally held by dichotomous theorists that
material in short term memory is either transferred to long term memory
or lost. As acoustic confusion is confined to STM, acoustically confused
material must, according to the dichotomous position be lost, a finding,
as pointed out above, not borne out by the empirical evidence.
Finally, it should be noted that evidence of acoustic confusion in STM
only has no overall generality, otherwise it is difficult to see how, for
instance, the congenitally deaf can learn. Indeed, Conrad and Rush
(1965) show that the congenitally deaf do not make errors of acoustic
confusion in STM where non-deaf subjects do.
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